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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Sukuk have become the cornerstone of Islamic financing and in spite of all the challenges, 
sukuk are now the premier investment outlet for Muslims as individuals, corporations and 
governments alike. Their popularity derives from cultural as well as economic needs; cultural 
in the sense of enabling Muslim investors to comply with their religious law or Shari'ah and 
economic because it enables them to invest in sukuk certificates which represent ownership 
rights in real assets with attractive returns. The growth of sukuk has exceeded even the most 
optimistic expectations. In fact, every issue of sukuk, so far, has been oversubscribed and 
demand by far exceeds supply. It is thus opportune and timely that a research paper which 
draws on past and current literature on the subject, and attempts to deal with some of the 
issues that sukuk will face in future, is presented here. 
The approach that has been used in the discussions throughout the chapters is to 
investigate the similarities and differences between conventional and Islamic debt 
instruments. This link is vital to our understanding of the characteristics of each in relation 
to whose needs they are meant to address. In the conventional setting, bonds are a means of 
providing funding for various institutions and yet serve as attractive investment outlets for 
those who want to park their excess liquidity profitably or diversify their risk portfolio. In 
the Islamic case, raising finance is certainly a top priority for sovereigns and corporates alike 
but religious compliance with the edicts of Islam, the ethical screening of the where the 
money is being invested and what assets constitute the collateral and how they are securitised 
are equally important. Additionally, the institutions set up to supervise and facilitate the flow 
of funds from the Islamic Financial Institution (IF I) to the holders of these securities whether 
in the form of returns, rentals or mark-up and repayment of original sum invested are 
essential to the workings of an Islamic financial system and should be structured in 
- - . . . - .. . 
accordance with Islamic laws and principles and therefore merit an examination and 
discussion of the issues they encounter 
1.1 AIM AND OBJECT][VES 
The aim of this work is to study sukuk as viable Islamic financing instruments within the 
framework of Shari'ah rules and background. 
The objectives of this study are as follow: 
1. To examine conventional bond structures, types, pricing and returns in order to 
understand their relevance to sukuk legal structures, adaptability and innovation; 
2. To consider the types of risks associated with fixed income securities and compare 
these to risks attached to their sukuk counterparts. 
3. To examine and evaluate the most common types of sukuk that are used today as 
financing instruments, their applications and uses, as well as their benefits and 
drawbacks, and consider their role globally. 
4. To compare and contrast sukuk with conventional bonds. 
5. To consider and explain the important role of securitisation in the development of 
primary and secondary capital markets for sukuk. 
6. To explore the criteria used by rating agencies to evaluate bonds and sukuk, and 
highlight their main concerns and the challenges which they pose to sukuk in the 
future. 
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7. To examine the role of Bahrain and Malaysia in developing the financial institutions 
and markets necessary to issue, market and trade in sukuk and also to provide 
liquidity. 
8. To survey and review the literature on benchmarking the returns on sukuk to other 
than interest-linked benchmarks, and examine the benefits and concerns regarding 
each of the proposed solutions. 
9. To outline a number of different sukuk issues, with case studies and brief comments 
on their structures and versatility. 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESIS 
The starting point was to look at conventional instruments of financing but more specifically 
to gain an insight into the structure and workings of these instruments so that we can 
understand how these instruments have been modified to fit into an Islamic context and 
satisfy an ever increasing demand for interest-free and asset-based instruments of finance. 
A number of writers on the subject have questioned the validity of Islamic instruments of 
finance and saw no point in using them as they were extremely similar to their conventional 
counterparts and remain reliant on inter-bank rates for the determination of their rates of 
return. The question that inevitably then poses itself is whether these Islamic instruments of 
finance are merely dressed-up conventional ones or genuine tools that comply with Shari'ah 
law and serves the needs of the Moslem financial communities and governments. 
There are many similarities between Islamic and conventional bonds. Therefore, as a 
hypothesis, we maintain that despite these similarities, there are distinctive features to 
1slarhic tools of finance or sukuk to justify-their-existence and use as a viable mean of 
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financing, but that these are still evolving structures, going through a process of continual 
enhancements and adaptability. 
1.3 THE RA T:U:ONALE AND MOTIV A 'fiON FOR THE RESEARCH 
The fact that almost every issue of sukuk is oversubscribed indicates more than a fleeting 
interest in their attractive rates of return. The wave of liberalisation, particularly in the 
economic field that has swept through much of the Middle East leading to the opening up of 
markets to competition and free trade has necessitated the mobilisation of internal wealth to 
carry out large scale economic development, each country according to its own niche; a kind 
of specialisation according to what each country does best and can offer to compensate for 
the loss of revenues that might occur as a result of competition and free trade. For example, 
Saudi Arabia is investing heavily in the energy and petrochemical sector, while Dubai has 
been investing in its tourist industry and real estate. Bahrain meanwhile has been setting 
itself up as a financial centre with similar developments taking place in Qatar and other Gulf 
countries. Furthermore, the post-9111 events have made the wealthy and governments alike, 
jittery about investing their money in the West. Additionally, there are thousands of 
Muslims who would prefer to invest their money locally rather than in the West. On a 
personal level, these developments can be seen as a trend for the future to which hopefully 
this research would contribute in some way. 
1.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This research follows a qualitative and descriptive approach. A descriptive review of the 
various types of conventional bonds is undertaken and wherever applicable their relevance to 
sukuk is explained. Then the sukuk scene is surveyed to ascertain their unique features, 
effectiveness as financing tools, risk profile and the legal requirements necessary fortheir 
compliance with Shari'ah law. Specifically, we first look at those with predetermined return 
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or mark-up, such as murabaha and sukuk al ijara and those with an uncertain outcome such 
as musharka and mudaraba. We also look at other short-term sukuk such as salam. In this 
respect, we draw on practical examples of sukuk issued and assess how they measure up to 
their theoretical models and legal precepts. A number of case studies and sukuk types have 
been included in the Appendix for this purpose. We also examine alternatives to interest 
rates as a reference point for determining the rate of return to investors. Finally, the stage is 
set for drawing conclusions and lessons based on the above-based work. Furthermore, the 
study will be substantiated by a closer look at the issues that are associated with sukuk such 
as securitisation and liquidity. The study also looks at the regulatory framework and capital 
market developments for sukuk, noting that these institutions are still in the early stages of 
development and evolution to provide the sort of momentum for the sukuk market as the 
well-developed conventional capital counterparts did for conventional bonds. 
It is a fact that no study is complete without a look at the institutional structure that 
supports the issue of sukuk and will support other Islamic financial instruments in future, 
namely, the infrastructure comprising the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic 
Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), the Liquidity Management Centre (LMC), the Islamic 
Rating Agency, the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), the General Council of Islamic 
Banks and Financial Institutions (GCIBFI) and the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB). 
1.5 RESEARCH METHOD 
A literature survey method has been adopted throughout this study without sacrificing the use 
of a critical approach in evaluating the data and information provided. The research study 
helps to highlight not only what the features of different sukuk mean to the borrowers and 
investors but also what is required in financial engineering for the future innovation in these 
financial instruments. For this purpose; we point out the availability ofeligible assets 
underlying Islamic financial instruments as a limiting factor in their growth and the absence 
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of a robust secondary market as a constraint on their tractability. The questions of 'true sale' 
and 'remoteness' of the special purpose vehicles are also discussed. These research questions 
and others will allow us to evaluate these Islamic structures and draw qualitative ideas for 
further investigation and research. 
The study has subsumed academic as well as other professional material. This work 
has also included numerous research papers and journals. The website for Islamic Financial 
Information Service (IFIS) provided much of the data and details pertaining to sukuk issues 
and a good deal of the academic and research papers. Use was also made of papers 
commissioned by the IMF, the World Bank and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), to 
name just a few. 
The lecture notes for the entire course provided by Professor R. Wilson have been 
extremely useful in providing the historical background to the subject and shedding light on 
the current thinking and practices of Islamic financial institutions and the extent to which 
various countries have adapted Islamic economic and financial concepts to their own schools 
of thought and practices. 
Journals such as The Banker and Islamic Finance News provided useful insight into 
current thinking on t~e topic of this research paper through useful articles and forums for 
opinion by distinguished academics and business individuals on various current and 
controversial topics in Islamic finance. 
Attendance at some of the Islamic finance conferences in Bahrain and the UK have 
proved very beneficial in terms of interaction with scholars, practitioners and lawyers closely 
connected with Islamic finance such as partners from the law firms of Taylor Wessing and 
Noriba, BMA, IDB, to name only a few. 
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CHAPTER2. CONVENTIONAL BONDS- LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter begins with an overview of conventional bonds and notes. These bonds have 
been classified according to the following categories: market, benchmark, interest 
determination, asset-based, redemption clauses and finally equity-based to appreciate the 
range and depth of debt instruments in conventional finance. 
The rise of debt financing in the economy is evidenced by the doubling of global 
fixed-income issuance from $2,379bn to $4,858bn between 2000 and 2004; but global equity 
issuance fell from $595bn to $543bn, according to Thomson Financial, the data provider as 
quoted in the Financial Times (2005). Price stability, cheap debt and balance sheet 
realignment have all contributed to this phenomenon. Islamic financial trends cannot be 
immune to the effects of such global shifts. Therefore an examination and review of the types 
and various structures of bonds in their conventional setting1 is not only important but 
relevant to an understanding of the Islamic financial counterparts. 
A bond is basically a debt instrument, in other words, a legal obligation of the 
borrower to pay the bondholder a predetermined rate of interest over the life of the security 
and to pay the principal at the maturity date. This is in sharp contrast to equities, which are 
ownership interests and do not represent legal obligations, and whose value appreciation or 
depreciation depends solely on the success or failure of the business enterprise which they 
are financing, and unlike coupon or interest payments, dividends are entirely at the discretion 
1 Batten, Dr. Jonathan. ; Rogers, Keith and Windas, Tom (1999). Reuters Financial Training Series: An 
Introduction to Bond Markets: Singapore: John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte Ltd 
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of the management of the company. Equities also rank far below bonds in terms of creditor 
claims when and if a company goes into liquidation or bankruptcy. 2 
Bonds offer better protection to investors in that some corporate and municipal bonds 
are structured around certain covenants which oblige the issuer to comply with certain 
conditions such as maintenance of liquidity, debt or revenue requirements. Finally, bond 
prices are determined by the market after taking into consideration the issuer's credit ratings, 
the coupon payment rate, the term to maturity and market yield on other fixed-income 
securities. Equity prices, on the other hand, are a reflection of the expected or perceived 
value of the company's current and potential future earnings. 
2 Strumeyer, Gary. (2005). Investing in Fixed Income Securities. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons 
pp. 1-4 
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What Instruments Are 
Used in Bond Markets? 
Debt Market Instruments 
Bond & Notes 
Classified By 
Market Interest Related Redemption 
•Domestic 
•Government 
•Corporate 
•International 
•Foreign 
•Eurobond 
•Dragon 
•Global 
•Fixed rate or Straight 
•Floating Rate Note 
(FRN) 
•Inverse floater 
•VRN 
•Zer~coupon 
•Callable 
•Puttable 
•Sinking fund 
•Perpetual 
Principal Payment Borrower 
•Index-linked 
•Dual currency 
•Eurobonds 
Source: "An introduction to Bond Markets". Reuters, p. 123. / 999 
•Asset-backed 
•Mortgage-backed 
•Brady Bonds 
•Medium Term Note 
(MTN) 
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Equity linked 
•Convertible bonds 
•Bonds with 
warrants 
2.2 MARKET FOR BONDS 
There are basically two markets for bonds; the domestic market and the international 
market. 
2.2.1 Domestic 
Domestic bonds are issued, underwritten, and traded under the currency and 
regulations of a country's bond market by a borrower located within that country; the 
borrower could be either a government/sovereign entity or a corporation. 
Domestic bonds are issued in the domestic currency by a domestic corporation using a 
syndicate of domestic banks. There are many different types of instrument available 
including bullets, floating-rate notes, convertibles, zero-coupon and so on. Domestic 
markets are usually overshadowed by trading in government bonds and Eurobonds 
denominated in domestic currency. These markets are well-regulated, governing 
trading and tax matters. Corporate bonds are usually listed and traded on the domestic 
Stock Exchange(s)- but there are also large OTC markets. 
Within the domestic markets the creditworthiness of the issuer is usually better 
understood than in the international markets. However, the domestic markets may not 
be suitable for large issues. Coupon payment usually uses the same frequency as that 
for the domestic government securities, the largest single corporate market worldwide 
being the U.S.A. 
Government securities are used to raise money for financing budget deficits and 
repaying interest on existing and maturing debt. Conventional bonds and notes are 
issued in domestic-currency and are issued using an auction system and involve 
primary dealers for the issue in the primary market. Government securities are the 
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highest quality instruments issued in a country and are therefore generally used as 
benchmarks for other bonds in that country. 
The markets in government securities are generally well-regulated and usually very 
liquid; the securities are often listed and traded on the domestic Stock Exchange(s), 
though the majority oftrading is OTC (over-the-counter). There are well-established 
conventions for issuing, pricing, coupon payments and repayments at maturity for 
government securities. The largest single government securities market worldwide is 
that for US Treasuries.3 
A corporate bond is essentially an IOU, a debt instrument that sets out the obligations 
of an issuer to satisfy the terms of the agreement. Failure to meet payment of principal 
and/or interest when due (and to meet other provisions of the debt) in accordance with 
the terms of the instrument constitutes legal default and court proceedings may ensue 
to enforce the contract. Bondholders, as creditors, have prior legal claim over ordinary 
and preferred shareholders. This does not mean, however, that those bondholders are 
immune from financialloss.4 
Corporations issue bonds to raise capital, particularly if they are private 
entities and wish to remain so. The type of borrowing that a corporation resorts to 
depends largely on the length of time needed for the funds raised and how much debt 
it wishes to issue in relation to its equity and capital structure. But corporations also 
use short-term borrowing by tapping their credit lines with banks and issuing 
commercial paper. 
3 Batten, J.; Rogers, K. and Windas, T. ( 1999). Re-uters Financial Training Series: An In{roduCiion to 
Bond Markets: Singapore: John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte Ltd., pp. 32-53 
4 Batten, Rogers & Windas, "Introduction" op. cit., and "Corporate Bonds" by Fabozzi, F; Wilson R. 
and Todd R., in Handbook of Fixed Income Securities. 
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The Role of the Corporate Trustee 
Corporate trustees are brought in to represent the interests of the bondholders for their 
expertise in the legal jargon of the bond indenture or contract. The trustee must keep 
track of all bonds issued or sold and ensure that the principal amount authorised by 
the indenture is not exceeded and that the issuer complies with the provisions of the 
indenture. 
However, we need to remember that the trustee is paid by the debt issuer and 
they can only act in accordance with the provisions of the indenture and the duties 
prescribed therein. Again, the trustee is under no obligation to exercise his powers or 
rights under the indenture at the request of bondholders, unless he has been offered 
reasonable indemnity or security. 5 
The terms of bond issues always reflect a compromise between the interests of 
the bond issuer and those of the investors. The issuer always wants to pay the lowest 
possible rate of interest and to have the minimum legal covenants, whereas the 
investor wants to have the highest possible interest rate, the best security and the 
maximum legal protection in legal covenants.6 The important part played by the 
trustee as an intermediary between the manufacturer and the use of equipment is 
illustrated below under ETCs. 
Asset-backed sukuk, on the other hand, are always issued through a special 
purpose entity or vehicle (SPE/SPV). These SPV s only act on behalf of the sukuk 
holders, are bankruptcy-remote and are usually wound up upon the completion of the 
transaction. They are frequently set up in an offshore location to minimise tax 
5 Strumeyer, "Investing" op. cit., pp. 308 & 315 
6 Fabozzi, "Handbook", pp. 254-255 
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liabilities and to protect investors from third party litigation should it occur. Trusts are 
a favourable legal form under which such entities are established. 
Corporate Debt Maturity 
Maturity is when the principal is repaid with any premium and any due accrued 
interest and indenture conditions are satisfied. However, because many issues can be 
retired prior to maturity, our perceptions of what constitutes long-term and short-term 
bonds may no longer be valid. 
Nowadays, there is greater preference for shorter maturities because of the 
reduced price risk. However, the shorter maturity structure imposes greater pressure 
on corporate financial managers because it becomes much harder to match long-life 
assets with long-term liabilities and requires frequent re-financings to replace a 
heavier volume of maturing debt. This leads to increased pressure on companies and 
the corporate bond market: more of a company's cash flow would have to be directed 
toward paying off these obligations as they become due. 
2.2.2 International 
These comprise foreign, euro and dragon bonds and what follows is a brief discussion 
of each. 
Foreign Bonds are issued in a domestic market by a foreign issuer and are 
denominated in the domestic currency. These are often bonds with names that are 
associated with the country of issue, for example: Bulldogs (UK), Yankees (US), 
Samurais (Japan) etc. This type of bond is subject to stricter market requirements, 
conoitions arid conventions than those- of the -domestic markets. Coupons ate usually 
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paid at the same frequency as that used in the domestic market. Foreign bonds may be 
issued as bearer bonds. 7 
Eurobonds are not subject to the same regulations as those that apply to 
domestic bonds and they are sold internationally. They are issued as bearer bonds-
no register of bond holders is kept by the issuer. Coupons are paid annually and no 
deductions are made for withholding tax. Most Eurobonds are issued as unsecured 
debt by organisations with high credit ratings and may be listed and traded on a Stock 
Exchange, though most trading is OTC. 
Prices for Eurobonds are quoted as a percentage of the face value to the 
nearest 0.01% and are denominated in any Eurocurrency; but the largest markets are 
for bonds issued in U.S. Dollars, Deutschemarks and Yen. Eurobond issues allow 
organisations greater flexibility to issue debt and allow rapid access to the markets. 
Eurobonds accrue interest using a 30/360 basis. 8 
Dragon bonds can be issued in any currency but usually this is in US$ and in 
at least two of the "Dragon Exchanges": Hong Kong, Singapore or Taiwan. 
These various issuers have developed their own different ways of raising debt 
and, accordingly, this was reflected in the attributes of the bonds that they issued-
differences in yield, denomination, safety of principal, maturity, tax status and with 
other important features such as the call privilege, put features and sinking fund. 
Market prices of issues denominated in US dollars (US-pay) are affected principally 
by the direction of U.S. interest rates and issues denominated in other currencies will 
be affected by movement in interest rates in the country of that currency. 
7 Batten, Rogers & Windas, "Introduction" op. cit., p. 55 and "International Bond Markets and 
Instmments" by C 8 Steward, in Fabozzi's Handbook on Fixed Income Securities, pp., 361-378 
8 Ibid. 
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Islamic bonds have also become global, with cross-border investors 
participating in various sukuk issues. We increasingly see investors from the Middle 
East and South East Asia investing in each other's issuances, with smaller 
participation from European and American investors.9 
2.3 INTEREST RELATED BONDS 
In terms of interest payments, a bond can be classified into fixed rate, floating-rate 
note (FRN) and zero-coupon bonds. 10 
A fixed-rate security pays a fixed rate of interest to investors throughout the 
life of a bond and at maturity it pays back the final interest and principal amount of 
the loan. Interest or the coupon is usually paid annually or semi-annually. A straight 
bond may also be called plain vanilla or vanilla bond. Sukuk essentially replicate the 
above debt structure with predetermined rental payments that can be varied over the 
life of the lease as with sukuk al-ijara. However, sukuk are backed by underlying 
assets, whereas the above conventional instruments depend on the ongoing financial 
reliability of the entity which issues them. 11 
Floating-rate securities, called floaters, are where the coupon rate is reset at 
specified dates (typically, more than once a year) with reference to some financial 
yardstick such as LIBOR plus some basis points. These pay quarterly. Other variable 
securities are not adjusted more than once a year. 
It is important to point out that although floaters are adjusted by way of 
reference to an interest rate or related index, the adjustment can also be made by 
reference to another index or rate. Thus, such an adjustment can be indexed to a 
9 See Appendix on sukuk illustnitioris. 
10 Batten, Rogers & Windas, "Introduction" op. cit, op. cit., pp. 75-87. 
11 Fabozzi, "Handbook", pp. 3-20 & Strumeyer's "Investing in Fixed Income Securities", pp. 4-10. 1 O-
J 1&34-36. 
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movement in foreign exchange rates or the price of a commodity, such as oil. This 
becomes relevant when we come to discuss benchmarks or indexes for sukuk in later 
chapters. 
Resets have a cap (a ceiling on the maximum upward movement) and a floor 
(a restriction on the minimum downward movement). Movement in response to a 
reference rate can also move in the opposite direction. Such floaters are called inverse 
floaters. 12 Similarly, there is no reason why sukuk al-ijara cannot have resets in the 
light of a revaluation of future cash flows should economic conditions change. 
High-yield or junk bonds are another type of bonds that are resorted to in 
recapitalisations and leveraged buy-outs. Because of the high cost of servicing these 
bonds, firms involved in these issues have devised new structures in the form of 
deferred-coupons that allow the issuer a grace period from making interest payments 
anywhere from 3 to 7 years. 
There are a couple of relevant points to note about bonds in general. Firstly, 
they are popular because interest payments are tax deductible. Secondly, the larger the 
size of the coupon rate the less the volatility (caused by faster recovery of present 
values of future cash flows), in contrast to maturity where the longer this is the more 
volatile the bond price. In other words, maturity and size of coupon rate have opposite 
effects on the bond price. 13 
Corporations in the Islamic world that find it difficult to borrow, either 
because of size or because of inadequate asset base, may resort to offering a similar 
12 Fabozzi, "Handbook" Op. Cit., pp. 325-334 & Strumeyer's "Investing". op. cit., pp. 306 and 318-320 
13 Pollack Irving M, et al ( 1983). Homewood, Illinois: Dow Jones-Irwin, Handbook of Fixed Income 
Securities. p. 381 
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type of high-yield sukuk which can compensate for higher issuer's credit and project 
risks. 
2.3.1 Zero-coupon 
Zero-coupon bonds pay no interest and instead are issued at a deep discount to the par 
value and are redeemed at par or full face value. Effectively, investors are receiving 
all their interest upfront when they buy the bond. 
Issuers of these bonds must have the highest credit rating to justify investors' 
confidence in that they will get paid at maturity. Issuers are likely to be governments 
and sovereigns who would want to defer payment of cash to the investors. However, 
large organisations and supranationals such as the World Bank also issue zero-coupon 
bonds. One such issue in 1985 had a bond price of $41.250, a yield of 7 .332, maturity 
15/02/2010 and duration of 11.862. 
Typical investors will be pension funds which prefer to receive a lump sum at 
maturity rather than a series of coupon payments. They use zero-coupon bonds to 
match investment with future liabilities (payouts). The return is, therefore, capital gain 
and is exempt from taxation in certain jurisdictions. Zero-coupon bonds can be 
created from a process called stripping, whereby the coupons of a bond are detached 
from the principal and from each other and treated as a separate bond matching the 
cash flows of the original. For example a 10-year bond with annual coupons can be 
stripped to 11 zero-coupon bonds - one for the par value and 10 for the coupon 
payments. 14 Malaysia has, in fact, used stripping to create debt instruments based on 
14 Fabozzi, "Handbook", pp. 6, 59-60 & 258,; Strumeyer's "Investing", pp. 18-19, 214-216 and 
Pollack's "Handbook", op. cit. 
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securitising the mark-up on murabaha contracts and the lease payments in ijara 
contracts. 15 
Islamic debt instruments such as murabaha and istisna'a may be traded at a 
discount in Malaysia, but this is not so in Gulf countries, where in some quarters such 
discount is viewed as hidden interest. However, sukuk al-ijara may be traded at a 
discount, or premium for that matter, when the holder wishes immediate liquidity 
rather than full face value at maturity. 16 
2.3.2 Other Types of Bonds 
There are a number of other bonds that are worth mentioning here; for example, 
equipment trust certificates will be discussed in more detail because of their relevance 
and similarity to Islamic leasing. 
a. Equipment Trust Certificates (ETCs) 
The desire of borrowers to pay the lowest possible rate of interest on their obligations 
generally leads them to offer their best security and to grant lenders the strongest 
claims on it. 
Usually backed by large industrial equipment, these bonds have been used to 
develop a legal arrangement for giving investors a legal claim on it that is different 
from, and generally better than, a mortgage lien. 17 
The legal arrangement vests legal title to such equipment to a trustee. 18 For 
example, Boeing may build a fleet of airplanes on an order from, say, BA. The latter 
may not have the money to purchase the airplanes outright, and so it chooses to lease 
15 Obaidullah M, (n.d.). Islamic Financial Services pp.l60-162 
16 The Banker. (2005). A closer look at Suktlk. 
17 Fabozzi, op. cit., pp., 262-263 
18 Barakat, M.and Toan, R. W., "Islamic Leasing Funds", in Islamic Asset Management, London, UK: 
Euromoney Books, pp. 154-158 
18 
them from Boeing. HSBC might act as trustee in this case, having full legal control of 
the assets. The trustee purchases these assets from Boeing and leases them to BA for 
their use. At the same time, HSBC /trustee sells BA equipment trust certificates to 
investors to finance the purchase of the airplanes from Boeing. The trustee collects 
lease rental money periodically from BA and uses it to pay interest and principal on 
the certificates. These interest payments are known as dividends and the amounts of 
lease rental payments are worked out carefully so that they are eno~gh to pay ETCs. 
The airline never owns the airplanes that it operates; yet it uses them as collateral to 
support their bonds. Since Boeing has been paid in full, the trustee retains control of 
the airplanes for the term of the lease. At the end of some time, the ETCs are paid off, 
the trustee sells the equipment to the lessee/ Airlines for some nominal price, HSBC 
get paid a fee for its services and the lease is terminated. 
ETCs are usually structured in serial form: a certain amount becomes payable 
at specified dates until the final instalment. For example, a $60 million ETC might 
mature at $4 million on each 151h of June from 2000 to 2014. Each of the 15 
maturities may be priced separately to reflect the shape of the yield curve, investor 
preference for specific maturities, and supply-and-demand considerations. The 
advantage of a serial issue from the investor's point of view is that the repayment 
schedule matches the decline in the value of the equipment used as collateral. Hence, 
principal repayment risk is reduced. From the issuer's perspective, serial maturities 
allow for repayment of the debt over the life of the issue, making less likely a crisis at 
maturity resulting from a large repayment becoming due at the same time. 19 
This description emphasises the legal nature of the arrangement for securing 
the certificates. In practic,e these certificates are regarded as obligations of the airlines 
19 Fabozzi, "Handbook", op. cit., pp., 262-263 
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company that leased the equipment and are shown as liabilities in its balance sheet. In 
fact, the name of the airline appears in the title of the certificates and the trustee is just 
an intermediary who performs the function of holding title, acting as lessor, and 
collecting the money to pay the certificates. 20 
This structure has been replicated in Shari'ah-compliant sukuk al-ijara leases 
and emphasises the use that could be made of conventional financing arrangements to 
finance Shari'ah-compliant transactions, so long as it is asset-backed.21 
b. Speculative-grade bonds 
These are rated below investment grade by the rating ~gencies, i.e., BB+ and lower by 
S&P, and Ba 1 and still less by Moody's. They are also known as "junk" and "high 
yield" securities. But one should take note of the fact that high yield can also apply to 
investment grade securities where high-coupon bonds may be subject to early 
redemption call and where there is a sharp decline in bond prices. But there is no such 
thing as a "free lunch" in the investment markets and above-average yield should 
indicate extra risks to investors. 
However, not all junk bonds are useless, as some might assume, and not all of 
them are on the verge of bankruptcy or default - they are certainly not so when 
profits are to be made from buying them and when they are on the fringe of the 
investment grade sector. 
c. Mortgage Bonds 
These are secured against property but carry a lower interest rate than when 
unsecured. 
20
-Strumeyer,-"Investing", pp. 314-315 
21 Adam & Thomas, "Islamic Bonds", op.cit., pp. 54 -55 and Toan, R.and Barakat, M., Structuring 
Islamic Finance Transaction in Islamic Asset Management. London, UK: Euromoney Books, pp. !54 -
!58 
20 
Islamic mortgages have become popular, particularly in the UK, and are 
structured along 'declining musharaka' lines, where the share of the lending partner 
decreases with each monthly payment, though there is added rental payment. 
d. Collateral Trust Bonds 
This applies to holding companies which do not own property but securities of other 
companies (their subsidiaries) and pledge these as security for bondholders. It is 
important to consider the issue of voting shares here if they are included in the 
collateral. The holding company must be allowed to vote these to maintain control of 
subsidiaries, but in default the trustees have the upper hand according to the 
indentures of these bonds. 
e. Debenture Bonds 
These are unsecured bonds, but because they are sometimes issued by companies with 
high credit rating and strong financial position; they can be offered at low rates of 
interest and do not need to offer security as well. However, they do get issued, but 
companies not so strong financially will be compensated for by higher interest rates. 
There are many provisions in the indenture of debentures that are designed to 
protect investors by restricting debenture issuance in future to the amount of the initial 
issue in order to prevent weakening the position of debenture holders by running up 
additional unsecured debt. Debentures may still be secured against the assets of the 
company if the value of such assets exceeds the amount of the secured debt or if the 
company has no secured debt. 22 
22 Fabozzi's "Handbook" op. cit., pp. 263-264 
21 
f. Subordinated and Convertible Debentures 
These debts rank after secured debt, debenture bonds and, often, after other creditors 
in its claims on assets and earnings. Because of this, they are offered at a higher rate 
of interest and with an option to convert into equity of the issuer at their discretion. 
g. Guaranteed Bonds 
Sometimes a corporation may guarantee the bonds of another corporation. But that 
does not mean that it would become immune to default, as this would depend on the 
financial strength of the guarantor as well as the issuer. A guaranteed bond may have 
more than one guarantor whereby each guarantor would be liable for the entire 
amount guaranteed by the others. 23 
2.3.3 Corporate Bond Ratings 
The larger body of investors and some institutional investors rely on rating agencies 
for valuation of their securities, on account of their independent and unbiased nature. 
The famous ones are: S&P, Moody's and Fitch. Rating definitions are released by 
these firms, but they are not 'buy', 'hold' or 'sell' indicators. They do not purport to 
indicate market direction, and though they serve only as a guide to the issuer's ability 
and willingness to meet the terms of the issue, they are taken into account in any 
investment decision. 24 
2.3.4 Types of Issuers 
There are six such categories of issuers: public utilities, transportations, industrials, 
banks, finance companies and international issuers. 
23 Fabozzi's "Handbook", op. cit., p. 265 
24 Ibid. (pp. 271-275) and Strumeyer's "Investing", op. cit., pp.276-279. 
22 
Several issuers fall under the 'less-than-investment-grade' high yield category, for 
example, original issuers who include venture capitalists or growth and emerging 
market companies. A bond rated at the bottom rung of the investment grade category 
(Baa and BBB), or at the top of the speculative grade category (Ba and BB), is known 
as a "businessman's risk." 
Others such as 'fallen angels' are investment grade companies which have 
fallen on hard times and investors may be interested in the liquidated value of the 
debt. 
And there are companies which, through restructuring and leveraged buy-outs, 
deliberately increase their debt-burden in order to maximise shareholder value. 
Shareholders get paid a special extraordinary dividend with the funds coming from 
borrowing, leading to a drop of ratings on existing debt. Newly-issued debt gets junk 
status because ofthe company's weakened financial position.25 
2.4 REDEMPTION 
2.4.1 Call and Refunding Provisions 
Some bonds carry the provision of retiring or paying off the debt before maturity. 
Corporations resort to this provision when market rates start to fall and they are stuck 
with high coupon rate bonds. They hope to reissue the debt with lower coupon (called 
refunding). They also resort to this provision when they have surplus cash to pay off 
25 Fabozzi, Wilson and Todd, "Corporate Bonds", in "Handbook". op. cit., pp.276-277 
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the debt, which they can then use to retire the debt, or when they wish to restructure 
their balance sheets. 26 
Investors, of course, lose on two counts. Firstly, they lose out on the high 
coupon bond when market rates starts to fall; secondly, they lose the price 
appreciation that occurs when interest rates decline. Other investments with similar 
rates to the ones which they had lost would be difficult to find in a declining rate 
situation. 
This call provision signifies that investors expect higher yield on those bonds 
than on those without the call provision. These bonds also carry a call premium which 
is the difference between the principal and the call price. This premium gets larger the 
earlier that the debt, represented by the bond issue, is retired. 
To circumvent such disadvantages, investors may be offered 'call protection', 
which represents a number of years during which bonds cannot be called/redeemed, 
particularly in the early years of the bond issue. 
2.4.2 Sinking-Fund Provision 
This provision requires the issuer (often an industrial concern) or obligor to retire a 
certain amount of debt each year. This is done either by the company itself purchasing 
the amount of bonds in the open market if the price is below par, or through a trustee 
who will organise and monitor the retirement through the lottery system. 
The investor benefits from this provision in that he or she receives an orderly 
retirement of the debt and, at the same time, the payment is not too large for the 
obligor. In addition, the investor does not have to wait for the whole term to maturity 
to receive payment, hence improved liquidity. And finally, there will be better 
26 Fabozzi's "Handbook", op. cit., p.266 
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stability in bond prices if the issuer retires some of the issue when the price is below 
par. In light of the above, the yield on bonds under the sinking-fund arrangement 
tends to be less than on those without them.27 
However, there are drawbacks, such as when the investor is forced to sell -
particularly when holding a high coupon bond and interest rates start to fall. The 
investor will have to find another attractive investment, which is not always 
possible.28 
2.4.3 Put Provisions 
This option grants the investor the right to redeem the bond at par value, particularly 
when interest rates rise in the market, forcing bond prices down. Because of their 
advantages to investors, issuers quote them at lower rates than straight or callable 
bonds. Put options in corporate bonds have been used to deter unfriendly takeovers. 
There are hard and soft puts. Hard puts can only be redeemed in cash, whereas soft 
ones can be redeemed by a combination of cash, stock and debt. 
2.5 PRINCIP AlL P A YMEN'f BONDS 
These are classified in accordance with the various ways of making the final principal 
payment on bullet bonds. Currently, they are mainly either index-linked or dual-
currency bonds. 29 
27 Strumeyer's "Investing", pp. 325-326 and Pollack's "Handbook", op. cit., pp. 24-25 
28 Ibid 
29 Batten, Rogers & Windas, "Introduction" op. cit., op. cit., pp. 94-101 
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2.5.1 Index-linked 
An index-linked bond has a fixed principal payment which is tied to a financial index 
such as the UK Retail Price index (RPI), the US S&P 500 Stock Index, the US 
consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers (CPI-U), foreign exchange rates or 
money market rates, or indeed other indexes. 30 
These inflation-indexed bonds offer investors some protection against inflation 
to their future purchasing power, and they allow issuers to use a lower rate for their 
bonds. Because of their lower rates, issuers are able to reduce their cost of borrowing 
by removing the premium for the risk of inflation embedded in conventional bonds, 
and thus issue these at lower coupon rates. 31 
Index-linked gilts are an important part of the UK government issuance of 
bonds. In fact, it is the largest issuer of these index-linked bonds.32 There are three 
types of index-linked bonds which have been, or are currently being, used by 
governments: 
1. Capital-indexed: most government-issued bonds are of this type, where 
interest payments are based on inflation-adjusted principal amount. At 
maturity both the final coupon payment and the principal are adjusted for 
inflation. 
2. Interest-indexed: here the fixed coupon rate is paid and the principal is 
adjusted at every coupon date. Hence, there will be no adjustment for 
inflation at maturity. 
30 Strumeyer, op. cit., 333-334 
11 - - - - - - - . -- -- - . --
- "An Investor's Guide to Corporate Bonds" (n.d.) Available at: <URL: http:// 
www.bondmarkets.com> and "Advanced Bond Analysis" (n.d.). Available at: <URL:http:// 
www. investopedia.com> 
32 Batten, Rogers & Windas, "Introduction", op cit. pp., 94-95 
26 
3. Zero-coupon indexed: as there are no coupon payments, only the principal 
is adjusted for inflation at maturity.33 
There is no reason why the mark-up or rental from Islamic bonds cannot be adjusted 
for the effects of inflation - and one presumes that they are so adjusted. 
2.5.2 Duan Currency Bonds 
These bonds pay coupon payments in one currency and principal at maturity in 
another. For example, an Australian dollar denominated bond repays principal at 
maturity in Australian dollars and pays coupons in Japanese yen. 
Dual currency bonds can be issued with the currency exchange rate for converting the 
coupon payments into another currency is specified when the bond is issued, or where 
the currency exchange rate is the spot rate at the date of payment, or the issuers and 
investors have a choice for payment of the coupon payments at some point during the 
life of the bond (an option currency bond). 
These dual currency bonds are often used to enter into interest rate swaps or 
currency swaps to lock in favourable exchange rates at the same time as receiving 
favourable interest rates in the coupon currency.34 
2.6 BORROWERS 
Borrowers can be classified by the type of collateral involved.35 There are four main 
types: Asset-backed security (ABS), Mortgage-backed, Brady Bond and Medium 
Term Note (MTN). 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. pp. 96-100. Also available at: <URL: http:// www.investopedia.com/articles> and at: <URL: 
http://www .bondmarkets.com> 
35 Batten, Rogers & Windas, "Introduction", op cit., pp. 101-111 
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2.6.1 Asset-Backed Security (ABS) 
This topic is discussed at some length because of its particular relevance to the 
structure of sukuk. ABSs took off in 1985 after the success experienced with the 
issuance of mortgage-backed securities (MBSs). According to Bloomberg, as of July 
31, 2004, almost $3.5 trillion of ABS have been issued and there are currently 1.5 
trillion of ABS outstanding, which clearly shows that the ABS is a significant part of 
the investment market. Asset-backed securities are securities collateralised by assets 
which are not mortgage loans and whose payments are underpinned by the cash flows 
generated by the underlying assets. 36 
A financial institution or corporation (the Sponsor/ Seller/ Servicer), transfers 
or sells a pool of financial assets (collateral) such as car loans or credit card 
receivables -substitute tangible assets for Islamic ABSs- to a bankruptcy remote, 
special purpose entity (SPE). It is critical that the SPE cannot be exposed to any 
bankruptcy proceeding to ensure the assets are adequately insulated from bankruptcy 
or insolvency of the sponsor. To do this efficiently, the assets can be sold to an issuing 
trust. Legal opinion varies as to whether a genuine or 'true' sale has taken place in this 
instance and whether the SPE could be consolidated with the sponsor's entity in the 
event that the sponsor becomes bankrupt or insolvent?7 Assuming, however, that 
there is a genuine sale and no consolidation is possible, then ABS investors would be 
insulated from the credit risk of the sponsor. The SPE can then sell the assets to a trust 
which issues the asset-backed security and sells it to the investor, usually through an 
underwriter. Such a bond structure allows the investor to tum his focus away from any 
36 Strumeyer, op. cit., pp., 406--436; Aric/es & Tutorials on the subject are available at: <URL:http:/1 
www.bondmarkets.com> and <URL: http://www.investopedia.com> 
37 Fabozzi, "Handbook", pp., 19 & 20 
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credit risk and towards the structure of such a transaction, the quality of the 
underlying assets and the servicing of the securities. 38 
Such a structure also enables a potentially low-rated entity (BBB) to tap 
potential investors seeking A- to AAA-rated securities and to lower its borrowing 
costs. 
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The most basic concept of the securitisation process is the isolation of ABS 
investors and the collateral that supports their investment from the credit risk of the 
originator of those assets. To issue an ABS with a higher credit rating than the 
company that owned the asset requires the legal separation of the assets from the 
company that owned them.40 
The securitisation process is also a method of raising cash through the sale of 
those assets. Typically, an SPE or trust is set up with the sole aim of buying the assets 
38 Batten, Rogers & Windas, "Introduction", op cit. , pp., 101-102 
39 Castro, D. and Strwneyer, G. "Asset-backed securities", in Strumeyer's, "Investing in Fixed Income 
Securities", op. cit., pp.408-409. 
40 Ibid. 
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and paying for them by issuing ABSs and selling them to investors. The assets in the 
trust should then generate sufficient cash flow to pay the interest or rental payments to 
bondholders/sukuk-holders and to pay whatever fee is agreed with the sponsor or 
seller. 
To achieve high credit rating, the provision of credit enhancements and 
structural protection (e.g., excess spread and corporate guarantee) are the essential 
requirements for protecting investors from credit risk, legal risk, market and interest 
risks, currency risks and anything else that might interfere with the investors receiving 
timely payments of interest and return of principal as promised. 
The borrowers/obligors are usually either consumers who have taken out loans 
(cars, credit cards, home equity loans, student loans, etc.) or businesses (car dealers, 
farmers, doctors) that wish to finance equipment or inventory purchases. In ABS 
financing, the primary collateral used are either loans or leases, which may be secured 
or unsecured and may already exist or be generated in future. 41 
The issuing entity for most ABSs is a trust or an SPE whose sole purpose 
would be to buy the collateral and issue ABS. ABSs can take the form of notes, 
certificates and equity, to name only a few. 
Interest payments for ABS were mostly fixed-rate in the beginning; later on, 
floating rate securities became more common. Most of these floating-rate ABSs are 
indexed to l-month, 3-month or 6-month LIBOR; but other indexes such as Cost of 
Fund Index, T -bills, commercial paper indexes, and the prime rate are also used. ABS 
usually pays monthly or quarterly. 
Often, in ABS loans, particularly in car loans, a below-market rate (called 
incentive financing) is included in the package. 'Yield supplement accounts' are often 
41 Strumeyer's "Investing", op. cit., pp. 410-421 
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used to set aside a pool of cash large enough to make up for the difference between 
the below-market rates on the car loans and the minimum coupon required by the 
rating agencies. Interest rate swap is used to bridge the gap in any mismatch between 
the interest paid to the investor and the interest generated by the underlying assets. 
Similarly, currency swaps are used if the ABS bonds and the underlying assets or 
collateral are denominated in different currencies.42 
Generally, high-rated ABS tends to be very liquid with tight bid-offer spreads 
of one basis point or so. However, prepayment risk reduces that liquidity and as a 
result the bid-offer spread is one or two basis points greater. Market liquidity of ABS 
has also improved as a result of greater transparency through monthly reports on the 
performance of the ABS and its collateral pool. 
Finally, large deals and individual tranches within them allow for a greater 
number of investors to participate, which makes the security more liquid. The same is 
true of dealer participation. 43 
Asset-based sukuk operate in much the same way, except that the underlying 
assets are tangible and not debt paper, as in receivables and loans. The cash flow is 
subject to a lease of the assets to the obligor, who promises to pay a predetermined 
rental to the sukuk-holders for the duration of the lease (this is discussed in some 
detail in the chapter 'Sukuk'). 
2.6.2 Brady Bonds 
The term Brady bond refers to a series of sovereign bonds issued by several 
developing countries in exchange for their rescheduled bank loans. Almost all 
42 Strumeyer, "Investing", pp. 410-421 
43 Ibid. Also see "Advanced Tutorials" available at: <URL: http://www.investopedia.com>. 
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countries with defaulted commercial bank debt have exchanged that debt for Brady 
bonds or restructured loans. 
The Brady market is unique in two respects. Firstly, yields are relatively high: 
in December 1999, for example, they ranged from 8% to 30%. Secondly, some issues 
are extremely large and liquid, especially compared to typical sovereign Eurobonds.44 
The Mexican Brady agreement included three basic options: Pars, Discounts, 
and New Money bonds. Pars and Discounts have their principal and interest secured 
by US Treasury zero coupon bonds which were originally funded by the IMF, World 
Bank loans and the country own reserves. In addition, the interest portion of the Pars 
and Discounts is partially collateralised by securities rated at least AA in amounts 
sufficient to cover a specified number of months (usually 12) of interest on the 
outstanding principle at a notional rate. The interest guarantee is characterised as a 
rolling interest guarantee (RIG) because the guarantee rolls forward to the next 
payment period if not utilised. 
Later issues of the Brady bonds allowed the sovereign to buy US Treasury 
strips from the open market. Such market transactions required the maturity of the 
strips to be no longer than that of the Brady bond issued with the restriction that the 
face value be equal to the principal amount of the Pars and Discounts. 
Bondholders do not have recourse to the principal collateral until maturity, at 
which time proceeds will be available to pay the full principal amount due. As for the 
interest collateral, if the issuer does not make an interest payment within the grace 
period stipulated in the Brady Exchange Agreement, the Collateral agent at the 
request of the Fiscal agent, acting on the instructions of the bondholders of at least 
44 Strumeyer's "Investing", op. cit., pp. 336-338 and Brauer, J.S. & Chen, D. of Merrill Lynch in 
Fabozzi's, "Handbook", op. cit., pp. 379-397 
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25% of the aggregate principal, will release interest collateral sufficient to cover the 
interest payable on the bonds. 
Brady bonds have been widely used to reschedule external debts of developing 
countries on terms which these countries can meet without suffering undue hardship. 
An interesting aspect of these bonds has been their linkage, in one form or another, to 
GDP rate of growth. Islamic countries with substantial external debt such as Iraq, 
Lebanon, Sudan and others, would do well to emulate countries that have rescheduled 
their debt and linked it to GDP growth.45 
External debts can also be structured on the basis of asset collateralisation in 
developing countries, which would include most of the Islamic world. Such 
securitisation might satisfy both creditors and the borrowing countries alike and 
provide for better quality of rating by the international agencies. 46 
2.6.3 Medium-term notes 
Despite the title, their maturities vary from 9 months to 30 years. They are uncallable 
senior debt securities issued with fixed coupon rates that have an investment-grade 
rating. These notes came about as a result of the auto-industry's needs for 2- to 5-year 
notes to cover the credit period to clients. SEC's rule 415 allowed corporations to 
register their issues of bonds with the SEC and then sell the securities at any time 
during the next two years. This reduced the cost of issuance for corporations and 
provided them with greater flexibility in choosing when to enter the market to raise 
additional funds. 
45 
"Brady Bond Primer" (n.d.). Available at: <URL: http://www.emgmkts.com/research>. Also see 
chapter 5 on Indexation. 
46 Fabozzi's "Handbook", op. cit., pp.379-397. 
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2. 7 EQUITY -LINKED (CONVERTIBLE SECURITIES) 
These are bonds that are convertible into equity. The conversion ratio specifies the 
amount of the ordinary shares to which the bondholder is entitled. 
Conversion is called by the issuer but some convertible bonds provide the 
investor with call protection whereby the issuer is not permitted to call for conversion 
until the price of the bond has increased by a certain amount above the issue price. 
Warrants are issued with bonds and these permit the bondholder to buy a 
specified number of ordinary shares at a specified price. The latter is normally set 
about 15% above the market price of the share. Warrants are also known for their 
longevity in comparison with, for instance, exchange-traded call options that are 
similar; they are actively traded on the stock exchange when they are detachable.47 
2.8 RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH INVESTING IN FIXED-
INCOME SECURITIES 
The return to the investor from holding a fixed-income security, from issue date to 
redemption, comprises the following elements: 
1. The income stream from the interest payments and any additional returns from 
reinvestment of the above cash flows, and: 
2. The market value of the security when it is redeemed or sold. 
Several factors outside the control of the investor can affect the above income streams 
and thus risk is a measure of the impact of these market forces on these expected 
returns. 
47 Dialynas, C. Dum, S. & Ritchie, R. Jr. "Convertible Securities and Their Investment Characteristics" 
in Fabozzi's "Handbook", op. cit., pp. II 03-1124 
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The risks48 that an investor in fixed-income securities is exposed to might 
encompass one or more of the following: market/interest rate risk, reinvestment, 
timing, credit or default risk, maturity risk, inflation risk, liquidity risk, exchange or 
currency risk, volatility risk, political or legal risk, event risk and sector risk 
Here is brief explanation of the more important ones: 
Market risk: This risk arises from the fact that when interest rates rise (fall), the price 
of a bond falls (rise). Such a risk does not exist for an investor who holds his security 
to maturity because by then it would be payable at its par value. But even then, a risk-
averse investor might not want a long-term investment which might have greater 
risks.49 The risk arises when an investor wishes to dispose of the security before 
maturity and when interest rates are rising. 
Reinvestment risk: is the risk associated with falling interest rates which reduce the 
return on reinvestment of the interest payments. Market risk and reinvestment risk 
work in opposite directions. 
Timing Or Call Risk: because of the issuer's ability to retire some or all the bonds 
before maturity, cash flows of the returns from such an investment tend to be 
uncertain. 50 
Credit or Default Risk: this risk is associated with rating assigned by such entities as 
Moody's Investor services, S & P and Fitch. However, a change in the market's 
perception of the credit risk can have a more immediate impact on the price of a 
security. 
Yield-Curve Or Maturity Risk: it is usually assumed that yields on different maturities 
move in equal amounts, and so if the yields on different maturities deviate from this 
48 Strumeyer. op. cit., pp., 81-90 and Fabozzi, op. cit., pp. 21-29, 332-334 
49 Fabozzi, op. cit., pp. 894-895 and 988-989 
50 Strumeyer, op. cit., pp. 84 and 235 
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pattern, there is this risk. With the issuance of short-term sukuk, BMA has made it 
possible to have an Islamic yield curve which exhibits different maturities and the 
more it does so, the more indicative it will be of any sizeable or standard deviation-
and hence risk - from such curve. 
Inflation or Purchasing Power Risk: inflation reduces the purchasing power of the 
fixed interest returns of a security, except for inflation-indexed securities which are 
already adjusted for inflation. Again, all countries face the risk of inflation, but 
especially those countries whose monetary systems are pegged to outside ones and 
whose main commodity prices are volatile. 
Liquidity Risk: This risk is measured by the spread between the bid price (at which a 
dealer is willing to buy) and the offer price (at which a dealer is willing to sell the 
security), and the bigger the spread, the greater the liquidity risk. 
It is often the case that institutional investors are required to re-evaluate their 
portfolios in line with current market prices so as to reflect the net asset value for 
reporting purposes. To do this they ask for bids from different dealers and decide, by 
some process, what price to adopt in their valuation. Liquidity risk arises when .there 
is a wide variation between dealers' prices. 
Event Risk: Management's main responsibility is to increase or optimise shareholders' 
wealth, whereas a bond issuer's is to meet the terms of the indenture including 
payment of interest and principal. However, events such as M & A, restructuring, 
recapitalisation, leveraged buyouts, and share repurchases, often cause substantial 
changes in the capital structure of a company by increasing leverage and reducing 
equity. This reduces bondholders' protection by lowering debt quality ratings, 
sometimes to speculative-grade categories. This in tum increases risk and lowers bond 
valuations - shareholders are enriched at the expense of bondholders. 
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As a result of these "events", some companies introduced "poison puts" in 
their indentures. The poison put provides that the bondholder may require the 
company to repurchase the debt under certain circumstances which may arise out of 
specified designated events such as a change in control. In many cases this poison put 
may not be activated until deterioration to below investment-grade takes place. Some 
issues provide for a higher interest rate instead of a put as a designated event. 
Event risk has caused some companies to include other clauses in their 
indenture such as the maintenance of net worth in their ret1rement features. It is not 
much different from offer to redeem. It may protect bondholders from the redemption 
of the high-coupon debt at lower interest rates. However, if a company's net worth 
declines to a level low enough to activate such a call, it would then probably be 
prudent to have one's bonds redeemed. 
To protect the value of debt investments against the added risk caused by 
corporate management activity, investors should analyse the issuer's fundamentals to 
determine if the company may be a candidate for restructuring, and pay attention to 
news and investment reports. The indenture should also be reviewed to see if there are 
any protective features. However, astute legal minds always find loopholes in these to 
circumvent them. Debt rating services issue commentary on indenture features of 
corporate bonds, noting the degree of protection against event risks. Diversification 
across industry lines can reduce the risk in large portfolios, but price declines do not 
only affect the issue at risk but may take the innocent down with them, so to speak. 
When RJR Nabisco Inc. became subject to a leveraged buy-out in 1988, the yield 
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spreads of the company to a benchmark Treasury widened from 100 to 350 points, 
which in tum caused yield spreads to widen for other corporations as well. 51 
2.9 CONCLUSION 
The variety and diversity of conventional bonds indicate the gap that exists in Islamic 
financial instruments. Continuous innovation and development in these instruments to 
satisfy the variety of markets, borrowers, and investors, should narrow that gap and 
drive the two markets towards convergence, but always keeping in perspective the 
unique non-interest and asset-linked features of Islamic finance. 
51 Strumeyer, op. cit. pp. 90-91 
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CHAPTER 3. BOND PRICING AND RETURN 
MEASURES 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to survey the issues relating to the calculation of 
conventional bond prices and yield returns 52 that may be indicative of some of the 
computational issues which Islamic financing and sukuk, in particular, will encounter. 
Algebraic formulae are used to determine the present or market value from a stream 
of cash flow returns. This of course applies to any stream of cash flows, whether 
generated by assets or paper debt. It then discusses the sensitivity of prices to changes 
in yield and explains the much-used concepts of duration and convexity, proceeding 
to show the interrelationship between coupon rates, prices and yields. This is followed 
by a description of the various models of measuring the risk profile of bonds and the 
relevance of concepts such as options and embedded calls to the risk profile of 
Shari'ah-compliant sukuk. 
3.2 BOND PRICING 
A bond's price is the present value of future cash flows. The rate of interest or 
discount rate used to compute the PV is a function of the yield on comparable 
securities in the market. We shall assume here that the bond in question is a 
noncallable: that the coupon payments are uninterrupted over the period to maturity 
52 Fabozzi's, "Handbook"; pp., 51-83, Strumeyer, "Investing"; pp .52-69; Batten, Rogers & Windas, 
"Introduction", op cit., 225-247 and Homer and Leibowitz, Inside the Yield Book (2004); also, <URL: 
http://www. investopaedia.com>. 
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and are known, and that the payments are made semi-annually. We shall also assume 
that the next coupon payment is made exactly 6 months from now. 
3.3 DETERMINING THE CASH FLOW 
The cash flow of an option-free bond consists of the semi-annual payments plus the 
par value at maturity. For example, a 20-year bond with a 9% (4.5% every 6 months) 
coupon, a par value on maturity of £1000 will have the following cash flow: 
Semi-annual coupon interest= £1000 x 0.045 = £45 
Maturity value = 
Therefore there are 40 semi-annual cash flows of £45 and a £1000 cash flow at end of 
40 interest payments from now. 
But it is not always easy to determine the cash flows of a bond when a bond issue or a 
part thereof is called by the issuer or when the investor puts his bond - in other 
words, sells it back to the issuer- as in both cases the timing and hence the cash 
flows become uncertain. 
3.4 DETERMINING THE REQUIRED YIELD 
This is the interest rate or discount rate which an investor wants from investing in a 
bond and is called the required yield. It is determined by ascertaining the prices of 
comparable bonds, that is, option-free bonds of the same credit quality, rating and 
maturity. 
The required yield is quoted annually but when the cash flows or interest 
payments are made semi-annually, we use 112 of the annual rate to discount the cash 
flows. This periodic interest rate which is half the annual rate will produce an effective 
annual yield that is greater than the annual rate. 
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Many are of the opinion that each cash flow should be treated as a zero-coupon bond 
and the cash flow of a bond will consist of a series of zero coupon bonds. However, 
for present purposes one yield will be used to discount the cash flow for each period. 53 
3.5 DETERMINING THE PRICE 
Once we know the cash flows of a bond (as in a fixed-rate option-free bond) and the 
required yield, it then becomes a matter of adding the present values (PV s) of the cash 
flows or semi-annual payments and the PV of the par value at maturity. We use the 
following formula to give us the price of a bond: 
c ( 1 - { 11[1 + it } )li + M/[ 1 + it 
Where 
C = Semi-annual payment(£) 
n =Number of periods 
i = Periodic interest rate or required yield divided by two because it is semi-annual 
M = Maturity value 
Example: What is the price of a 9% coupon bond with 20 years to maturity and a par 
value of£ 1000 if the required yield is 12%? 
C = (9% X 1000)12 
n = 20 years representing 40 periods 
= £45(1 - { 11 [ 1 + 0.06]40 } 10.06 + £1 OOOI[ 1 + o.o6t0 
= £45(1 - 0.097222)10.06 + £10001[1 + o.o6t0 
= £677.0835 + 10001(1.06)40 
= £677.0835 + 1000 I (10.28572) 
The price of the bond is then equal to the sum of the two present values: 
53 Fabozzi, op. cit., pp., 52-53 and Homer and Leibowitz, "Inside the Yield Curve", pp.21-29 
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= £677.08 (PV of coupon payments) + £97.22 (PV of par or maturity value) = 
£774.30 is the current price of the bond. 54 
3.5.1 Relationship between Required Yield and Price at any given 
time 
The price of a bond moves in the opposite direction to that of the required yields. That 
is because as the yield increases the PV of cash flows decreases (and the opposite is 
true)-· hence the price decreases (note the price of a bond is the PV of cash flows). 
This can be demonstrated if we drop the yield in the above example to 7% where the 
PVofourbond becomes £1213.55, as compared to £774.30 when the required yield 
was 12%. 
54 Strumeyer, op.cit., pp.52-80, Fabozzi, op. cit., pp., 53-55 
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3.5.2 The Relationship between Coupon Rate, Required Yield and 
Price 
Table55 : Showing the Price/yield relationship for a 20-year, 9% Coupon Bond 
Required Yield Price of Bond (US$) 
5% 1502.05 
6% 1346.72 
7% 1213.55 
8% 1098.96 
9% 1000.00 
10% 914.21 
11% 839.54 
12% 774.30 
The following results are observed: 
When the coupon rate equals the required yield, the price equals the par value and 
when the price equals the par value, the coupon rate equals the required yield. 
When the coupon rate is less than the required yield, the price is less than the par 
value and when the price is less than the par value, the coupon rate is less than the 
required yield. 
55 Fabozzi, op. cit., Exhibit 4-1, p. 56 
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When the coupon rate is greater than the required yield, the price is greater than the 
par value and when the price is greater than the par value, the coupon rate is greater 
than the required yield. 56 
3.6 TIME-PATH OF A BOND 
For a bond selling at par value, the coupon rate is equal to the required yield and as 
the bond moves towards maturity, it will continue to sell at par. However, for bonds 
selling at a discount, the bond price will increase towards maturity, whereas for bonds 
selling at a premium, the price will decrease - assuming in both cases that the 
required yield does not change. 57 
3.7 REASONS FOR CHANGE IN THE Pru:CE OF A BOND 
The price of a bond will change as a result of a change in the level of interest rates in 
the economy; discount and premium bond prices change as they move towards 
maturity; for non-Treasury bonds, a change in the required yield due to changes in the 
spread to treasuries; a change in the perceived credit quality of the issuer; and finally, 
price of a bond may change due to changes in the factors affecting the embedded 
options for bonds with these feature. 58 
3.8 PRICING A ZERO-COUPON BOND 
This is simply the PV of its expected cash flows and in this case the only cash flow is 
the maturity value (in the previous example, the PV of maturity value was £1000 
divided by (1.06)40 = £97.22). 
56 Fabozzi, op. cit., pp. 5!-83; Also see "Advanced Bond Analysis". Available at: 
<URL:http:/ /www .investopedia.com. 
/ 57 Ibid 
58 Fabozzi, op. cit., pp.58-59 
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3.9 YIELD AND TOTAL RETURN CALCULATIONS 
The price of a bond is equal to the PV of expected cash flow. For bonds with 
embedded options, the cash flow is difficult to estimate. The required yield used to 
discount the cash flow is determined by the yield offered on comparable securities. 
The two most popular yield measures cited in the bond market are the yield-to-
maturity and the yield-to-call. Both yield measures consider the coupon interest and 
any capital gain (or loss) at the maturity date, or call date in the case of the yield-to-
call. The coupon interest and capital gain (or losses) are only two of the three 
components of potential dollar return from owning a bond until it matures or until it is 
called. 
The other component is the reinvestment of coupon income, commonly 
referred to as the interest-on-interest component. This component can be as large as 
80% of a bond's total return. The yield-to-maturity assumes that the coupon payments 
can be reinvested at the calculated yield-to-maturity. The yield-to-call assumes that 
the coupon payments can be reinvested at the calculated yield-to-call. 59 
A better measure of the potential return from holding a bond over a 
predetermined investment horizon is the total return (TR) measure. This measure 
considers all three sources of potential return: income from coupon receipts, 
reinvestment income (interest on interest) and capital gain/loss. TR takes into account 
the fact that investors do not always hold the bond to maturity and the fact that the 
investor must make an assumption about the available reinvestment rates level each 
time he or she receives a coupon payment. In this way, the TR measure reflects more 
accurately the return potential of a bond than the YTM. 
59 Ibid., pp. 64-83 and Strumeyer, op. cit., pp. 74-78 
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The formula for calculating TR is the same as that for calculating the future value of 
an annuity but by replacing the latter with C, the coupon payment. So we have: 
Coupon Interest + Reinvestment Interest = C [( 1 + i) N- 1] li (equation A). 
To obtain the reinvestment interest, we merely deduct the total coupon payment from 
the result of the above formula. 
The TR is the interest rate that will make the initial investment in the bond 
grow to the total future dollar amount. First we compute the coupon interest plus the 
interest on interest as in the above formula. But when we do this the reinvestment rate 
is set equal to the annual interest which the investor assumes can be earned. This 
gives the investor the leeway to choose the reinvestment rate that he or she thinks is 
available in the market, instead of the bond's YTM. Then, we compute the total dollar 
return from buying and holding such a bond as follows. 60 : 
Total Return= [Total Future Amount/Price of bond] IIN- 1 (equation B) 
(To account for semi-annual payments, we merely multiply N by 2) 
Let us say that an investor is looking to invest in a six-year bond with a 5% coupon 
paying semi-annually. The bond is selling at 970 and will be held to maturity. 
Assuming the investor can reinvest the coupons at 4%, the total return of this bond 
comprises the coupon interest of $25 every 6 months, reinvestment interest of 2% ( 112 
x 4%) and the par value at maturity of$1,000. Applying our equation A, we have: 
$25 [(1 +0.02)6x2 - 1] / 0.02 = $335.25. 
The total future amount is: $335.25 + 1,000 = $1,335.25 
The semi-annual return = [Total Future Amount/Price of Bond] liN - 1 
= [$1 ,335 .25/970] 1112 - 1 
= (1.0269) - 1 = 0.0269 
6° Fabozzi, op. cit., pp.75-83 and Strumeyer, op. cit., 74-80 
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Therefore as a percentage = 2.69%. Multiplying this result by 2 gives us an annual 
value of 5.38%. 
The above formula only accounts for total return if we hold the bond to 
maturity. However, this problem can be easily overcome for the purposes of 
determining the potential yield to the end of a predetermined holding period or 
'horizon period'. For this we first need to compute the coupon interest, the 
reinvestment interest and the expected price of the bond to the end of the holding 
period. 
The coupon rate is given. The reinvestment rate will be a market rate selected 
by the investor. It is the determination of the expected price of a bond that poses the 
greatest difficulty. A sensible way of doing this is by looking at the historical yield 
spread between a bond and a US treasury bond with similar maturity and 
extrapolating that trend into the future, taking into account the economy as a whole 
and the relative values between bonds. But, of course, this is not an exact science and 
estimates could, and often do, go wrong. Let us assume, nonetheless, that instead of 
holding a bond to maturity, we decide to hold it for only three years, with the market 
value at that time, based on the yield spread to Treasury for three years, being 97 (or 
$970, based on $1,000 par) and assuming interest at 2% every 6 months. So what 
would be the total return then? 
Coupon Interest + Reinvestment Interest 
= C [(1 + r)N- 1]/r 
= $25[(1.02)6 - 1]/0.02 = 157.75 
The estimated future value is therefore $1,127.75 ($157.75 + 970) 
The semi-annual Total Return= [Total Future Amount/Price of Bond] liN- 1 
= [$1,127.75 I 970] 116 - 1 
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= 0.0254 or 2.54% 
therefore 2.54x2 = 5.08% (annual value for total return). 
The doubling of the semi-annual rate to give us the annual interest is not 
exactly accurate and to obtain the effective annual interest rate, the future value of 
investing a bond at, say, 3% every 6 months is not 1.5 %, but 1.015 times 1.015, 
which gives us 1.0302, in other words, an annua1ised rate of interest of 3.0225 %, and 
not our 3%. This is called the bond-effective yield and allows investors and traders to 
compare, for example, the yield on discount securities to yields on corporate and 
Treasury bonds.61 
3.10 MEASURING INTEREST RATE RISK 
The value of a bond changes in the opposite direction of the change in interest rates. 
The value of a long bond position will decline if interest rates rise, resulting in a loss. 
For a short bond position, a loss will be realised if interest rates fall. However, an 
investor wants to know more than simply when a position might realise a loss. To 
control interest rate risk, an investor must be able to quantify what will result. 
The key to measuring an interest rate risk is the accuracy of the estimate of the 
value of a position after an adverse rate change. A valuation model is used to 
determine the value of the position after an adverse rate move. Consequently, if a 
reliable valuation model is not used, there is no way to properly measure interest rate 
risk exposure. 
There are two approaches to measuring interest rate risk: the full valuation 
approach and the duration/convexity approach.62 
61 Strumeyer, op. cit., pp. 74-80, and Homer and Leibowitz, op. cit. 
62 Buetow, G. Jr, Robertson, R. R. in Fabozzi's, "Handbook", pp. 85-129 
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3.10.1 The full valuation approach 
The most obvious way to measure interest rate risk exposure of a bond position of a 
portfolio is to re-value it when interest rates change. 
The characteristics of a bond that affect its price volatility are: ( 1) maturity, (2) 
coupon rate, and (3) presence of embedded options. 
A fundamental characteristic of option-free bonds is that the price of a bond 
changes in the opposite direction from a change in the bond's required yield. However 
this relationship is not a linear one. The shape of the price/yield relationship for any 
option-free bond is referred to as convex. This p/y relationship is for an instantaneous 
change in the required yield. 
Property 1: Although the price changes in the opposite direction from the change in 
the required yield, the % price change is not the same for all bonds. 
Property 2: For small changes in the required yield, the% change in the price of a 
bond is roughly the same, whether the required yield increases or decreases. 
Property 3: For large changes in the required yield, the% price change is not the same 
for an increase in required yield as it is for a decrease in required yield. 
Property 4: For a given large change in basis points in the required yield, the% price 
increase is greater than the% price decrease. 
Although these properties are expressed in % price change, they also hold for dollar 
price changes. 
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The implication of Property 4 is that if an investor is long a bond, the price 
appreciation that will be realised if the required yield decreases is greater than the 
capital loss that will be realised if the required yield increases by the same number of 
basis points. For an investor who is short a bond, the reverse is true: the potential 
capital loss is greater than the potential capital gain if the yield changes by a given 
b fb . . 63 num er o asts pomts. 
3.10.2 Bond Features that Affect Interest Rate Risk 
The degree of sensitivity of the price of a bond to changes in market interest rates (sc. 
a bond's interest rate risk) depends on various features of the issue, such as maturity, 
coupon rate, and embedded options. 
3.10.3 The Impact of Maturity 
Assuming all other factors constant, the longer the bond's maturity, the greater the 
bond's price sensitivity to changes in interest rates. For example, for a 6% 20-year 
bond selling to yield 6%, a rise in the yield required by the investors to 6.5% will 
cause the bond's price to decline from 100 to 94.4479, a 5.55% price decline. 
For a 6% 5-year bond selling to yield 6%, the price is 100. A rise in the yield required 
by investors from 6% to 6.5% would decrease the price to 97.8944. The decline in the 
bond's price is only 2.11 %. 
3.10.4 The Impact of Coupon Rate 
A property of a bond, all other factors constant, is that: the lower the coupon rate, the 
greater the bond's pr_ic;e sensitivity to changes in interest rates. For example, ~onsider 
63 Ibid. 
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a 9% 20-year bond selling to yield 6%. The price of this bond would be 134.6722. If 
the yield required by investors were to increase by 50 basis points to 6.5%, the price 
ofthis bond would fall by 5.13 to 127.7605. This decline is less than the 5.5% decline 
for 6% 20-year bond selling to yield 6%. 
One implication is that zero-coupon bonds have greater sensitivity to interest 
rate changes than same-maturity bonds bearing a coupon rate and trading at the same 
yield. 
3.10.5 Interest Rate Risk for Floating-Rate Securities 
The change in the price of the fixed-rate coupon bond when market interest rates 
change is due to the fact that the bond's coupon rate differs from the prevailing market 
interest rate. For a floating-rate security, the coupon rate is reset periodically based on 
the prevailing value for the reference rate plus the quoted margin. The quoted margin 
is set for the life of the security. The price of a floating-rate security will fluctuate 
depending on three factors. 
First: the longer the time to the next coupon reset date, the greater the potential 
for price fluctuation. For example, consider a floating-rate security whose coupon 
resets every 6 months and the coupon formula is the 6-month Treasury rate plus 20 
basis points. Suppose on the coupon reset date the 6-month Treasury rate is 5.8%. If 
on the day after the coupon is reset, the 6-month Treasury rate rises to 6.1 %, this 
means that this security is offering a 6-month coupon rate that is lower than the 
prevailing 6-month rate for the remaining 6 months. The price of the security must 
decline to reflect this. Suppose instead that the coupon resets every month at the one-
month Treasury rate and that this rate rises immediately after the coupon rate is reset. 
In this case, while the investor would be realising a sub-market one-month coupon 
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rate, it is only for one month. The price decline will be less than for a security that 
resets every 6 months. 
The second reason why a floating-rate security's price will fluctuate is that the 
required margin which the investors demand in the market changes. For example, 
consider, once again, a security whose coupon formula is the 6-month Treasury rate 
plus 20 basis points. If market conditions change, such that the investors want a 
margin of 30 basis points rather than the 20 basis points, this security would be 
offering a coupon rate which is 10 basis points below the market rate. As a result, the 
security price will decline. 
Thirdly, a floating rate security will typically have a cap. Once the coupon rate 
specified by the coupon formula rises above the cap rate, the coupon rate will be set at 
the cap rate and the security will then offer a below market coupon rate and its price 
will decline. In fact, once the cap is reached, the security's price will react in much the 
same way to changes in market interest rates as that of a fixed-rate security. This risk 
of a floating-rate security is called 'cap risk' .64 
This analysis should be applicable to floating-rate sukuk in terms of resets and 
adjusting the spread to the LIBOR to which they are linked. 
3.10.6 'fhe Impact of the Yield Level 
In reality, the higher the level of interest rates that a bond trades, the lower the price 
sensitivity. Compare a 6% 20-year bond initially selling at a yield of 6%, and a 6% 
20-year bond initially selling at a yield of 10%. The former is initially at a price of 
100 and the latter, 65.68. Now if the yield on both bonds increases by 100 basis 
points, the first bond trades down by 10.68 points (10.68%) to a price of89.32. After 
64 Fabozzi, op. cit. pp., 98-99 and Stumeyer, op. cit., pp., 32-34 
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the assumed increase in yield, the second bond will trade at a price of 59.88, for a 
price decline of only 5.80 points (or 8.83%). Thus, we see that the bond that trades at 
a lower yield is more volatile in both % price change and absolute price change, so 
long as the other bond characteristics are the same. An implication is that, for a given 
change in interest rates, price sensitivity is lower when the level of interest rates in the 
market is high, and price sensitivity is higher when the level of interest rates is low. 65 
3.10.7 Duration 
Frederick Macaulay was working on the historical returns of bonds for the National 
Bureau of Economic Research in 1930 when he began to think ofbonds' interest 
payments and redemption at maturity as a portfolio of zero-coupon bonds which tends 
to liquidate or pay itself off from the very first coupon payment.66 
To illustrate this, assume a 10-year bond with a £1000 par value and annual 
interest payments of 10% per year. In Macaulay's thinking, this represented a £ 100 
cash flow each year with another £1000 payable at maturity or at year 10. Therefore, 
the total cash flow over the life of this bond will be £2000. But after the first coupon 
payment is made, the remaining cash flow will be £1900 and after the second, it will 
be £1800 and so on until the final payment of£ 1000 at maturity or the par value 
becomes payable. 
By discounting these cash flows, using the yield as the discount rate and then 
dividing the total by the bond's price or its present value, we should arrive at 'duration' 
as a measure of the average time to the receipt of the bond's cash flows, weighted by 
the present value of the each specific cash flow. 
65 Fabozzi, op. cit. pp., 99-111; Archer, Simon and Rifaat Abdul Karim (eds.), "Islamic Finance: 
Innovation and Growth", p. 181 :London, UK., (Euromoney Books and AAOIFI publication). 
66 Strumeyer, op. cit.pp., 39-43. 
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Again, to illustrate this, let us assume that our 1 0-year, 10 per cent coupon 
bond, above, pays interest annually and let us also assume that this bond is priced to 
yield 8% to maturity. Discounting the bond's cash flows by the bond's yield, the 
present values will be: 
100/(1+.08) + 100/(1+.08)2 + 100/(1+.08)3 + ... + 100/(1+.08)10 + 1000/(1+.08) 10 
= £(92.59+85. 73+ 79.38+ 73.50+68.06+63.02+58.35+54.03+50.03+46.32+463.19) 
= £1134.20 
Next, we multiply the above present values by their time to maturity and then 
total them up: 
92.59(1) + 85.73(2) + 79.38(3) + ... 46.32(10) + 463.19(10) = 7900.63 
Finally, we divide this total by the bond's price to get Macaulay's duration, 
which is always measured in years: 
7900.63/1134.20 = 6. 97 years (a duration of 6. 97 years means that the approximate 
change in price for this bond is 6. 97% for a 100 basis point change in rates). 67 
Having calculated Macaulay's duration in this way, it becomes much easier to 
calculate the duration for a zero-coupon bond, as there is only one cash flow, namely, 
the principal amount to be paid at maturity. 
Traders do not find the concept of the average time to the receipt of the present 
value of the bond's cash flows particularly useful ifthe bond is not going to be held 
for very long. An application in which duration is useful is in a bond portfolio 
management strategy called 'immunisation', where a portfolio is managed in such a 
way so as to produce a sufficient amount of cash at some predetermined future date to 
meet a given liability, such as a pension or a provision for education fees. However, 
interest rates are not going to remain the same in the long run and the risk will be if 
67 Ibid. 
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interest rates were to rise causing a decrease in the value of the portfolio and an 
increase in the return on reinvestment of the coupon receipts and vice versa. These 
two opposite trends - the market value of the portfolio and the return on 
reinvestment - must be managed in such a way as to produce the amount of cash to 
meet the liability, despite changes in interest rates. 
While Macaulay's pioneered concept of duration came first, it is the modified 
version that is more widely-used in the industry. Modified duration measures the 
percentage change in price for a small change in the market yield- typically 100 
basis points. Now, we know that the price of a bond and its market yield move in 
opposite directions; but the critical question is by how much the price changes in 
response to a given change in yield? Or, how sensitive is a particular security to 
changes in market yields? 
Using our previous example, we obtain the modified duration by dividing 
Macaulay's duration by 1 plus the yield in decimals, in other words, (1 + y). 
Equation (A) 
6.97 years/ (1 +.08) = 6.45 (A) 
This only gives us the percentage change in price for 100 basis points change 
in yield. So if the latter were to rise by a 100 basis points from 8% to 9%, we would 
say that the price decreased by 6.45% to £1061.04 (from £1134.20). If the yield 
moved downwards by 100 basis points, then the price would increase by 6.45% to 
£1207.36. 
Interest rates, however, rarely move in incremental 100 basis points and 
therefore an additional formula is needed to augment our modified duration formula, 
above, and to account for a bond's expected percentage change in price for any basis 
point change in yield. Such a formula would be: 
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Change in price/Original price = Percentage Change in Price 
%Change in Price= -(Modified Duration) x (Change in Yield) x 100 (B) 
Substituting the values in equation (A) above into equation (B): 
% Change in Price = -6.45 x 0.0 I x 100 = -6.45% 
The formula works for any change basis point change in yield. Let us assume that 
yields are expected to move by 18 basis points. The resulting percentage change in 
price will be equal to: -6.45 x 0.0018 x 100 =- 1.161%.68 
It is important to remember that duration is an expectation of the bond's price 
sensitivity for any given combination of price and yield. Thus, any change in these 
parameters will cause duration to be different - indeed, it can change from day to 
day. That does not, however, make it less useful in measuring interest rate risk. All 
that it means is that we have to understand its limitations before we use it as a 
measure of risk. 
The next question is: why do different bonds have different durations on any 
given day? There are three attributes of a bond that could affect duration: the coupon 
rate, length of time to maturity and the 'pull to par'. The latter simply means that at 
maturity, the price of a bond will always be par, no matter what the original purchase 
price was. Hence, no trader will buy a bond at a premium shortly before maturity, 
simply because he or she would not be able to resell it at a higher price, or sell a bond 
at a discount when he or she knows that the bond will, shortly thereafter, be redeemed 
at face value or par at maturity. 
Market forces that prompt the 'pull to par' provide us with the following 
principles governing duration: ( 1) long-maturity bonds will experience greater price 
volatility than short-maturity bonds, because the longer the bond's maturity, the higher 
68 Strumeyer, op. cit. pp., 43-51 
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is its duration and, therefore, the greater its price sensitivity to changes in yield; (2) 
low-coupon bonds will also experience greater price movements than high-coupon 
bonds and thus it follows that lower coupon rates will mean higher durations and at 
the end of the spectrum, where no interest is paid, we find zero-coupon bonds' prices 
extremely sensitive to changes in yield.69 With zero-coupon bonds, we find that one 
single payment at maturity constitutes their entire cash flows and that single payment 
will fully dictate the bond's price sensitivity to yield changes. 
Thus zero-coupons have the highest durations and will be subject to significant 
change in price as a result of small changes in yield. We can now introduce the 
concept of convexity and incorporate it within our duration model.70 
We know that the price and yield of a bond have an inverse relationship and if 
we plot that relationship on a chart, it will give us a convex curve, as illustrated 
below: 
8 
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This chart71 shows that for small changes in yield from Yl to Y2, the relative increase 
/decrease in price, Pl to P2, is similar to that for the yield change. However, larger 
69 Strumeyer, op. cit., pp. 44-45 
7
° Fabozzi eta!., op. cit., pp.99-J 20; Strumeyer, op. cit., pp.43-5 1 
71 Batten, Rogers & Windas, "Introduction", op cit pp., 266-267 
57 
changes in yield from Y3 to Y 4 cause disproportionate change in price, namely, from 
P3 to P4. Convexity explains why modified duration may not give us an exact change 
in price for 1% change in yield, whereas convexity does. The formula used to 
calculate the percentage change in price can be stated as follows: 
- [Modified duration x ~ YTM] + [Convexity x (~ YTM)2 /2] 
An example: assume a bond with a modified duration of 2.27% and assume further 
that the yield rises by 50 basis points and the convexity is calculated as 0.05%. Using 
our equation, above, this gives us (in%): 
=- [2.27 X 0.5] + [0.05 X (0.5)2 /2] 
=- 1.13500 + 0.00625 = -1.12875% 
The convexity adjustment to modified duration tends to be very small; but for 
a large holding in tens of millions, the loss is significant. It can be seen from the 
price/yield curves above that. As yields rise, the loss on the bond becomes less and 
less and as yields fall, the gains become more and more. 72 
As yield changes the price of a bond must change. The rate of change is the 
bond's duration. Moreover, as the yield changes, the bond's duration is also changing. 
This rate is represented by the bond's convexity but such change is asymmetrical, in 
other words, the increase in duration and price as the yield decreases is greater than 
the decrease in duration and price when the yield starts increasing. From this, we can 
deduce a third principle of duration: lower yielding bonds will experience greater 
price movements than higher-yielding bonds. In other words, the bond's price is less 
sensitive to changes in yield as the yield increases. This is a characteristic of positive 
convexity- the rate of price appreciation is greater than the rate of price 
depreciation. This almost tells us that while, theoretically at least, a bond's price has 
72 Advanced Bond Analysis Tutorial (n.d.). Available at: <URL:http://www.investopedia.com> 
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an unlimited upside potential, it has a limited downside, below which it cannot go, no 
matter how high yields may rise. This, of course, is mania for investors who would 
pay a premium for this positive convexity. In economic jargon, at ever-higher yields, 
a bond's price is almost inelastic and a bond's duration is almost a horizontal line: zero 
slope and zero duration, meaning that there is zero price sensitivity. 73 
3.11 CONCLUSION 
A great deal of conventional bond concepts that were dealt with above were relevant, 
and some might be applicable, to Islamic financial instruments. However, as M H 
Kamali states, there is a great need for further research and analysis, particularly in 
the areas of risk and derivatives where Islamic finance could be treading a fine line 
between the permissable (halaf) and the impermissible (haram). 74 Moreover, a more 
robust market for trading in Islamic financial instruments is needed before 
measurements of sensitivity for prices and yields can be developed for these 
instruments. 
73 Fabozzi, op. cit, . pp. 112-120; Strumeyer, op. cit., pp 46-51. Also see "Advanced Bond Analysis 
Turorial". Available at: <URL: http://www.investopedia.com>. 
74 Thomas, Cox and Kraty, op. cit., "Structuring Islamic Finance Transactions". p.l90 
59 
CHAPTER 4. SUKUK 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
After decades of existence in the shadow of their conventional counterparts, Islamic 
banks and financial institutions have finally come up with viable Shari'ah-compliant 
financial instruments which governments and private sector alike can use to finance 
their capital requirements and at the same time satisfy their Muslim citizens, offering 
them investment instruments that conform to their religious edicts which forbid riba. 
In 2000 there were only three sukuk issues of$336 million issued, buy in 2004 there 
were 64 issues accounting for almost $7 billion, and in 2005 the figure is expected to 
exceed $10 billion with 54 issues already either oversubscribed or announced.75 
This chapter is based on the study of sukuk in the context of Shari'ah 
compliance. For this purpose, we review a number of sukuk issues across a fairly 
representative sample of sukuk structures to identify their main features in terms of the 
legal structure that is required to justify their Shari'ah compliance and the financial 
applications to which they have been put. Our approach included, wherever possible, 
a comparative analysis of the material on Islamic sukuk with conventional bonds and 
within sukuk between the different types, structures and returns. The drawbacks and 
weaknesses of the various sukuk structures were, wherever relevant, examined and 
noted. Sukuk as a tool for liquidity management and issues dealing with securitisation 
are also examined and discussed and their importance to the further development of 
sukuk markets emphasised. 
75 R Wilson, (2005, December) "Innovation in the structuring of Islamic sukuk securities''. Islamic 
Finance Information Service, London, December 2005. 
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Rating by International agencies such as S&P and Fitch, to name but a few, is 
of paramount importance to borrower and lender alike, particularly, with regard to the 
marketability and risk profile of an Islamic investor. The criteria and concerns of the 
two above-mentioned rating agencies are discussed at length, as these raise serious 
and important issues with respect to compliance with Shari'ah law, choice of law and 
enforcement of judgements in various jurisdictions, tax matters and securitisation. 
4.2 TYPES OF SUKUK 
The Accounting and Auditing Organisation of Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI) has issued standards for 14 eligible asset classes in its investment sukuk 
standard. 76 Those most popular are sukuk al-ijara where an existing tangible leased 
asset may be securitised through a sukuk issuance. The investor owns a share of the 
asset and the related income. A second class of assets is where a person seeking to 
acquire a tangible asset and lease it, may raise funding for such asset through sukuk 
ijara mawsufa bithima issuance. In this case the investor owns a divisible share in the 
asset and income or gain related to it. Thirdly, the owner of a leasehold estate may 
securitise the beneficial ownership of the underlying assets through sukuk manfa'at al-
ijara. Fourthly, another type of sukuk called sukuk manfa'at al ijara mawsufa bithima 
may be used to acquire a leasehold estate and lease it through the securitisation of the 
underlying assets. Fifthly, a business which seeks to render specific services may 
raise funding by pre-selling such services and the expected benefits from them by 
issuing sukuk milkiyat al khadamat. The sixth assets class which may be securitised 
is where a business wishes to produce or provide certain goods/commodities at a 
future date, it may pre-sell such future goods for delivery at a specific future date and 
- --
76 Adam, N. and Thomas, A." Islamic Bonds", op. cit., pp. 36-38 
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securitise the assets for a value through the issuance of sukuk al-salam. The seventh 
standard deals with manufacturing and construction where the funding for the 
construction, development or manufacturing can be secured through the issuance of 
sukuk a! istisn'a for the future delivery of the completed project. The eighth standard 
enables a business or a trader to acquire goods or commodities or other tangible assets 
for future sale under a murabaha agreement with a financier with funds obtained 
through the issuance of sukuk al murabaha. The sukuk holders shall own the assets 
or goods and will be entitled to the realised proceeds from the sale of assets just 
mentioned. The ninth standard deals with raising funds through equity participation 
in the capital of the company or in a project through sukuk al-musharaka. The sukuk 
holders shall be entitled to any profit (loss) that may arise. The tenth standard deals 
with funding an entrepreneur (mudarib) who has a sound business proposal but 
requires funding for implementation of his/her business plan. An issuance of sukuk 
al-mudaraba may provide the necessary capital if there are willing financiers or 
investors to participate. The sukuk holders share in any profit/loss resulting from the 
business. 
Other sukuk types are: sukuk al-wakala where the sukuk holders entrust the 
management of their underlying assets to a wakil/agent;; sukuk al-muzra'a are used to 
finance cultivation of agricultural land; sukuk al-musaqa are used for maintaining the 
orchards and trees which bear fruit, its irrigation and management; and finally, the 
fourteenth standard deals with financing owners of farmland to maintain the land as 
well as the trees/crops. In all the sukuk used for funding agricultural assets and their 
maintenance, the sukuk holders share in the produce of the land and the crops. 
Currently the most common in the Middle East (ME) are the sukuk al-
murabaha and the sukuk al-ijara, which is based on leasing, whereas in Malaysia the 
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most popular are the sukuk bi-thaman al-ajil, based on murabaha principles. The 
latter is not considered Shari'ah compliant in the Middle East, where jurists have 
prohibited trading in debt. 
4.3 SUKUK SECURI1ITES AS A TOOL FOR LIQUIDITY 
MANAGEMENT 
Before the advent of sukuk, Islamic banks obtained their return on their liquid assets 
through the placement of funds on a murabaha basis with institutions that would sell 
and buy commodities on their behalf, often through the London Metal Exchange. The 
resulting profit or mark-up payment was considered legitimate or Shari'ah-compliant 
by Islamic scholars, as it was based on a real transaction - as opposed to a monetary 
one. However, there were only a few of these institutions which caused their charges 
to be high, which in tum reduced the returns on these transactions. Furthermore, 
some of the trading houses that Islamic banks and institutions invested with were not 
immune from bankruptcy or potential losses and therefore there was an added risk to 
investing in commodities. 
The potential for diversification in sukuk investment implies increased 
improvement in liquidity management but does not create the desired volume of 
secondary trading, as demand seems, at least in the Gulf, to exceed supply. Islamic 
banks and other financial institutions find sukuk (murabaha, sa/am, short-term ijara 
and lately tawarruq) as an outlet in which to invest their excess liquidity and their 
returns attractive enough to hold them to maturity. Malaysia, on the other hand, does 
not suffer as much from this liquidity problem as it enjoys a bigger volume of trading, 
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greater frequency of issuances and no restriction on the issue of securities that are 
backed by collateralised debt, amongst other factors. 77 
Regulatory framework is important in this regard and the establishment by 
BMA of the Liquidity Management Centre (public-private partnership) as a trading 
platform and the Islamic Financial Services Board (multi-state entity) is a step in the 
right direction towards promoting trading in sukuk and improving liquidity for a 
robust secondary market. 
4.4 SUKUK STRUCTURES 
Sukuk are similar to conventional securities in that they are issued for a fixed term 
rather in perpetuity as in the case of equity. 78 Sukuk are now issued for tenors ranging 
from 3 months (as with T-bills) to five-to-ten years (Term-Notes). Most issues to date 
are either murabaha or ijara, with the former offering an agreed-on mark-up or fixed 
return, whereas the latter offers both a fixed and variable return, much like a floating-
rate note. Sukuk transactions are Shari'ah-compliant because they are based on trading 
real assets like land, buildings and plant, and not paper debt. 79 
In murabaha, the bank securitises its trading transaction and uses part of its 
mark-up to provide a return to the investor; and once it receives payment from its 
trading client, it will pay back the murabaha sukuk-holder on termination of the 
contract. 
Sukuk al-ijara are almost always issued through the creation of a special 
purpose vehicle (SPV) which acts as an intermediary between the client and the sukuk 
investors and manages the cash flow from the leased assets, i.e., the receipt of the 
77 - - --- - 0 • - ' - • - - • - • - - - ·-
Wilson R. "Innovation in the structuring of Islamic sukuk securities", December, 2005, pp. 5-6 
78 Jaffer, S. 2004. "Islamic Fixed-Income Securities: Sukuk.", in Islamic Asset Management, London: 
Euromoney Books, pp. 72-75 
79 
cif. Wilson, R. 
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rental payments from the client for the leased asset and the payment to sukuk 
holders.80 It is bankruptcy-remote, which helps to protect the investors, and is 
immediately wound up when the sukuk mature. SPYs carry none of the risks 
associated with banks, nor are they subject to their control or regulation; such 
advantages justify, in a sense, the relatively high legal costs of setting them up. Risk 
assessment in ijara leases depend on the client's perceived ability to make the lease 
payments to the SPY, which in the case of a government, is a sovereign risk, as 
opposed to a corporate risk in the case of companies. 
The diagram below 81 illustrates sale of assets to an SPY which leases them 
back to the issuer in return for rental payments against which the SPY issues 
certificates of participation to investors who will entitled to an undivided interest in 
the underlying asset/s. The proceeds from the sale of certificates are then used to 
acquire the title to the asset/s from the issuer but doubts remain as to the transfer of 
title to the SPY.82 The SPY then enters into a leasing agreement with the issuer which 
governs the terms of the lease in respect of rental payments and whether they are fixed 
or reset periodically. The issuer also provides a guarantee so that the SPY can meet 
its obligations to the sukuk holders. The fulfilment of these obligations, in the final 
analysis, will depend on the issuer maintaining the flow of rental payments agreed to 
under the lease. The guarantee also provides for the buyback of the asset at end of the 
period of the lease at the original price at which the asset was sold. This should 
provide the monies required to repay the sukuk holders the sum originally invested. 
80 Aseambankers (2005), "Capitalising on Opportunities in the Sukuk Industry"; Kuala Lumpur, pp. 1-5 
81 Wilson, R. "Innovation in the structuring of Islamic sukuk securities", December, 2005, p. 9 
82 See section 3.5.1 on Sukuk Ratings and securitisation Issues and Challenges. 
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The risk profile of sukuk al-ijara closely relate to the ratings assigned to the 
issuer's financial ability of the issuer during the period of the lease. 83 
Ijara sukuk structure 
Buy back of asset at maturity 
Sale of asset 
Lease agreement 
Rental payments 
Rental payments/coupons 
Cash 
Reimbursement of issue 
price on maturity 
Guarantee of SPV obligations 
Murabaha sukuk is probably the most widely used form of sukuk. Here, the bank 
securitises the trading transaction with part of its fixed mark-up to provide the return 
to the investor/s and uses the repayment by its client to repay the sukuk holders at end 
of contract. 
However, another form of sukuk has been gaining popularity for short-term 
financing and is set to replace the commodity murabaha transaction as a liquidity 
management tool and because it deals with future events, banks, particularly, have 
looked upon it as possibly useful hedging tool for their income and asset risks. 
The basic transaction consist of a sale in which payment is made in advance 
by a buyer against a future delivery of asset/goods at a future date by the seller and the 
term of the transaction is typically three months. 
83 Wilson, R. "Innovation ... ", op. cit. pp., 9-10 and Adam & Thomas, Islamic Bonds, pp. 68-77 
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The BMA has been issuing 3-month sukuk al-salam at three-monthly intervals 
since 2002 as part of its short-term financing for the Government of Bahrain. Salam 
sukuk act much like Treasuries in that they are issued for similar period to maturity 
and the returns are fixed from the outset. 
What distinguishes salam from the other sukuk is the advance payment which 
entitles the investor to a repayment of that sum plus a predetermined or fixed mark-up 
at the end of the three months upon surrendering his/her certificate of participation. 
Islamic banks, takaful Islamic insurance companies or Islamic investment companies 
have found sa/am sukuk to be a convenient and useful tool for parking their liquid 
assets in a Shari'ah compliant way. 
4.5 THE FOUR MAIN METHODS OF SUKUK 
In the following paragraphs, the four sukuks- murabaha, ijara, musharaka and 
mudaraba - will be examined in more detail. The first two are the most widely-used 
methods of financing, whereas the last two are what scholars and those involved in 
Islamic finance would like to see become more widespread in practice and eventually 
prevail, as they represent the core of Islamic financing. 
4.5.1 Murabaha 
Murabaha is not a mode of financing, in terms of its origin. 84 It is a simple sale on a 
cost-plus basis with the price deferred. Both price and date of payment must be 
specified in the contract. The application of murabaha is limited to where a client 
84 Usmani, M.T. 2002. "An Introduction to Islamic Finance" . The Hague, Netherlands: Kluwer Law 
International, pp. 41-42 
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wishes to buy a commodity; it was conceived as a temporary method, until later, 
musharaka and mudaraba took off and became widely-used. 
To be Shari'ah-compliant a murabaha transaction must be a genuine 
transaction, at the core of which there is a physical or real commodity. Murabaha 
cannot be used to finance the cost of overheads in a client/business, or to pay off a 
debt or for a mere exchange of currencies. 
Murabaha can best be put to use by having the financier/bank purchase the 
commodity direct from a supplier and, having taken delivery of it, sell it to the client 
on a murabaha or cost-plus basis. Though not favourably looked upon by Shari'ah 
boards, the financier might appoint the client to act as its agent and purchase the 
commodity in question, which reduces the likelihood of subsequent rejection by the 
client. In his or her capacity as agent, the client acts as a trustee and will not be liable 
for any loss or damage to the property, which is now in his or her possession, unless it 
was due to negligence or fraud on his or her part. After taking delivery of the 
commodity, he or she, as agent, should inform the financier of this act and offer to 
buy the commodity from him. The financier will then inform the client of his 
acceptance and the sale will be deemed to be complete and the risk transferred to the 
client as buyer. The relationship will then assume the form of a debtor and creditor. 85 
Murabaha does not allow for uncertainty and the client is obliged to select one 
of two options: cash, or deferred payment- though it is mostly done on a deferred-
payment basis. Once the price is fixed, the financier cannot subsequently increase the 
price for late payment nor can the client ask for a discount on an earlier settlement, 
unless the financier voluntarily offers such a discount - it cannot be made a 
condition in the agreement of prepayment. And to ensure that the purchaser pays on 
85 Obaidullah, M. (n.d.) "Islamic Financial Services". pp. 68-72. 
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maturity, the financier or bank might ask the client to sign an undertaking that in case 
of a late payment or default, the client/debtor will pay a sum of money to a charitable 
fund set up by the bank, calculated on a percent per annum of the debt. The fund 
monies cannot form part of the bank's/financier's income. 
a. Applications 
Murabaha is used as short-term financing to buy commodities, goods or assets, 
usually with the intermediation of a financial institution or bank. Use of a letter of 
credit in murabaha transactions is allowed, either as a means of guarantee or of 
ensuring that parties will fulfil their obligations under the documents defining them in 
long-term credit transactions. The jurists, however, do not approve of a payment of a 
guarantee by the same beneficiary, as one is deemed to be paying money for money. 
A letter of credit is an accepted method of payment in international trade which 
ensures that the two parties to a trade or sale contract conduct their transaction in 
accordance with the terms of documents which they have agreed to, so that the 
mutually-confirmed intermediary bank can then allow payment. Muslim scholars 
allow such a process between two unfamiliar parties in international trade. 86 
b. Drawbacks of Murabaha 
Murabaha financing has been criticised on many grounds. It is said to be inflexible 
from the point ofview of the Shari'ah. As mentioned above, late payment cannot be 
penalised and the price cannot be changed in the event of a late payment. It also 
cannot be used to finance overheads or to pay off the debts of a business. 
86 Thomas, Cox and Kraty, "Structuring Islamic Finance Transactions", op. cit., pp. 172-173 
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It is also said to be restricted to people well-known to that financing 
institution, in other words, their familiar customers (thereby excluding entrepreneurial 
newcomers) who wish to buy a commodity or asset. In this respect, it is alleged that 
some financial institutions have used murabaha financing to provide unsecured 
lending to large corporate customers. In such transactions the bank would sell a 
commodity such as copper or aluminium to the customer for a credit price of say $1 0 
million-worth of the commodity payable at a later date. The customer would then tum 
around and sell the commodity on the spot market for £9 million cash, thus gaining 
liquidity and simulating an unsecured loan. This could extend to retail finance as 
well.87 
There is no rollover of murabaha in trade financing and this duplicates the 
process and costs of financing when used as a letter of credit. However, there is a 
view amongst scholars that the extension of a murabaha transaction is permissable 
provided that the price is not increased. 
Other problems persist. Murabaha, which was devised to help funding in the 
short-term and liquidity for the secondary market, has not, according to some 
scholars, been taken to its logical conclusion and allowed to be traded as a debt 
instrument, as in Malaysia. There, they have separated the principal from the profit 
and have issued separate zero-coupon notes, primary in the case of the principal, and 
secondary for the profit portions. 
The justification for the practice in Malaysia was that when the bank sells such 
an instrument at a discount, the bank is parting with a share of its profit on the original 
transaction. Similarly, the buyer is receiving a share of profit too and not interest. In 
87 El-Gamal, M. (2005, April). "Mutuality as an Antidote to Rent-seeking Shari'a-Arbitrage in Islamic 
Finance". P.4 
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other words, the sale and purchase of the murabaha-based debt is about the mark-up 
on the spot price and not interest. 
The other view of the Shari'ah scholars, particularly in the Middle East, is that what 
was profit on a murabaha basis for the seller of goods and services on the original 
contract may not necessarily remain the same when the same seller, in tum, sells the 
debt arising from that transaction. The fear is that once trading in asset-based debt is 
permitted, it becomes difficult to stop it from spreading to other forms of debt trading, 
which, in the opinion of those scholars, will inevitably involve riba. 
Therefore, murabaha sukuk are not tradable in the secondary market of the 
Middle East and are illiquid. But such a position has also been criticised for the 
opportunity lost in terms of accelerating the development of an efficient market for 
Islamic financial instruments and wealth creation for many investors. 88 
4.5.2 Sukuk ai-Ijara 
Sukuk al-ijara in terms of leasing has rules that are very similar to those of sale. 89 In 
both cases something is transferred to another party for a valuable consideration. The 
only difference is that in the case of ijara, ownership of the property remains with the 
transferor, and only its usufruct or right of use is transferred to the lessee. 
Sukuk al-ijara almost always involve the creation of a special purpose vehicle, 
a legal entity that acts as an intermediary between the investors and the client, and 
when it is set up as a trust, the trustees act on behalf of the beneficiaries/sukuk-
holders. The SPY manages the receipt of rent from the client and its disbursement to 
the sukuk-holders. The SPY carries no risks apart from those that are associated with 
88 Obaidullah;M. ~''Islamic Financing Products"(n.d.). pp., 160-162. See also the example of Auto 
Leasing in the Appendix. 
89 Usmani, M. T. "Introduction to Islamic Finance" p. 70 and Adam and Thomas, "Islamic Bonds", 
op. cit. pp., 112-115 
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the sukuk which it issued, and once these mature, the SPY is usually wound up, unlike 
banks which are subject to continuing obligations and risks. This, in the opinion of 
some, justifies the high legal costs of setting up the SPY. The risks attached to sukuk 
are a function of the client's ability to make the lease payments. The client may be the 
State, in which case the risk is called a sovereign risk and in the case of a corporation, 
it is a corporate risk.90 
a. Sukuk Pricing and risk assessment 
Objections to pricing on the basis of LIBOR and similar benchmarks are more fully 
discussed in chapter 6 and only a brief note of some of the more important alternatives 
will be made here. 
The present model of relating sukuk returns to LIBOR and similar benchmarks 
is all too familiar to both financiers and investors. One important alternative suggested 
is to link sukuk returns to GOP-linked growth so that when the economy is on an 
upward trend of growth, governments can, through increased tax revenue, afford to 
pay higher returns to their sovereign sukuk-holders. Conversely, in a downward 
growth situation, the government has reduced capacity to service the debt and 
therefore part of the risk of default is shared with the sukuk-holders. This might give 
the GDP-linked sukuk better rating than the present form of sukuk. 
Professor R. Wilson proposes benchmarking corporate sukuk to indicators 
relating to the performance of the companies being financed, which could lead to a 
new type of sukuk based on a musharaka structure.91 But this approach is fraught with 
difficulties as past performance of companies is not a good indicator of a future one 
and unless the private sector is well-developed and robust, it would be extremely 
90 w·1 R "I . " . 9 10 1 son, . nnovatwn... op. cit. pp. -
91 Ibid. 
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difficult to extrapolate a future measure from past experience. In addition, Professor 
Wilson argues that illiquidity of musharaka sukuk and uncertainty about the exit route 
has rendered musharaka contracts unattractive. In fact even if there was the possibility 
of early exit, why would anyone buy such sukuk if the outcome was uncertain? 
Moreover, an investor would also need to reassess the prospects of the company 
whose sukuk he or she is buying, which in itself could be time-consuming and costly. 
Another possibility discussed by Professor Wilson is mudaraba-based 
corporate sukuk with investors sharing in the profits, but not the losses. However, as 
with mudaraba investment deposits in Islamic banks, there could be no guarantee of 
recovering the original capital invested. This coupled with the higher risks involved 
means that investor expectation would be for higher returns, to compensate for the 
higher risks. As stated before, expected returns from mudaraba contracts can be 
maintained at an acceptable level if a provision is made out of the profits of the good 
years for less profitable, or loss, years. 
b. The Rules of Ijara 
The rules of ijara require the transfer of a property or asset use to another party for an 
agreed period at a valuable consideration. The transferred asset must possess a useful 
feature and must have a productive life, which excludes all assets that are of a 
consumable or perishable nature. The lessor, by virtue of retaining ownership of the 
asset, must bear all the risks and liabilities that go with it unless there is material 
misuse or negligence by the lessee, in which case the lessee must indemnify the 
lessor. It is commonly accepted that repairs and running costs incurred in the normal 
course of business shall be borne by the lessee. 
Ownership does riot transfer with ijara as it does with a sale. This has an 
important consequence in that all the liabilities of ownership remain with the lessor, 
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who has a duty to repair and maintain the property or asset to be leased. Professor R. 
Wilson is of the opinion that if it were not so, the leasing transaction would introduce 
an element of uncertainty in respect of the costs to the lessee, as maintenance 
payments could be considered an extra rental element. 92 
Operating expenses and consumables may include items such as fuel, in the 
case of a leased aircraft or vehicle, or fertiliser and seeds, in the case of leased land. 
However, lessees are responsible for any misuse or negligence towards their leased 
assets and would have to compensate the lessor for any such damage or diminution in 
the value of the asset. 
If, for any reason, rental payments are not paid on time or delayed, the lessor 
cannot impose a penalty on the lessee, as this would be considered in the nature of 
riba, but the lessee may have to make a contribution to some charity in recognition of 
this fact. Otherwise, the leased property will revert to the lessor and the lessee will 
still be liable for the outstanding rental payments. Jurists, however, accept the 
principle of liquidated damages, but only to the extent that they relate to the cost of 
collection. 
The period of the lease must be clearly stated in the lease agreement. In some 
financial leases, a condition may be found that could terminate the lease before the 
end of such period at a lessor's option and the lessee held responsible to pay the rental 
for the remaining lease period. This, of course, would be against the principles of 
equity and justice in Shari'ah, which stipulates that the mutual consent of both parties 
is necessary for the termination, for otherwise, such a situation could be construed as 
an interest-bearing loan under the guise of a lease. The lessee can only be asked to pay 
92 Wilson., R. 2004. "An Overview of the Sukuk Market", in Adam and Thomas (eds), Islamic Bonds. 
pp., 7-8 
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the rent up to the termination date and to return the asset under lease to the lessor. 
Other Islamic covenants to the lease agreement are the permissibility of insurance 
under the Islamic mode of takaful. 
c. ljara wa-lqtina' 
Islamic leases usually contain the provision that the leased assets are sold back to the 
lessee against a nominal or negotiated payment: this is termed ijara wa-iqtina '. The 
logic behind this is that the leased assets are not part of the lessor's activity or business 
and the lessor has already recovered his cost plus profit on those assets. Moreover, the 
whole transaction was undertaken so that the lessee could have the use of that asset 
through an SPY which is terminated once the transaction has served its purpose. 
However, scholars like M. T. Usmani take exception to this, maintaining that, "it is a 
well-established rule in Islamic jurisprudence that one transaction cannot be tied up 
with another so as to make the former a precondition for the other". Once the lease 
expires, the lessor can gift it or sell it to the lessee. Alternatively, other scholars 
advocate the use of a 'separate' and 'unilateral' promise by the lessor to sell the leased 
asset at an agreed price or to gift it after the expiry of the lease period. The lessee is 
not bound by such an agreement if he or she does not want to acquire such an asset. 
d. Assignment 
Assignment of the lease without transfer of ownership is only allowed where no 
monetary consideration is charged by the assignee and the entitlement to the cash flow 
of the rental payments is made in the form of a gift to a friend or son, or to settle a 
debt with any of his or her creditors.93 
93 u . . 80 smam, op. elf., pp. 
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Assignment of the lease is possible so long as ownership and the rental 
payments are both transferred. Otherwise, selling the right to rentals for a fixed price 
alone would be strictly a monetary transaction and in the nature of riba, and hence 
prohibited. The lease period must be specified clearly in the lease agreement, as must 
the use to which the asset(s) will be put; the leased assets must also be fully identified. 
And where there is more than one owner, rental income will be distributed according 
to their respective share in the property or assets. However, a joint-owner can only 
transfer his proportionate share of the leased asset to his or her co-sharer and not to 
any other person. 
To be Shari'ah-compliant, the lease must start from the date of the delivery of 
the asset and not from the date of the payment of the price for the leased asset. In 
addition, the lessee would not be liable for any late delivery. 
Ijara involves two sets of relationships. One is that of a principal and agent, 
when the financier appoints the client as his or her agent to purchase the leased asset 
- and here there is no lessor and lessee relationship yet. The other relationship comes 
into play when the lessee takes delivery of the asset from the supplier. The two sets of 
relationships involve two separate and distinct legal relationships between the parties. 
In murabaha, actual sale takes place after the client has taken delivery of the 
asset, has kept it in his or her possession and has notified the financier or bank of this 
fact and has simultaneously made an offer to buy the asset. The sale is only concluded 
when the bank or financier accepts the offer. In leasing there would be no need to 
have two contracts and once the financier or bank has agreed to lease the asset from 
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the date of taking delivery of the asset, the lease will automatically start on that date, 
without further delay or act. 94 
e. Fixed and Variable Rentals 
The lease rental or stream of rentals can be fixed for the whole period of the lease or 
determined separately for each phase of the lease so long as the amount of rent for 
each phase is specifically agreed upon at the time of the commencement of the lease. 
The lease period shall start from the date of delivery of the leased asset to the lessee, 
notwithstanding that the lessee may have already started using it. 95 
In the long run, it might not be in the interest of the lessor to have one fixed 
rental for the whole lease period. This is because economic conditions change due to 
inflation, growth and business cycles etc. To circumvent this, the lessor may stipulate 
in the lease contract that such rental will increase by a certain percentage each year or 
have a series of short-term leases at the expiry of which the lessor can readjust the 
rent in accordance with market values by mutual consent with the lessee. 
Now, some scholars have agreed with the principle of periodically adjusting 
the rental amounts to compensate for the effects of such factors as inflation and, 
probably, government taxes; but they have expressed concerns with regard to 
determining the rentals by reference to interest rates such as LIBOR. Scholars who are 
critical of this approach claim that such an approach renders the returns akin to 
receiving interest and therefore makes the transaction a ribawi one. 
Scholars on the other side of the divide argue that the lease should be looked 
at in terms of the totality of the transaction and not just in terms of the return aspect of 
it, and that if all the requirements comply with Shari'ah principles, particularly in the 
95 Usmani, op. cit., pp., 75-76 
77 
mode of transacting the lease, the legal structure and the relationship between the 
parties, then there should not be a judgement to ban it.96 However, there is an essential 
difference between a conventionally-financed and an Islamically-structured lease- it 
is about who bears the risks in each lease. In a Shari'ah-compliant lease, the lessor 
assumes all the risks of ownership, so that if the asset is destroyed or the lessee loses 
the benefit or usufruct of the assets under the lease, the lessor cannot claim rent from 
the lessee unless the latter was responsible as a result of misuse or negligence on his 
part. In a conventional lease, the lessee is liable for payment of rental whether he or 
she has received any benefit or not.97 
Another objection to the use of a 'future' interest rate benchmark relates to the 
volatility of this measure which makes the amount of rent unknown when entering 
into such a transaction, for this would imply jahala ('lack of appropriate information 
or knowledge') and gharar ('uncertainty'), both of which are not permissable under 
the Shari'ah.98 But these objections may be redressed by setting an upper and lower 
limit for the movement of the benchmark, so that any probable loss resulting from an 
adverse movement in interest rates is at least minimised. In addition, there is no 
question ofjahala when the lessor and lessee have clearly agreed upon the use of a 
specific benchmark and thus no dispute can arise from this aspect of the lease. 99 
Late payment of a debt due poses a problem in Islamic finance, for under Shari'ah 
law, a penalty cannot be imposed on the lessee. Instead, it is now widely-accepted that 
in order to avoid the use of such prohibition, a charity may be set up by the lessor for 
this purpose, so that all monies received would be disbursed for charitable purposes. 
The amount of such a charitable contribution may be calculated on the basis of 
96 See chapter 5 for a -fu-ller discu~sion of p-ricing. 
97 See IDS's floating-rate issue in the Appendix. 
98 See chapter 5 for a fuller discussion of benchmarks. 
99 Usmani, op. cit. p. 48-49 
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percent per annum. Another punishment suggested for defaulting clients is denying 
them future facilities by Islamic banks; others, however, consider such punishment 
inadequate in a hybrid banking environment where they could access conventional 
banks for such facilities, unless an arrangement is worked out between Islamic and 
conventional banks to share information on defaulting customers. 100 
Sub-leasing is allowed, but only with the express permission of the lessor. And most 
scholars/jurists have no problem with this unless the rent received from the sub-lease 
is greater than the rent which the lessor receives from his lessee. Here the Shafi'i and 
the Hanbali schools concur in the permissibility of the lessee enjoying the excess of 
the rental from the sub-lease over the amount that he or she pays to the lessor. The 
exception is the Hanafi school, which maintains that it should be returned to the lessor 
or to charity, unless the lessee has added some sort of value to it or the rent was in a 
different currency to that of the main lease. However, the Shafi'i view prevails in 
practice as there is nothing explicit on this in either the Qur'an or the Sunna. 101 
Termination of the lease is not normally possible without the mutual consent ofboth 
parties. However, in circumstances of misuse or negligence, the lessor has the right to 
terminate the lease agreement, to recover the asset, to ask for compensation as well as 
being entitled to the rental payments until termination. Some financial leases include 
the right of unilateral termination by the lessor, but this is construed as a disguised 
mechanism for recovering a loan made under the guise of a lease agreement, and 
could be due to the lessee's declining credit rating or other financial factors. 
100 . - .. . . . - . . - - - -- . . -
1/iid., p. 77; Vogel, F. V. & Hayes, S. Islamic Law & Finance, pp., 114-115 and Siddiqi, M. N., 
(2004, May). "Social Dynamics of the Debate in Payment and Sale of Debt", A paper presented at the 
6th Harvard University Forum on Islamic Finance: Current Legal And Regulatory Issues. 
101 Usmani, op. cit., pp. 79-82 and 
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f. Residual value of the leased asset 
An important issue in leasing is the residual value of the leased asset. It is generally 
accepted that upon expiry of the lease, the title of the leased asset is transferred to the 
lessee (ijara wa-iqtina '). This is not, strictly speaking, the case under Shari'ah, where 
such an arrangement cannot be made a condition in the lease agreement, although it is 
widely-accepted that the lessor may enter into a unilateral promise to sell the leased 
asset or indeed to gift it to the lessee upon expiry of the lease, which would be binding 
on him but not on the lessee. This unilateral undertaking should be made the subject 
of a separate document and not part of the lease agreement as pointed out above. 102 
4.5.3 Differences between Murabaha and Ijara 
The main difference between murabaha and leasing is that in murabaha, a valid sale 
must be contracted instantly and not by reference to some future date. In murabaha, 
taking possession of and delivery of the asset( s) is only one aspect of the performance 
of the contract, whereas the offer and acceptance between the client and the financier 
constitutes another and a completely separate step. The reason for this is that unless 
the financier or banker owns the asset, even if for the shortest possible interval, with 
the risks inherent in such ownership, the financier cannot claim profit or fee. 103 
Moreover, one cannot sell something which one does not own. 
In ijara, the leasing contract is simultaneously validated with taking delivery 
and possession of the asset. The asset's ownership and related risks remain with the 
lessor for the duration of the lease period and only the usufruct is transferred. Thus, 
the start of the lease period can begin from the time that the client has taken delivery. 
102 Usmani, op. cit., pp. 78-79 
103 Chapra, Umer, ( 1998, September). "The Major Modes of Islamic Finance." A paper presented at 
the Islamic Foundation, Leicester, UK. 
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Another important difference between ijara and murabaha is the difficulty of 
securitising the latter, leading in the view of some jurists to the creation of an 
instrument evidencing a debt and so exchanging this instrument for cash would mean 
exchanging money for money in the same currency, something which would not be 
Shari'ah-compliant. Even if such an exchange were to take place, it would only be at 
face value. However, if murabaha was only one part of a wider portfolio that included 
ijara, musharaka and others, then negotiable instruments could be issued. 
Sukuk al-ijara, on the other hand, are relatively easy to securitise, because 
their securitisation results in the issue of certificates of participation/sukuk that 
represent equal, undivided and proportionate share in the ownership of the underlying 
assets, whereas the sukuk al-murabaha evidence a debt. And since the lessor in ijara 
owns these assets, s/he can sell these or any part of them, to a third party with all the 
rights and obligations of the lessor with regard to the purchased assets. 
One must remember that these certificates owe tradability to their ownership 
rights and not to their debt feature, which materialises when the rental becomes due. 
Therefore, sukuk al-ijara that purport to confer a right to a stream of cash flows 
without ownership right to the underlying assets would not be regarded as Shari'ah-
compliant. 
4.5.4 Mudaraba and Musharaka 
Under this heading two other important modes of financing will be examined. These 
two involve risk-taking and reward-sharing, which are much favoured by Islamic 
jurists. Mudaraba and musharaka are based on profit/loss-sharing contracts. 104 
104 Adam and Thomas, Islamic Bonds, op. cit. "Overview of the Sukuk Market" by Wilson, R., pp., 9-
10 
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a. Mudaraba 
Mudaraba is a contract between two parties where one party, rabb al-ma/ (the 
investor) entrusts money to a mudarib (the working partner or trustee) and has a right 
to information about the business activity which he or she is financing as well as the 
right to monitor its performance. The degree to which he or she can do this without 
unduly interfering in the smooth running of the business is subject to negotiation and 
mutual agreement. The mudarib/entrepreneur, who must possess the necessary 
business skills, uses the money in an agreed-on business activity and upon completion 
of the project agrees to pay back the principal and pre-agreed profit share and retains 
the balance of the profits. 
The mudarib may sometimes indicate a limit to the profits which they can 
realise and in a continuing mudaraba, he or she may retain part of the profits to 
smooth out the return to investors across accounting periods; but losses must always 
be deducted before any profits become available for distribution. 105 
There are two types of mudaraba: mudaraba muqayyada is a 'restricted' 
mudaraba in that it is formed for a specific business and place and is limited by time; 
mudaraba mutlaqa is 'unrestricted' by time, place or permissable trade or 
counterparty. 106 Iran has codified this form of contract in its civil law- a 
development expected to be emulated by other jurisdictions. Traditionally, mudaraba 
has been an unlimited liability entity. Today, almost all mudarabas are structured with 
limited liability. 
The ratio of profit distribution is proportional to pre-agreed shares but is 
negotiable and flexible. Partners are allowed to allocate their share of profits on the 
105 See the example of Meezan Bank in the Appendix. 
106 Tyser, C R, p. 233 as quoted by Thomas, Cox & Kraty in "Structuring ... ", p. 9 
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basis of either the net operating profit/loss or gross profit. The latter basis can reduce 
moral hazard by avoiding arguments over depreciation, cost of goods sold, valuations 
and other matters subject to management discretion and audit directives. 
However, the investor is not liable to losses beyond his capital contribution, 
which must be the case in a limited liability mudaraba; and the mudarib does not 
share in losses unless he has wilfully, or through negligence or fraud or some similar 
act, caused such losses. 107 
Mudaraba is widely used for retail funds aggregation. Private Islamic funds 
invested in real estate, private equity and a large number of portfolios use the 
mudaraba concept to finance these investments and acquisitions. In fact, most equity 
funds, for example, such as the highly successful NCB funds offered with Wellington 
Investment Management as well as other funds and unit trusts, all adapt mudaraba to 
their own situations and requirements. 
b. ~usharaka 
There are generally two forms of musharaka in Shari'ah: shirkat at-milk and shirkat 
at- 'aqd; 108 there is also the declining-balance musharaka which is a credit-driven 
derivative ofthe musharaka concept, the discussion of which, however, falls outside 
the scope of this paper. Musharaka today takes the form of limited partnership, 
although traditionally the concept was, as with mudaraba, that of an unlimited 
liability. 
Shirkat at-milk is a partnership between two or more owners of common 
property which is equivalent to inherited property and does not have to be the subject 
of a specific contract. The problem with this form of property is that it is neither 
107 See the example of the Meezan Bank of Pakistan in the Appendix. 
108 Thomas, Cox and Kraty (eds), "Stntcturing Islamic Finance Transactions". p. 53 
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divisible nor can it be unitised, and this causes problems when the intention is to use it 
or when a specific division of the property is needed. 
Shirkat a!- 'aqd is a mutual partnership by contract. Capital contributions may 
be in kind or for services rendered, although typically they are cash at an agreed par 
value. A sub-division of this partnership is a partnership in goodwill ( wujuh ), in 
which there may not be any form of cash contribution towards capital but a 
contribution in terms of a known name in the trade, similar to a brand or the credit 
history with such a value. In both forms of partnership, the capital is quantified and 
specific. 109 
c. Basic rules of musharaka 
As with mudaraba, the rule is that profits must be shared on the basis of capital, 
active participation and responsibility in the musharaka business. 110 Profits should be 
distributed in proportions to be settled by them in advance, precluding any allocation 
of a fixed amount to any partner. All jurists agree that losses must be shared in the 
same proportion as profit. 
This is similar to a partnership which may be for a limited period or for a specific 
objective such as participation in a particular project, be it new or existing. 
Profits/losses will be determined in accordance with the capital contribution of each 
partner. Partners may share in the equity of the partnership as well as the management 
of the company in accordance with the terms ofthe partnership agreement. 
109 Ibid. pp. 53-54 
110 Ibid. 
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4.5.5 Obstacles to Mudaraba and Musharaka financing 
Lack of transparency in accounting, reporting and monitoring of performance may 
inhibit financiers/banks from participation in public and private companies, and may 
impede the rating of prospective issuers. In addition, lack of control over a mudarib's 
activities poses a real problem to the financier who, even if he were able to exercise 
control, may consider such control costly to implement and futile. 
Generally, the legal and specialised expertise in emerging markets may not be 
sufficiently developed to attract cross-border investors who might be keen to invest 
were it not for lack of proper monitoring of project performance and the high cost for 
such an activity. 
Potential sukuk-investors in emerging countries are mostly traders and may be 
averse to investment risks. They are more accustomed to short-term business activities 
from which they can make quick profits, albeit at some risk. Generally speaking, they 
are also not used to entrusting their money to investment managers for long-term 
investment with all the accompanying risks that this would involve. Furthermore, 
investors in these slow developing capital markets lack the necessary information and 
knowledge to make an informed judgment. 
Property rights and a clear legal system as understood in the West may not be 
the norm in those countries, particularly with regard to foreigners who may not own 
private property, making equity sharing and PLS unattractive even for Muslim 
investors from other countries. However, these laws are evolving and economies are 
opening up for international banks and investors to invest in them, particularly where 
these countries have either joined, or are in the process of joining the World Trade 
Organisat{on (WTO). 
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Sometimes, as in the case of Pakistan, mudaraba companies with PLS 
contracts, were tax-exempt until 1992, yet interest was allowed as a tax deductible 
item. Legislation is, therefore, seen here as a hindrance to further growth of these 
Islamic modes of financing. 
Putting laws and regulations in place to support capital markets and the 
necessary infrastructure for sukuk issuances will take time to filter through and be 
adopted by the relevant financial institutions and Islamic banks. Yet without this 
infrastructure, it becomes difficult to mobilise savings on any significant scale. 
Other obstacles might include lack of trust, risk of disclosure of trade secrets 
and high profits, the demand for guarantees and additional securities by the banks and 
financial institutions, and the costs of documentation and other fees which the receiver 
of funds has to bear. 
These obstacles to mudaraba and musharaka, have for the most part forced 
Islamic banks and investment institutions to offer less risky modes of finance so as to 
remain competitive with their conventional banks. Additionally, Islamic banks have 
limited capacity to provide long-term financing in terms of mudaraba and musharaka 
when most oftheir funds are locked in short-term deposits; and if they do, they will 
only exacerbate the mismatch in maturity between their assets and liabilities. 111 
111 Adam and Thomas, op. cit, pp.l23-127 
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Example of Musharaka finance for the manufacturing industry 112 
Bank Partner Total 
I. Capital contributions 900 600 1,500 
Contribution(%) (60) (40) (100) 
2. Expected net profit (after deduction of all costs of production) 525 
3. Profit distribution 
a) 40% for managing transaction 210 
- 35% for partner's role in managing transaction 183.75 
- 5% for bank's role in managing transaction 26.25 
b) 60% as shared profit 315 
- 24% partner's% in the profit 126.00 
- 36% bank's % in the profit 189.00 
Total profit (a+ b) 215.25 309.75 525 
4. Rate of return on investment 
Partner's rate of return/monthly(%) 52 
Partner's rate of return/annually(%) 624 
Bank's rate of return/monthly(%) 24 
Bank's rate of return/annually(%) 288 
a. Comments on the musharaka model 
In the above example, the purpose of the transaction is to finance the purchase of 
materials or input from the local market in order to manufacture the final products for 
an order which the manufacturer has received. The production run is not expected to 
take more than one month. 
The example above purports to offer a risk-taking model for all types of 
businesses. The entrepreneur is allocated the greater part of the profit, assuming that 
the profit realised is at a satisfactory level and is a reward for his entrepreneurship and 
managerial skills. However, his share of the management fee seems to be excessive as 
both the bank and the entrepreneur are co-managers in this case, unless their 
agreement stipulates otherwise. Therefore, the.extent ofeach partner's role in the 
112 Adam and Thomas, "Islamic Bonds"., p. 126 
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management of the business must be clearly defined. However, if the business incurs 
a loss, then the entrepreneur loses his capital contribution together with any time or 
effort which he has invested in the business. 
In their book, Islamic Bonds, as referred to previously, the authors maintain: 
"The transaction is particularly satisfying to Muslim and Third World countries where 
inflation is usually high and automatically adjusts to inflation as the return of each 
partner is based on the profit earned and not fixed". But in the real world, unless 
materials' prices are locked in from the very start and the unions are happy with their 
wages remaining as they are, profits might not tum out to be as planned and in an 
inflationary situation, the purchasing value of these profits will be devalued by 
inflation so that the adjustment may only be in nominal terms. 
Musharaka, as a mode of financing, is particularly suited to the Islamic 
funding ofbusinesses. Positive results can be expected from it ifbanks exercise due 
diligence in screening the venture to be financed and regularly monitor its 
performance. Nevertheless, businesses do fail. But if the risks in any particular 
business are properly analysed and mitigated, then losses incurred on some will be 
more than compensated for by future successes. 113 
However, the Profit/Loss sharing (PLS) model has been much criticised for 
the burden that it places on those who have to verify the viability of projects financed 
in this way. The process of verification involves time-consuming detailed assessment 
procedures, negotiations, sector-expertise and experience. Often, there are no 
generally-accepted criteria for assessing medium to long-term projects. Each project 
would have to be evaluated on its own merits. It is said that the PLS model ties up 
capital for long periods, until it is repaid from the ultimate profits, whereas 
-- - ~ . -
113 Ibid. p. 127 
88 
conventional finance recovers it in instalments over the life of the project, thereby 
reducing risk and uncertainty. Some have advanced the idea of periodical distribution 
of profits, based on proper valuation of work-in-process to overcome the long 
repayment period. 
A further example of sukuk al-musharaka is the Emirates sukuk which marked 
an innovative shift from the commonly-used sukuk al-ijara structure. Under this 
structure, Wings FZCO ("Wings", an SPY incorporated in the Dubai Airport Free 
Zone) issued floating-rate sukuk to investors and used the proceeds of the sukuk issue 
to contribute to the musharaka between Wings and Emirates (each as partners to the 
musharaka). The purpose ofthe musharakajoint-venture is to develop and to lease to 
the Emirates a new engineering centre and a new HQ building in Dubai. The rental 
payments from the musharaka will be used to make the periodic payments on the 
sukuk certificates, which are listed on the Luxembourg Stock Exchange. It is 
anticipated that this model of sukuk structure will become popular in future. 
b. Musharaka and the small business 
It is further argued that since most businesses in Islamic countries are small in size, 
the PLS model, with the costs of the resources that need to be mobilised compared to 
the facility required, makes financing these small businesses difficult and 
uneconomic. 114 And it is further argued that what businesses need in their start-up 
phase is short-term financing in the form of working capital so that they can sustain 
their survivability in the first few years. 
114 McDowall, B. (2005). "The Business Challenges of Islamic Banking". 
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Thus, one cannot escape the conclusion that the contradiction between the need for a 
full appraisal of a business and the necessity for immediate working capital is a major 
inhibitor for successful operation of PLS schemes. 115 
Still, others have pointed out that Islamic banks should change their culture to 
match their rhetoric by recruiting and training, or retraining, their existing loan-
officers to carry out such assessments, in order to overcome the information 
asymmetry and the adverse risk which individual investors would have been burdened 
with had they had to carry out such tasks. 116 
4.6 COMPARISON AND CONTRAST OF SUKUK WITH 
CONVENTIONAL BONDS 
In terms of ownership, sukuk represent an undivided ownership stake in well-defined 
and existing assets, whereas a conventional bond is merely a debt obligation that may 
or not have first claim on the assets of an entity in case of bankruptcy or liquidation. 
In addition, the use of the assets must be Islamic; it must conform to certain ethical 
criteria. Financing a casino or a distillery or a factory which uses pork in its 
components is prohibited. In the case of claims, sukuk-holders have an ownership 
claim on specific assets/project/service and so on, whereas the bondholder has a 
general claim on the borrowing entity and in some cases liens on assets. 117 
Unlike bond obligations, asset-related expenses comprising all the expenses 
that the seller may have incurred in acquiring the asset such as freight and customs 
may be added to the cost price of the asset before adding on the mark-up. 118 
liS ifiid. 
116 Gafoor, A.L.M. ( 1995). Problems in Implementing the PLS Scheme, in "Islamic Banking". 
117 Adam and Thomas, Islamic Bonds, pp.52-56 
118 M T Usmani, An Introduction to Islamic Finance, p. 41 
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It is stated that sukuk prices are market-driven and depend on the movement in 
market value ofthe underlying assets, whereas bond prices depend largely on the 
credit worthiness of the issuer and not directly on specific assets. However, the capital 
market for conventional bonds is well-developed, sophisticated and active, whereas 
the sukuk market is still in its infancy and sukuk-holders usually hold sukuk to 
maturity. 
The sale of sukuk is a sale of a share of an asset, whereas the sale of a bond is 
a sale of a debt. However, bonds are not necessarily a mere packaging of a debt for 
sale. Asset-backed securities and mortgage-backed securities in their conventional 
debt setting are also linked to secure bonds, that is, related to well-defined assets -
hence the similarity with sukuk. 
Sukuk are secured by ownership rights in the underlying assets or projects, in 
addition to other collateral enhancements that may be structured to support it. Bonds, 
on the other hand, are generally unsecured debentures with few exceptions, such as 
equipment trust certificates. However, both principal and return are guaranteed by the 
issuer in the case of conventional bonds, whereas they are not in the case of sukuk. 
Sukuk are securitised assets that can be easily traded and transferred in 
financial markets- though this is not so in reality, as investors hold on to their sukuk 
certificates until maturity. Moreover, the demand for sukuk has thus far exceeded 
supply and there cannot be active trading unless the market for sukuk achieves critical 
mass where investors start trading rather than holding on to their investments. There 
must also be diversity in the sukuk issues: bills, notes and bonds with various tenors as 
in conventional bonds, in order to offer wider choices to investors and satisfy their 
different needs and improve liquidity. 
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Although sukuk are analysed and rated by international rating agencies such as 
S&P, Moody's and Fitch, further enhancing their marketability, there are still legal 
and jurisdiction problems which complicate matters and make it difficult, on 
occasions, to assign to sukuk the same high ratings that some conventional bonds 
achieve. 119 
Different sukuk structures may allow for credit enhancements that broaden 
their appeal to risk-averse Islamic investors as well as to the conventional investor in 
these Islamic bonds; for example, an obligor may guarantee the underwriting where 
an investor accepts a lower yield. In 2003, IDB did just that by agreeing to guarantee 
the performance of the underlying assets and buy back the assets pool at the maturity 
of the sukuk. 120 
The variety of sukuk structures described by AAOIFI in its 14 standards 121 
allow for sukuk to be structured to meet financing needs across different legal and tax 
jurisdictions. It also offers variable and fixed-income streams and may obtain cross-
border listing compatible with global bond regulations. 
The risks embedded in conventional bond investing can be mitigated by a 
variety of derivative instruments. Greenspan, the Fed Chairman 122, notes that 
derivatives have significantly removed or reduced individual risks but that their 
prospective increase of systemic risks does appear to be an issue which requires 
further understanding. This is not so for sukuk, which are asset-based and are primary 
instruments - not derived instruments - and are more likely to fit into existing legal 
and regulatory regimes. Sukuk may therefore be used to disperse risk by selling them 
119 Seethe section 'Sukuk Ratings and Securitisation'. 
120 See Appendix, case study 10 
121 See the section on 'Types of Sukuk'. 
122 Greenspan, Alan, (1999, March 19) "Financial Derivatives at the Futures Industry Association", 
Florida, USA. 
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with an asset linkage to new investors, but not to enhance wealth by deriving new 
instruments that are independently traded and completely unattached to the underlying 
assets. 
Sukuk are investment instruments and not a debt owed by the issuer to the 
holder of the certificate and as such may not be issued for a pool of receivables. 
Finally, sukuk must be Shari'ah-compliant which implies a non-ribawi return on 
investment, conformity with ethical standards and are the result of a genuine sale and 
the whole transaction must be approved by a recognised panel of Islamic jurists. 
Sukuk al-ijara yield predetermined returns in relation to a benchmark, whereas 
others, namely sukuk al-musharaka and sukuk al-mudaraba are based on profit/loss 
sharing. 123 
And with respect to leasing underlying sukuk al-ijara transactions, there is an 
important difference between Islamic and conventional leases. First, Islamic 
jurisprudence does not of course prohibit the use of bankruptcy-remote offshore SPY 
lessor. However, the relationship between SPY lessor and the investors/financiers is a 
little different. The fact that there could be many investors/ financiers in Islamic 
leasing transactions requires the appointment of an agent (mudarib) to represent and 
co-ordinate their combined interest in the beneficial ownership of those assets. The 
mudarib acts much like the standard agent bank and security trustee in a lending 
transaction, collecting and distributing funds on their behalf and protecting their 
interest. Moreover, in the event of termination or total loss with regard to 
conventional leases, the lease agreement may stipulate the payment of a termination 
sum or an agreed value in the event of default or loss by the lessee to the lessor 
whereas to be Shari'ah compliant, investors might have to waive separately such 
123 Adam and Thomas, "Islamic Bonds", op.cit.,. pp. 54-60 
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claims on the lessee. In the event of total loss, however, Islamic investors my have to 
rely exclusively on their takaful receipts to recoup their investment, whereas in the 
case of a loss resulting from negligence on the part of the lessee, all parties may claim 
for the full loss on the lessee. 
4.7 SECURITU:SATION 
Securitisation is typically defined as the process of transforming dormant, illiquid 
assets into tradable, negotiable and liquid assets. It is a process of intermediation 
which pools assets of similar characteristics and allows risks to be diversified and 
distributed amongst a large number of investors who are able to choose the type of 
risk profile that suits their investment needs. Securitisation in Islamic finance is made 
possible because it is predicated on the performance of a well-defined set of assets. 
For example, payments to certificate holders are based on rents received from parcels 
of land or leases for the use of certain equipment such as aircraft or cars. Furthermore, 
the relationship of the parties within the securitisation process is governed by Islamic 
law. For example the lease should be an ijara contract. 124 
The securitisation process has come to encompasses asset classes from 
commercial and residential mortgages to car loans, leases, credit card receivables, 
computer leases and equipment notes. It is often employed by companies to move 
their assets outside their balance sheets to free up financial resources for further 
investment. Companies also seek to lower their costs of funding through this process 
and to pay off their more expensive lines of credit. 
124 Sajjad Chowhdry, (2005, September). "An Overview of the basics ofSecuritisation and its 
emergence on the Islamic Finance scene", in Dinar Standard, I-5 
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The growth in the market for Shari'ah compliant securitisation can be traced to 
the strong demand by investors for Shari'ah compliant financial instruments and the 
need to raise finance in a cost-effective manner without affecting shareholders' equity. 
This is particularly true of financial institutions where the imposition of capital 
adequacy ratios and reserve requirements by the regulatory agencies have made them 
a safer place to invest and allowed them, in tum, to serve a wider base of customers 
without resorting to raise new equity or deposits. And as the barriers on the 
movement of capital are removed and capital markets converge to become one and 
larger, competition between various segments of the economy for the same capital 
becomes more intense and necessitates the search for cost-effective funding. 125 
Another factor which has spurred the growth of securitisation is the rapidly 
growing field of computer technology which has made it possible to obtain credit and 
liquidity information on millions of financial assets, enabling those in the market 
greater leeway to isolate certain types of assets and make them self-financing. The 
availability of this type of information has enabled institutions to remove these assets 
from their balance sheets as previously mentioned and obtain better credit rating for 
them than what the originators could and thereby lower the cost of funding. 
In the nine months to end-September 2005, the global total of rated 
securitisation deals rose 35 per cent, to about US$ 1,240bn, according to S&P. In 
Europe, the total volume of rated securitisation deals rose 50 per cent to US$ 
250bn. 126 
"There is still the perception of securitisation as a new science," says Kurt 
Sampson, European head of structured finance ratings at S&P. "It is not an exotic 
125 Sulaiman Abdi Dualeh. (1998, July). "Islamic Securitisation: Practical Aspects", Geneva. Paper 
presented at the Noga Hilton for the World Conference on Islamic Banking, Geneva, Switzerland. 
126 Charles Batchelor. (2004, Nov., 4). "Joining Europe's Mainstream". Financial Times. 
95 
technique. Increasingly, people regard it as a fundamental part of their investment 
strategy." 
Islamic financiers cannot but focus their attention this phenomenon for 
securitisation has some specific benefits for Islamic institutions. Asset-backed 
securitisation is of course the right course of action for Islamic institutions to take as 
long as these assets are structured in accordance with Islamic principles. Islamic 
transactions are based on collateralised assets. For example, we use murabaha to 
purchase certain goods on behalf of clients and sell them back to the same client 
rather that advance an interest bearing loan to enable them to purchase the goods. 
Similarly, we use an ijara contract to buy specified equipment and lease it to the 
project operator instead of advancing him liquid capital against payment of interest. 
Thus, securitisation can free up resources that are tied up in illiquid project and trade 
financing activities and bring in much needed liquidity to the institutions and the 
capital market. 
There are three main structures commonly used in securitisation. They are: 
pass-throughs, asset-backed securities and pay-throughs. These structures have been 
developed in the secondary mortgage and non-mortgage market. Only one such 
structure will be considered here - the pass-throughs - as they most closely adhere to 
Islamic principles. "Pass-throughs represent direct ownership in a portfolio of assets 
that are usually similar in quality, maturity and yield. The originator services the 
portfolio of assets, makes collections, and passes them on, less servicing fee, to the 
investors. Ownership ofthe assets in the portfolio lies with the investors; thus pass-
throughs are not debt obligations of the originator and do not appear on the 
originator's balance sheet. Pass-throughs may also be designed to represent a portion 
of ownership, rights and obligations, but not a conveyance of title. Sometimes 
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complex tax or investor issues and in many Islamic countries, rules restricting foreign 
ownership of locally domiciled assets require the partial assignment or sale without 
recordation". 127 
The process of securitisation works in the following manner: first the 
originator collects the assets on its balance sheet and as the level of assets reaches a 
critical mass, they are sold or assigned to the SPV set up by the originator and whose 
sole purpose is to raise finance for the assets. Next, the originator is retained to 
service the assets by the SPV which then issues tradable securities and uses the 
proceeds from the sale of these securities to purchase the original asset portfolio from 
the originator. Investors then make the decision to purchase these securities on the 
basis of the quality of the assets pool and their confidence that the assets are of 
sufficient value to repay the securities on maturity. 
There is no reason why Shari'ah-compliant securitisation cannot, for example, 
utilise the assets that are in the UK or Europe, particularly in the property market 
which Islamic investors have traditionally been investing in. With the Islamic Bank of 
Britain and other Islamic financial institutions and funds having established 
themselves in the UK and elsewhere, this market should witness increased activity in 
future. And considering their popularity, as evidenced by their oversubscription in 
various jurisdictions, sukuk can be more cost-effective in funding real estate or 
property developments. 128 
Sukuk al-ijara can drive the process of creating an active secondary market for 
trading in these securities. By providing payment of income on a monthly, quarterly 
127 Sulaiman Abdi Dualeh; "Islamic Securitisation: Practfcql Asp(!cts ", I <,)98, Geneya, a paper for the 
World ConJerence on Islamic -Banking~pp.5-6; Adam & Thomas, "Islamic Bonds", pp. 71-73 and 
128 Thomas, Cox & Kraty, in "Stmcturing Islamic Finance Transactions", op. cit., pp., 157-169 
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or annual basis, they are well-suited for securitisation, which can have many of the 
features of conventional bonds. Sukuk al-ijara represent ownership of well-defined 
assets under a leasing contract and can be traded in the secondary market at prices 
determined by market forces. Sukuk can be issued by different types of issuers, from 
government authorities, public and private companies, to religious 
ministries/endowments (awqaj). The maturity of such securities can extend from 3 to 
6 months and 5 to 20 years, though there are very few issues which extend beyond 10 
years. 
Although there is great potential for securitisation for Islamic banks as SPV or 
originator of its own assets, the process has not gone far enough and the volume so far 
is insignificant compared to the world market. 
The limiting factors have been dearth of assets of the right quality; absence of 
a viable secondary market; the predominance of murabaha form of financing by 
Islamic banks the risks involved in securitisation are higher because they are typically 
off balance sheet and stand-alone without the protection of the overall standing of the 
corporate or institutional entity; and, finally corporate sukuk complicate the picture by 
being less well regulated than institutional issues. Cross-border taxation can also be a 
complicating factor in securitisation. 
It is important to note that as capital markets become globalised, rating begins 
to assume more importance as a safety valve for investors and financiers. However, 
this issue has so far not worked in favour of Islamic securitised products and only 
rarely have these products been awarded triple A ratings, so there some way to go 
before Islamic securitisation can really take off in the world market. 129 
129 Manjoo, F. A. (2005). "Securitisation: An Important Recipe for Islamic Banks- A Survey". 
Review of Islamic Economics, Vol. 9, No.1. 
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4.7.1 Sukuk Ratings and Securitisation Issues and Challenges 
Fitch Ratings and Shari'ah Law 
Before we deal with the concerns and issues of rating sukuk in the Muslim world, it 
would perhaps be useful to start with a brief note on conventional ratings agencies. 
"The larger body of investors and some institutional investors rely on rating 
agencies for valuation of their securities on account of their independent and unbiased 
nature. The famous ones are: S&P, Moody's and Fitch. Rating definitions are released 
by these firms but they are not 'buy', 'hold' or 'sell' indicators. Although they do not 
purport to indicate market direction, serving only as a guide to the issuer's ability and 
willingness to meet the terms of the issue, they are still taken into account in any 
. d . . 11130 
mvestment ecision. 
Fitch maintains that many Islamic jurisdictions, such as Saudi Arabia and 
others in the Middle East, have significant potential to securitise domestically-
originated assets. However, securitisation ratings often prove difficult to achieve in 
jurisdictions with legal systems based on the precepts of Islamic Shari'ah. For Fitch, 
the legal opinions which it has so far received do not indicate that a true sale has taken 
place. By this is meant that it has yet to see a fully-perfected transfer of the legal 
interest in the collateral from the originator to the SPV/SPE. In effect, Fitch expects 
legal opinion to address the vulnerability of the sale transaction to be looked upon as 
an unsecured loan by a bankruptcy court or an insolvency official of the originator, or 
overturned by the same over preference or fraudulent transfer, generally. 
Fitch would also like to see that where a jurisdiction permits the consolidation 
of the assets and liabilities of related companies, the creditors of the parent 
130 Richard, K. and Penrose, J. (2006). "Two Aspects Of Rating Sukuk: Sharia Compliance And 
Transaction". Available at:,URL:http://www.standardandpoors.com>. Access date: [8th Feb., 2006] 
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company or the issuer/originator cannot lay claim to the assets of the SPY. This is 
in line with the main purpose of using a bankruptcy-remote SPY, which is to 
avoid bankruptcy or insolvency events. This minimises the risk that the assets of 
the SPY will be distributed other than in accordance with the contractual 
obligations contained in the transaction documents. In this respect, certain rules 
must apply: first, the SPY's purpose must be limited to transaction-limited 
activities only. It may not engage in activities that may cause it to have creditors. 
Secondly, all transaction documents should contain non-competition clauses from 
any party engaged directly or indirectly in the transaction. Thirdly, all transaction 
documents should include limited-recourse clauses whereby all transaction 
creditors should agree that the liability of the SPY to pay any interest and 
principal claims will be made from the proceeds of the securitised assets and 
enhancements available and once these are fully paid, the SPY's obligation to all 
remaining creditors will be fully realised and finally, the constitutional documents 
of the SPY should contain restrictions on the shareholders' ability (where a parent 
company's structure is used) to initiate bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings and 
that the SPY will not be a party to such proceedings. 131 
Fitch claims that it has, to date (24/03/05), not seen any legal opinion 
confirming that non-petition or limited-recourse clauses are enforceable in a Shari'ah 
jurisdiction and emphasises that in any securitisation structure, it is crucial for 
investors to have the benefit of first-priority security over the collateral (after 
creditors, as the law stipulates). The concept of security under Shari'ah is not always 
consistent with the Western understanding of it. As a result, Fitch would expect legal 
131 Dommisse, A. and Kazi, W. (2005). "Securitisation and Shari'ah Law": NY: Fitch Ratings Ltd. 
Available at: <URL:http:www.fitchratings.com> 
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opinion to address the nature of the security interests created under the transaction 
document and its enforceability against third parties (including the originator, his 
insolvency official or the creditors) and the perfection of documents such as 
registration and recording mechanisms. Again, according to Fitch, there is no legal 
opinion with regard to Shari'ah law jurisdictions, which shows that there is at least 
some legal certainty that the transaction documents are valid, binding and enforceable 
in a Shari'ah jurisdiction. The opinions expressed with regard to the latter, in Fitch's 
opinion, are qualified in the sense that: (1) Shari'ah law, by its very nature, is a 
statement of general principles which leaves the courts great latitude with regard to 
the interpretation of a particular Shari'ah precept and the manner in which it should be 
applied in respect of a particular transaction; (2) there are four schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence, each of whom adopt different criteria for interpreting Shari'ah precepts. 
Interpretation would then differ not only among different Islamic countries or 
jurisdictions but also within one country itself. This is further complicated by the fact 
that court decisions are often not recorded and even when they are recorded are 
binding on later decisions. Some opinions have gone as far as saying that courts 
operating under Shari'ah law might refuse to enforce a contract or might interpret it in 
accordance with their own terms if they judge it to be inequitable. Even with the 
latitude exercised by Shari'ah courts in their interpretation of equitable principles, 
securitisation could still be possible. However, it does mean that investors might not 
be sufficiently certain that the collateral underlying a securitisation will be available 
to them in distress situations; (3) since interest is expressly forbidden, legal opinion is 
needed to confirm that any payments structured as profits, rents, service charges, etc., 
are Shari'ah-compliant. Fitch is of the opinion that collateral-based triggers, such as 
those used to prevent asset deterioration and allow for accelerated repayment of 
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investors, should be included in any definition of default; ( 4) choice of Law and 
Enforcement of judgments: legal opinion should confirm that the law chosen to 
govern each aspect of the transaction would be upheld by the courts and adjudicative 
authorities of the chosen jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of incorporation of the parties to 
the transaction and the jurisdiction in which the collateral is held. In other words, 
would a judgment issued in a Shari'ah jurisdiction be recognised and enforced in the 
relevant foreign jurisdiction? What is needed is a securitisation structure that will 
address Shari'ah law risks where the collateral is in a Shari'ah jurisdiction and 
enforcement against the collateral and its proceeds rely on the Shari'ah law 
recognising and enforcing a foreign law judgement 132; and (5) all tax obligations 
should be predictable and the SPY is not subject to any withholding tax or any other 
taxes. But this is uncertain in the light of the SPYs' newness. Therefore, where an 
SPY is established, a tax directive from an appropriate authority, or an opinion from a 
reputable tax consultant, should provide the necessary comfort for such a transaction; 
In conclusion, Fitch believes that Shari'ah law opinion may not support 
securitisation ratings that rely on Shari'ah law interpretation or enforcement of 
investors' rights by a Shari'ah court. This applies where the chosen law is Shari'ah law 
as well as where another law is chosen but where a court order must be executed 
against collateral assets located in a Shari'ah jurisdiction. 
Despite these problems, securitisation may be possible through the use of a 
guarantor, even one in the Shari'ah jurisdiction. In this case, Fitch would refocus on 
such matters as the guarantor's reputation and creditworthiness, the importance of the 
transaction to the economy, the financial system and the Islamic banking community. 
This was the case in the Fitch-rated Solidarity Trust Services Ltd. transaction which 
132 
cif. Richard and Penrose. 
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securitised loan-type assets through Shari'ah-compliant financing techniques such as 
ijara, murabaha and istisna '. IDB provided an unconditional and irrevocable financial 
guarantee for the full maturity value of the notes, whose terms were governed by 
English law and whose jurisdiction was England. Fitch gave it a rating of AA, the 
same as its rating of IDB. 133 The latter also provided a liquidity facility to cover any 
mismatches between the underlying assets and the note obligations. However, because 
of the guarantee, the rating did not rely on a Shari'ah jurisdiction upholding an order 
by an English court or the validity of a 'true sale' of the assets to the SPY and other 
relevant legal issues. The guarantee would also cover any cash shortfalls generated by 
the assets. 134 
4.8 ISLAMIC EMBEDDED OPTIONS 
Trading in debts is not allowed under Shari'ah law; but the exchange of debt for real 
assets and usufructs is allowed. This provides for the opportunity to exchange debt for 
real assets and usufructs that can be added as embedded options for the settlement of 
debt.t35 
This can work particularly well in project financing where, for example, in a 
construction project, financing is provided to the tune of£ 100 million divided into a 
million zero-coupon sukuk at £100 each. Now if the istisna' certificate is based on a 
10% mark up, then the issued price of a zero-coupon sukuk is 90% of the principal 
amount or £90. Suppose, then, that these sukuk are issued for 10 years. Istisna' sukuk 
are not tradable under Shari'ah law and, as a result, there will be no secondary market 
133 See the details of the IDB issue in the Appendix. 
134 Dommisse, A., and Kazi, W. (2005). "Securitisation and Shari'ah Law": NY: Fitch Ratings Ltd. 
Available at: <URL:http:www.fitchratings.com> 
135 Archer, S. and Abdel Karim, R. op. cit., p.l81 
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for them. The investor is therefore locked in for 1 0 years before s/he can convert them 
into cash. At the same time, the investor is exposed to the following risks 136: 
1. Liquidity risk as he or she is locked in for ten years. 
2. Re-investment risk because he or she cannot reinvest the 10% profit which he 
or she has been promised, until the certificates reach their maturity date in 10-
years time. 
3. Credit risk. This is always greater with longer maturities than with shorter 
ones. It relates to the issuer's/borrower's credit worthiness, which is relatively 
easier to predict in the short-term. 
4. Interest rate risk. Again, this is greater in the longer run, particularly in a 
volatile market. Interest rates are brought in here because sukuk returns are 
benchmarked to LIBOR+. 
5. Foreign exchange risk. This risk arises from the difficulty of predicting or 
forecasting in the longer run. 
An embedded option could transform the risk profile of these zero-coupon sukuk 
certificates in the following way: 
Let us assume that the real estate project involves the construction of an 
apartment building and that the construction company writes an option in the 
certificate that upon completion of the project in one year, the certificate holders 
are allowed to purchase or acquire an apartment on lease, utilising their zero-
coupons. Assume that the rent for an apartment is £7000 a year, then a person 
holding, say, £7000 worth of zero coupons will be able to lease an apartment for 
one year, starting from year 2, instead of having to wait 10 years in order to cash 
the zero coupons. Similarly, the investor can buy the apartment if he or she holds 
136 Tariq Ali, op. cit., pp., 43-47 
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sufficient zero coupons to pay for their full price. In this way, a financial asset is 
converted into a real asset with different risk characteristics. 137 
The embedded feature in this case is a call option on the new assets of the 
construction company. This call option cannot be detached or traded as in 
conventional ones, thus, there is no 'danger' of creating derivatives. 138 
The risk profile of the certificates also changes as mentioned above. The 
downside to the investments is by default protected by the mark up of 10%. The 
certificates would become more attractive as holders of the zero-coupon 
certificates would benefit from the call option and at the end of the day will be 
able to redeem their certificates at maturity at face value or par, which is 
permissable under Shari'ah. And once the call option is exercised, all the above-
mentioned risks are isolated and their impact reduced - hence, the transformation 
of a financial asset into a real asset with different risk features. 139 
Embedded options can be added to most Islamic financial contracts such as 
leasing, instalment sale and sa/am contracts. Moreover, the options themselves 
can be varied to suit the particularities of the transaction: 
• The zero-coupon holders may be given the option to exchange their 
certificates for an equivalent or suitable amount of the goods or 
output that a company produces; the certificates could also be 
given the option of converting into the common stock or equity of a 
company, and/or its subsidiaries, if listed on a recognised stock 
exchange. 
137 Ibid., pp., 73-76 
138 Bacha, 0. I. (n.d.) "Derivative Instruments and Islamic Finance: Some thoughts For a 
Reconsideration", International Journal of Islamic Financial Services Vol. I No. I 
139 cif., Ali Arsalan Tariq, op. cit., pp., 74-76 
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• The certificates can be 'put' or sold back to the issuer during a 
specified time before maturity or the company/issuer can 'call' back 
the securities during a specified time period before maturity. 140 
4.8.1 Relevance of Options to Islamic Instruments 
"From a Shari'ah perspective, there is a distinction between an option and the trading 
of an option, while the former is permissable, the latter is not, in the current view of 
Islamic scholars. Options represent rights (huquq), but do they represent benefits 
(manfa 'a) and not wealth or mal? The general view is that rights are not tradable at a 
price, but manfa 'a is. When options result in physical delivery, they best fit into 
established Islamic norms. However, cash settled options involve the exchange of two 
money assets or the netting of two payment obligations." 141 
The role of options and derivatives in the development of capital markets is 
important, particularly in enhancing the competitiveness of Islamic financial 
instruments with regard to conventional bonds. Bay' a!- 'urbun is the closest thing to 
an options contract. A would-be buyer would pay a deposit to purchase a specific 
product in future but if he or she does not do so, they would then forego the 'urbun, 
the deposit. 142 Scholars differ on the use of future contracts and consider it akin to 
gharar. Others disagree and argue that the contract is predicated on the specificity of 
the commodity in the contract. Such conditionality makes it difficult for such 
contracts to replicate the functions of the conventional options contract that may be 
exercisable on unspecified underlying assets. The OIC Academy considers such 
contracts untradable because, first, such contracts involve investing in intangible 
140 Ibid. 
141 Thomas, Cox and Kraty, "Structuring Islamic Finance Instmments", pp. 190- I 92 
142 Tariq, Ali Arsalan, "Managing Financial Risks ofSukuk Structures", Msc Dissertation, 
Loughborough Universty, September 2004 and cif. Thomas, Cox & Kraty, p.l92 
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assets and secondly, the uncertainty in these contracts amounts to gharar, which 
renders them invalid under Shari'ah law. 
4.8.2 The Impact of Embedded Options 
These options are not detachable from the bond and cannot be traded separately like 
equity options. They must be evaluated with the fixed income portion of the bond 
when determining the proper market price, yield and risk of the bond. Embedded 
options work to the advantage of the issuer; when an investor buys a callable bond, 
one is effectively buying a noncallable bond (also called a bullet bond) and 
simultaneously selling a call option back to the issuer. 
The value of a bond with embedded options will change depending on how the value 
of the embedded options changes when interest rates change. For example, as interest 
rates decline, the price of a callable bond may not increase as much as an otherwise 
option-free bond (that is, a bond with no embedded options). 143 
To understand why this is so, we decompose the price of a callable bond into two 
parts, as shown below: 
Price of a callable bond= Price of an option-free bond- Price of embedded call 
options. The reason for subtracting the price of embedded call options from an option-
free bond is that the call option is a benefit to the issuer and a disadvantage to the 
bondholder. This reduces the price of a callable bond relative to an option-free bond. 
Now, when interest rates decline, the price of an option-free bond increases. 
The price of the embedded call option also increases when interest rates decline, 
143 Archer, S. and Abdel Karim, R. 2002 (Eds). "Islamic Finance-Innovation and Growth". London, 
UK: Euromoney Books, p.l82 
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because it becomes more valuable to the issuer. So when interest rates decline both 
components increase, but the price of the callable bond depends on the relative change 
of the two components. Typically, a decline in interest rates will result in an increase 
in the price of the callable bond, although not by as much as the price change of an 
otherwise comparable option-free bond. 
Similarly, when interest rates rise, the price of a callable bond will not fall by 
as much as an otherwise option-free bond. The reason is that the price of the 
embedded call option declines. When interest rates rise, the price of the option-free 
bond declines but is partially offset by the decrease in the price of the embedded call 
option. 144 
4.9 ISLAMIC RISK PROFILE 
Most Islamic finance instruments are illiquid because they are either held to maturity 
or cannot be traded except at face value and because of the underdeveloped state of 
the secondary market; so liquidity risk is of particular concern as far as Islamic 
financial products are concerned. Furthermore, this risk arises out of a number of 
other factors, amongst them are: small number of participants in the secondary 
market, slow development of Islamic financial products, absence of Islamically 
acceptable inter-bank market, absence of a lender of last resort facilities and the 
potential for different Shari'ah interpretations. 
Sovereign sukuk risk is usually defined as a probability of default and pricing 
volatility which arises as a consequence of an action by a foreign government. 
Sovereign issues may have a higher credit rating than others but governments have 
been known to default (Argentine, Mexico, etc.), while others (KSA, UAE and the 
144 Strumeyer, op. cit. pp. 37-38 and Fabozzi, Handbook, pp. 328-329 
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smaller Gulf countries whose currency is pegged to the US dollar), makes them 
susceptible to US economic cycles and policy changes. It is the relative, and not the 
absolute, creditworthiness of a country to others that is at issue when sovereign risk is 
assessed; hence the need to establish a system of relative values or indicators by 
which we can compare and assess these countries in terms of sovereign risk. These 
values must include quantitative indicators such as foreign exchange reserves, exports 
and balance of payments. 
The risk profile of the corporate sukuk issues is different and is a function of 
the type of sukuk under consideration and their underlying assets. With sukuk al-ijara, 
the liability is limited to the value of the assets securitised. The SPY, as the owner of 
the leased assets, will be bankruptcy-remote, which makes it doubly difficult to lay 
claim to anything more than the related cash flows. However, musharaka sukuk and 
mudaraba sukuk are risky, as they rely on the outcome of a business venture that is 
difficult to predict, much like equity participation in companies. Third party guarantee 
against investors' losses can be secured; but this must be entirely outside the contract 
for these two forms of sukuk. Additionally, a guarantee is a problematic issue in 
Islamic finance, whereas risk is a prerequisite in Islamic transactions, needed to 
ensure compliance with Shari'ah law. 145 
145 Adam, N. & Thomas, A." Islamic Bonds", op. cit., pp., 57-60 and Archer, S. & Abdel Karim, R. in 
Islamic Finance, Innovation and Growth, pp., 176-180 
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4.10 CAPITAL MARKETS, JLIQUIDITY AND THE ROLE OF 
BAHRAIN AND MALAYSIS 
Chapter Introduction 
In this chapter, the leading role of Bahrain and Malaysia is considered and examined 
in the context of liquidity and development of capital markets. 146 
There is of course extensive literature on sukuk, but not much in the way of 
critical examination of that literature. Perhaps overwhelming pressures to come up 
with new products to satisfy the ever-growing demand for Islamic financial 
instruments and investment outlets has, for the time being at least, deferred such an 
examination and discussion. However, a critical discussion and examination of the 
sukuk structures will be crucial if they are to meet the challenges facing them, and 
crucial also to the furthering of their development. Consequently, there are large areas 
of Islamic finance where further analysis and research is required. 
What is taken for granted in the conventional financial markets, in terms of the ability 
to access liquidity and invest flexibly, is not so in their Islamic counterparts. 
Furthermore, much of the product innovation in the Islamic financial 
sector in the past has been engineered to meet specific investment risk and return 
criteria for Islamic commercial banks. Increasingly, Islamic financial institutions have 
applied murabaha, salam, tawarruq and sukuk to manage their liquidity. The absence 
of a money market, outside Malaysia, to serve Islamic banks remains a challenge. 
146 Cox, S. (2005). "Developing the Islamic Capital Market and Creating Liquidity", Review of Islamic 
Economics, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp., 75-86 and Thomas, Cox, and Kraty, "Structuring ... " op. cit., pp., 171-
182. 
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4.11 THE GLOBAL SUKUK MARKET IN PERSPECTIVE 
4.11.1 Sovereign and Corporate Sukuk Market 
Sovereign sukuk are those issued by countries such Bahrain, Malaysia, Pakistan and 
others, while corporate sukuk are those issued by companies such as Tabreed 147 and 
HANC0. 148 They both serve as financing tools for both issuer/borrower and lender. 
Sovereign sukuk are issued by various governments in the Middle East such as 
Bahrain, Malaysia, Qatar, Iran, Pakistan, Sudan and Turkey. 149 These have become 
quite popular as a means of financing infrastructure developments, government debt 
and credit expansion through the banking sector. These sukuk also help in cross-
border convergence of standards and opportunities by virtue of having investors from 
one market or geographical area such as the Middle East investing in, say, Malaysian 
issues or sukuk and vice versa. Indeed, a number of US and European investors have 
also participated in some of these issues, though they remain a minority. Such cross-
border participation necessitates that the characteristics of these sukuk issues be 
attractive enough in terms of returns, tenor and compliance with Shari'ah. The latter, 
in particular, poses a problem because, for instance, the majority of Middle Eastern 
jurists do not sanction the trading of receivables-based debt and other forms of debt, 
whereas Malaysian jurists do and actively trade in it. 150 
147 Adam, N. and Thomas A. (2004). "Islamic Bonds" pp., 119-121; see also the example in the 
Appendix. 
148 Thomas, A., Cox, S., & Kraty, B.,(2005). "Structuring Islamic Finance Transactions", pp., 83-84 
Also see example in the Appendix. 
149 Adam, Nathif and Thomas, Abdulkader (2004). Islamic Bonds: Your Guide to Issuing, Structuring 
and Investing in Sukuk: London, UK: Euromoney Books. 
150 The Qatar Global Sukuk and the Anhalt-Saxony are two examples of sovereign sukuk that are 
included in the Appendix. 
111 
Sovereign sukuk are nowadays widely used to finance public expenditure 
programs, to develop infrastructure projects such as medical complexes, motorways, 
ports, airports and substantial tourist developments. Corporate sukuk, on the other 
hand, are mainly used by companies to finance expansion, by merger and acquisition, 
for instance, or by opening new markets and establishing overseas operations. 
The Qatar Global sukuk has been hailed as an important landmark issue, 
because it demonstrated that a sukuk issue, if structured properly, would not be 
precluded under a civil legal system with parallel legal systems (Shari'ah and 
conventional). 151 The issue arose as to how the issuer (QGS) would be able to enforce 
the rights of the sukuk-holders in its capacity as their trustee in a Qatari court when 
Qatari law does not recognise trusts? The issue was resolved by Qatari agency law 
which gives the issuer a recognised legal relationship vis-a-vis the sukuk-holders in 
any local enforcement proceedings against the government. The Qatari Government 
also undertook to pay a late payment amount to the charity of an issuer's choice if it 
delayed payment of a rental. 152 
Sovereign sukuk have, generally, been criticised on the grounds that in most 
cases the head lease does not transfer ownership rights or obligations of the leased 
assets, and does not provide for a possible liability for new government land taxes; in 
effect, there is nothing amounting to ownership. In the same vein, the Bahrain sukuk 
issue of US$250,000,000 Trust Certificates due 2009 was criticised because of the 
clause that indemnified the issuer of sukuk (the "owner" of the parcels of land) against 
any possible losses, transferring risk to the lessee. Although this was not considered to 
be wholly acceptable under Shari'ah, the Citi Islamic Investment Bank Shari'ah Board 
151 
see details in the Appendix. 
152 Rahail Ali, (n.d.) "Qatar US$ 700,000,000 Global Sukuk- A Civil Jurisdiction First". Amarican 
Journal of Islamic Finance (ajif), pp., I -2 
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approved it, for reasons, it seems, that had more to do with expediting the 
development of Islamic financial institutions and product innovation than Islamic law. 
Corporate sukuk 153 should take off on the back of the market for sovereign 
sukuk, now that the latter is reasonably well-developed. There have already been a 
number of corporate issues such the one for Hanco, the Saudi car rental company, 
Tabreed, the UAE cooling company. 154 
There are companies in the Middle East with large pools of assets that can be 
I 
securitised and issued to the public - companies like SABIC in Saudi Arabia which 
has already started this process and most telecommunications companies that are still 
owned, to varying degrees, by the State in such countries. Privatisation is now 
creeping in and has affected most of these semi-monopolies. Some, and SABIC is one 
ofthem, have already followed the route of pooling their assets, securitising them and 
issuing them as sukuk certificates. There are also substantial infrastructure projects 
that can be developed by a combination of istisna ', when a project is under 
construction, and sukuk al-ijara, when the project is completed and a stream of cash 
flows is expected. 
Middle Eastern economies, particularly those of the oil-rich countries ofthe 
Gulf, have always been characterised by an active construction sector. This is 
especially so when the economy is on an upward tum. A large number of these 
companies use heavy plant and equipment which could form the basis of issuing 
sukuk to finance the projects which they have been awarded and/or capacity 
expansiOn. 
153 Adam, N. and Thomas, A. Islamic Bonds, op. cit., pp. 119-121 
154 See Appendix where a case study is presented on Hanco's 'Caravan Sukuk'. 
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Similarly, the private sector is now increasingly engaged in industrial 
production, producing consumables as well as household appliances. Many of these 
private sector companies can be readily financed by Islamic banks on the basis of 
their assets; hence, the potential for sukuk issuance. 
The following table provides information on the Sukuk market in terms of 
type of issuer, originating country, type of sukuk (if any), value of issue, share of each 
issuer and sector and number of issues for each issuer. 
Islamic Bonds Issuers League Table 2005 
Type of Sukuk Amount Share No. Issuer/Borrower Country US$ Issues Issued Million % 
Announced 
1 IDB Saudi Arabia Sukuk 500.00 15.87 1 
2 Syabas Malaysia Sukuk 473.68 15.04 1 
3 Brunei Co. Brunei Sukuk 300.00 9.52 1 
4 SABIC KSA Sukuk 267.00 8.48 1 
5 Sdn Bhd Malaysia Sukuk 263.25 8.36 1 
6 DRB-Hycom Malaysia Sukuk 263.08 5.35 1 
7 Arcapita Bank Bahrain Murabaha 200.00 6.35 1 
7 National Leasing Qatar Sukuk 200.00 6.35 1 
8 Boustead Holding Bhd Malaysia Sukuk al ijara 199.00 6.32 1 
9 Sapuracrest Petroleum Malaysia Sukuk 131.61 4.18 1 
Bhd 
1 0 Arab Media Corp. Jordan Sukuk 100.00 3.17 1 
10 Dubai Emirates Sukuk 100.00 3.17 1 
11 A'Ayan Leasing & Kuwait Sukuk 60.00 1.90 1 
Investment Co. 
12 The Investment Dar Co. Emirates PLS 60.00 1.90 1 
(KSC) 
13 Volaw Trust Co. Qatar Sukuk 26.00 0.83 1 
14 Apexindo Pratama Duta Indonesia Sukuk al ijara 16.43 0.52 1 
Tbk 
Total 3150.05 100.00 16 
SOVEREIGN (Issued) 
1 Govt. of Pakistan Pakistan Ijara-(Leasing) 600.00 88.30 1 
2. Govt. of Bahrain Bahrain Ijara (Leasing) 79.50 11.70 1 
Total 679.50 100.00 2 
CORPORATE (Issued) 
1 J imah Energy Ventures Malaysia Istisna'a 1275.76 23.24 1 
(Purchase 
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Order) 
2 Time Engineering Malaysia PLS 658.02 11.99 1 
3 Plus Expressway Bhd Malaysia Deferred 634.20 11.55 1 
Payment Sale 
(BBA) 
4 Emirates Airlines UAE Sukuk 550.00 10.02 1 
5 IDB KSA Sukuk 500.00 9.11 1 
6 Amlak Finance UAE Sukuk 200.00 3.64 1 
6 Dubai Metals & UAE Sukuk 200.00 3.64 1 
Commodity Centre 
6 World Bank Malaysia BBA 200.00 3.64 1 
7 Durrat Sukuk Co. Bahrain Istisna'a + Ijara 152.50 2.78 1 
BSC sukuk 
8 Ranhill Powertron Sdn Malaysia BBA 142.14 2.59 1 
Bhd 
9 Ranhill Utilities Bhd Malaysia BBA 142.10 2.59 1 
10 AI Marfa' a AI Mali Bahrain Istisna'a + Ijara 134.00 2.44 1 
Sukuk Co. B. S.C. sukuk 
11 Commercial Real Estate Kuwait Ijara sukuk 100.00 1.82 1 
Company 
12 Lembaga Kemajuan P. P. Malaysia BBA 78.92 1.44 1 
Pertanian Ng. 
13 Jimah Energy (SPV) Malaysia Bai' Inah (Sale 56.65 1.03 1 
with 
immediate 
purchase) 
14 Premba Jaya Holdings Malaysia Murabaha 52.63 0.96 1 
Dsn Bhd Sukuk 
14 Cagamas Berhad Malaysia BBA 52.63 0.96 1 
15 Ample Zone Berhard Malaysia Ijara sukuk 39.50 0.72 1 
16 Malaysian Merchant Malaysia BBA 31.63 0.58 1 
Marine Bhd's 
17 lntelbest Sdn Bhd Malaysia BBA 28.95 0.53 1 
18 Oxbridge Height Malaysia Sukuk 27.37 0.50 1 
19 Tracoma Holdings Bhd Malaysia BBA 26.32 0.48 1 
20 AI Safeena I Ltd UK Sukuk 26.00 0.48 1 
21 Apexindo Prtama Duta Indonesia Ijara sukuk 25.28 0.46 1 
Tbk 
22 Midas Plantation Malaysia ljara sukuk 24.47 0.45 1 
23 Indosat Indonesia ljara sukuk 21.10 0.38 1 
24 PG Muni Assets Malaysia Mudharaba 21.05 0.38 1 
(Profit-
Sharing) 
25 Mulpha International Malaysia Murabaha 15.80 0.29 I 
Bhd 
26M -Trex Malaysia Murabaha 15:8o 0.29 1 
27 Intelbest Sdn Bhd Malaysia Murabaha 13.16 0.24 1 
27 Oxbridge Height Malaysia Murabaha 13.16 0.24 1 
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27 Midas Plantation Malaysia Ijara sukuk 13.16 0.24 l 
28 Ricky Putra Indonesia Sukuk 13.00 0.24 l 
Total 5489.2 100.00 33 
Grand Total (issued Corporate + Sovereign) 6168.7 100.00 35 
Source: IF/S-IS Emerging Markets, www.securities.com/ifis 
4.11.2 Sukuk Applications in Project Finance 
Project financing has proved to be a fertile ground for the application of sukuk al-
ijara. This is usually a combination of construction finance (istisna ') during the 
construction phase, followed by a redeemable lease (ijara wa iqtina ') that buys out 
the completed project either in tranches or whole on completion. 155 
In parallel with istisna ', the Islamic banker or financier agrees with an end-
buyer on a price with profit as a return on the capital used in the construction. This 
transaction can take the form of an outright purchase, deferred sale or re-financing. 
The latter would be done through lease financing. In project finance, the common 
approach is to structure sequential contracts of istisna'a and ijara. These are 
combined for the purpose of financing the construction of new capital equipment or 
plants such as a refinery or power plant when the construction takes more than three 
years. 
The profit calculation is fixed in tranches, based on stages of completion and 
or payment certificates and may be fixed or variable when the lease starts. 
Another form ofleasing which is permitted by Shari'ah scholars is ijara 
mawsufa bil thimma which is a form of future pre-paid lease. In this case, rentals are 
prepaid by the lessee on the understanding that if the plant is not constructed or 
acquired in accordance with the specifications in the lease agreement by a certain 
155 Thomas, Cox and Kraty. "Structuring ... ", op. cit., pp., 82-88. See also the example ofTabreed in 
the Appendix. 
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date, such prepaid rentals will be payable by the financiers. This structure is used to 
provide working capital for construction against an undertaking to lease such plant or 
equipment. 156 
4.12 MlJRABAHA AS A LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT TOOL 
One way for banks to have recourse to liquidity and to satisfy their regulators was the 
use of murabaha in commodity trading through a recognised commodity exchange 
such as the London Metal Exchange (LME). Basically, it would instruct a broker on 
the LME to buy a recognised commodity at spot value and resell it to a third party on 
deferred terms and at the same time engage in a parallel transaction through a broker 
to buy the commodity on its behalf on deferred terms and sell it spot to another. These 
transactions can have a duration ranging from one week to a year and have yields 
similar to money market rates and are said to resemble breaking a time deposit 
although more costly, as more steps are involved and therefore more charges. 157 Some 
scholars have questioned the validity of such a transaction as true sale while others 
have accepted it as such on the basis that the sale is between different and independent 
parties. 
Commonly, wholesale murabaha transactions are credit-enhanced and the 
beneficiary is asked to support its payment obligation by asking its bank to issue an 
LIC in favour of the financing institution. 
More than 70% of the funds of Islamic banks are still invested in murabaha 
structures. Malaysia has been able to securitise its murabaha or bay 'bi-thaman ajil, 
156 Adam, N., Thomas, A., (2005). "Structuring Islamic Finance Transactions", op.cit., p. 82 
157 Abdul Majid, Abdul Rais. (2003, October). Development of Liquidity Management Instruments: 
Challenges and Opportunities. Paper presented at the International Conference on Islamic Banking 
and Supervision organised by the International Islamic Financial Market. Jakarta, Indonesia. 
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but the resulting bay 'al-dayn has proved unacceptable amongst jurists in the Arab 
World which considered such securitisation as one of debt rather than assets. 
4.13 MURABAHA: ASSET OR LIABILITY? 
Murabaha has been much criticised for its limited application and for that 
overdependence on it, as some believe, has impeded the research and development of 
other Shari'ah-compliant instruments that would have been better placed to support 
the development of the Islamic capital market. It would be unimaginable to envisage 
the consequences of inaccessibility to money markets for any period of time without 
the existence of murabaha. A case in point was when some international banks 
refused to roll over their murabaha placements into new transactions during the first 
Gulf War . Islamic banks were at a loss as to where to place their funds in the absence 
of local inter-bank markets. 158 
It would be difficult to ignore the role that murabaha has played throughout 
the three decades that Islamic banks have managed to exist and throughout which 
have been obliged to maintain high liquidity, but also during which they managed to 
grow their customer base and satisfy their central banks. 
4.14 IJARA SUKUK AND FUNDS 
With the advent of lease financing through sukuk al-ijara, it has become possible to 
satisfy investor demand for an instrument that has a combination of enhanced 
performance plus asset and risk diversification. An ijara contract incorporates a fixed-
term, or a periodically re-fixed, income stream or rental from the economic use of a 
physical underlying asset. Lease income can be readily securitised without any 
158 Thomas, A., Cox, S., & Kraty, B., Structuring Islamic Finance Transactions, p., 173 
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infringement of the Shari'ah, because the investor retains title to the leased asset 
throughout the investment period. 
!jar a funds have been incorporated to capitalise on a wide spectrum of 
international investment opportunities. Lease funds tend to invest in pools of suitable 
leased assets which may be sold to an SPY owned by the fund. The fund manager 
may issue certificates that represent their ownership of or title to a percentage of the 
asset pool and thereby a pro rata share of the income stream- subsequent sale of the 
certificates releases liquidity. 159 
Most Islamic funds now incorporate periodical redemption facilities as a 
feature. Historically, it has been the sponsor who would undertake to buy back the 
asset holding from the investors on a 'best-effort' or matched basis. 
It has proved difficult to move speedily without regulatory approval and an 
established market infrastructure. But there has been some movement in this respect, 
with recent initiatives to include liquidity provision by third party facilitators with 
their own investment grade ratings. 
The first Islamic Investment Bank had come up with its own Islamic 'Ijara 
Liquidity Programme' with the aim of preserving capital, providing a consistent 
income and offering investors returns comparable to those of the conventional money 
markets. The investor is granted a put option to sell the sukuk at 'face value' to a third 
party; such 'put' can take place on any redemption date after a minimum of one month 
holding. A profit return is attached to the sukuk and re-fixed on a monthly basis. This 
is an interesting sukuk launch because Malaysia was the first to do this and as the 
option was underwritten by a third party bank with an investment grade rating. 
159 Cox, S. (2005). "Developing the Islamic Capital Market and Creating Liquidity". Review of 
Islamic Economics, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp., 75-86 
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Islamic capital markets require sufficient volume of assets that are both 
eligible for securitisation and Shari'ah-compliant. The global market has offered the 
asset supply but also presented problems of taxation and structures that proved 
challenging. Nevertheless ongoing demand has spurred the growth of Islamic fund 
management sector towards greater activity and the international capital markets have 
served to deliver the allocation opportunity. 
Historically, the international equity markets have been the focus of Islamic 
asset management with equity funds representing more than 65% of the total Islamic 
fund universe. Some Islamic equity funds have been listed on both international and 
regional stock exchanges. 
4.15 DISCLOSURE, REGULATION AND RATING 
4.15.1 Introduction 
The legal and regulatory practice governing Islamic Financial Institutions (IFis) varies 
across the Muslim countries. For example, the Malaysian Islamic Banking Act (1993) 
refers to banking as a "lending business" and investment accounts are considered to 
be liabilities. In Iran, Islamic banks accept customer investments on the basis of 
wikala contract, an agency contract and not the mudaraba contract as is the case in 
other countries. 160 In other countries, such as Saudi Arabia, no laws have been passed 
to regulate Islamic banks; they operate under laws governing conventional banks. 
Kuwait has one IFI which operates as a finance house, not a bank, and is supervised 
by the Ministry of Commerce rather than the Central Bank. 
160 Wikala operates on the basis of the agent receiving a fixed fee, not a share of the profits as in 
Mudaraba. 
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Since the early 1990s, increasing attention has been paid to the regulatory and 
supervisory frameworks governing IFis. Differences in balance sheet structures 
between Islamic and conventional banks and the special features of Islamic financial 
contracts have been recognised to have important implications for accounting and 
financial reporting. 
AAOIFI is one of the main contributors to the BMA guidelines issued under 
the 'Prudential Information & Regulatory Framework for Islamic Banks' (PIRI). 
Professor Abd al-Karim is of the opinion that Bahrain's Islamic banks will have to 
comply with AAOIFI's standards on capital adequacy and follow AAOIFI's Shari'ah 
and governance standards. The change will enhance transparency and should narrow 
the disparities between the previously different rulings of in-house committees of 
different banks. He further expects AAOIFI standards to be adopted outside Bahrain 
and that such standards are necessary for cross-border listing. 161 
At the same time, a group of central bankers from Islamic countries founded in Kuala 
Lumpur the Islamic Financial services Board (IFSB). The aim is to develop 
international standards relevant to the IFI including corporate governance, 
transparency and disclosure. With the IFSB, AAOIFI and the Islamic rating agency, 
as well as the various national efforts at building a framework governing Islamic 
financial intermediation, a public policy for co-ordinating and consolidating these 
efforts is emerging. 
But what is the rationale for regulation? It is important to clarify the rationale 
to avoid over-regulating and stifling business initiatives and activities, or under-
regulate, allowing greater risk-taking in the pursuit of profits. 
Theoretically, there been three arguments for regulation: 
161 Middle East Economic Survey (200), Vol. XLV No. 5 
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1. The Public Good; 
2. Protection of Public Resources; and, 
3. Integrity of Fiduciary Contracts 
In respect of the public good, it is argued that the market alone cannot protect the 
stakeholders such as depositors and therefore regulation is needed to mitigate the risks 
taken by them. While some might be able, given the appropriate transparency and 
disclosure requirements, to undertake the necessary due diligence to assess the risks of 
their investments or deposits, in practice the majority would not. 
It is also argued that another objective of prudential regulation is to mitigate 
systemic risks which could disrupt normal business performed by the financial system 
payments or provision of liquidity. Such systemic risk could arise from the failure of 
one institution to meet its obligations, thereby undermining the confidence in the 
system or failure in some of its parts as in the payments system itself and the 
mechanisms and instruments to exchange liquidity. 
As a result, prudential regulation from this point of view would require a clear 
sense ofthe type, quality, and quantity of the public good to be delivered as well the 
nature of risks and risk exposure or values at risk involved. 162 
Protection of Public Resources implies that the existence of deposit insurance 
for the protection of depositors is itself a commitment of public resources and thus 
requires regulation to protect the resource. 
With regard to the Integrity of Fiduciary Contracts, the role of regulation here 
is seen as the provision of adequate checks and balances to mitigate the risks of the 
intermediary failing the trust of its stakeholders. The latter may include small 
162 El-Hawary, D., Grais, W., Iqbal, Z., (2004, March). "Regulating Islamic Financial Institutions: The 
Nature of the Regulated", World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3227 
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shareholders, in addition to depositors, raising the importance of corporate 
governance. 
4.15.2 The Reasons for the Regulation of IFis: 
A number of reasons have been advanced for the regulation of IF Is by Chapra and 
Khan (2000) 163 and Professor R Wilson. 164 
One reason is to maintain an orderly system of payments so that the IFI can 
meet its commitments and ensure the integrity and soundness of the IFI. Another 
reason relates to the protection of depositors through deposit insurance in 
conventional banks. This might not be required in an IFI, as both the financial 
intermediary and the depositor share symmetrical risk and PLS; introducing a 
guarantee on the downside would seem to run counter to the core objective of PLS 
and risk sharing. However, investment depositors should be informed of the contracts 
they enter into and have recourse when it is breached. But it is doubtful if depositors, 
in practice, are fully aware of the risks with their deposits and may require sufficient 
assurance as regards both security and returns. 
The third reason for requiring regulation is to ensure compliance with Shari'ah. 
In a jurisdiction where there is less defined separation between civil and religious law, 
it is necessary to ensure that banking activity complies with Shari'ah. And as IFis 
begin to integrate into the international financial community, the latter would like to 
see a commitment of IF Is to fulfilling contracts they enter into and participation in 
international payments. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Wilson, R (n.d.)., "Regulatory Challenges Posed by Islamic Capital Market Products and Services" 
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4.15.3 Regulatory Options 
Various options have been put forward. The ones which have gained acceptability are 
dynamic interaction between the regulated and the regulator, described as "regulatory 
dialectic" 165 and market discipline. In the first instance, Islamic financiers are 
encouraged to anticipate the demands of the regulators and incorporate these in their 
future design of Islamic products and services and as trust develops, it should lead to a 
softer approach by regulators. The market discipline approach is embedded in the 
PLS intermediation and should indicate to the IFI the extent of its capital requirement 
that is required to protect the reputation of the institution and provide legitimacy to 
the partnership with its stakeholders. At the same time, there should be more 
emphasis on transparency and disclosure in IFis than in conventional banks. 
Competition will cause the IFI to focus more on providing sufficient safety and return 
to depositors on unrestricted investment accounts than on providing the returns that its 
shareholders expect. As a result, the latter may be facing similar intermediation risk 
to conventional banks, thus requiring similar capital and supervision requirements. 
Furthermore, the pooling of demand deposits, unrestricted investment deposits and 
capital in financing their assets raises transparency issues for the distribution of 
returns or losses; hence, the need for more emphasis on disclosure and 
transparency. 166 
165 w· I R . 3 1s on, ., op. c1t., p. 
166 El-Hawary, D., Grais, W., Iqbal, Z., (2004, March). "Regulating Islamic Financial Institutions: The 
Nature of the Regulated", World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3227, pp., 33-36 
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4.15.4 Requisites for Effective Regulation 
Effective regulation requires that the IFI has systems in place to properly receive 
feedback on the risks that result from its actions but also the ability to process such 
feedback. For institutions to function properly the institutional infrastructure must 
provide for a proper system of property rights and the ability to enforce them, a sound 
contract law and the ability remedy any breaches. In addition, judicial recourse 
procedures must be available to resolve disputes speedily and efficiently. 
Transparency and soundness of accounting and auditing systems play a crucial 
role in the credibility of financial institutions.. In this respect, The Islamic Capital 
Market Fact Finding Report mentions three major issues with regard to accounting 
and auditing standards: 167 
• Comparability and reliability of information 
• Internationally acceptable standards; and 
• Quality of accounting and auditing standards. 
While the survey did not find uniformity in the application of accounting standards 
and practices across Islamic jurisdictions, the current approach of Islamic financial 
institutions is to benchmark standards for Islamic transactions to International 
Accounting Standards (lASs) to ensure consistency with globally accepted standards, 
modifying them where necessary, to ensure financial statements present fairly the 
financial position, financial performance and cash flows of the Islamic financial 
position. 168 
167 OICU-IOSCO, (2004, July). Islamic Capital Market, pp., 56-60 
168 OICU-IOSCO (2004, July). "Report of the Islamic Capital Market Task Force of the International 
Organisation of Securities Commissions". 
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Measurement and comparison of risk exposure should be the basis of 
regulation and despite the notable efforts at establishing accounting and auditing 
standards for IFis, accounting remains more concerned with value than risk 
assessment and allocation. These efforts can be augmented with other financially 
relevant information and credit rating. 
With increasing demand for Islamic financial instruments which requires a 
great deal of innovation, regulators need new skills to face the challenge of adapting 
to this dynamic environment. 
4.16 RISING TO THE CHALLENGE 
The issues that were discussed in the preceding sections point to the fact that the 
Islamic capital market is a part of the wider global securities market and that a sound 
regulatory framework with an appropriate supporting infrastructure are necessary for 
the development of a such a market. 
Although regulations applicable to conventional securities have been applied 
to Islamic financial securities, there may be instances where the special features of 
Islamic capital market products require specific guidelines. And as IOSCO report 
shows, there are no global best practices for regulating such areas as Shari'ah 
certification or the qualification of Shari'ah advisors and enhanced disclosure to 
Islamic capital market products. The report also noted the need for uniformity in 
regulation and practices to provide necessary clarity and confidence for market 
participants. Furthermore, information on investment products across borders and as 
well as credibility of and quality of information should be available and disseminated 
widely for the protection of investors. 
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Different Shari'ah interpretations among scholars, committees and Islamic 
countries are seen to retard the development of Islamic financial products and 
innovation and growth in the Islamic financial services industry. Therefore, 
convergence in Shari'ah interpretations is seen as beneficial long-term objective but 
there is consensus that that it is up to the Shari'ah scholars to accomplish such 
convergence. 
Another challenge is the gap in the skills of market practitioners for a 
sustainable growth in the Islamic capital market. 
There are now many international organisations established to facilitate and 
regulate the workings of the Islamic capital market such as the AAOIFI, IFSB and 
IIFM, yet there is no international body that can direct and focus debate on the 
important issues that affect the Islamic capital market and it is early days to assess the 
impact of the General Council for Islamic Banking on progress in respect of these 
issues. Several of these institutions have begun to consider regulatory and accounting 
issues relevant to the development of the Islamic financial services industry, by 
issuing guidelines and standards in governance and accounting matters to ensure 
investor protection and uniformity in standards as well as expertise in market 
regulation. 
It is only with co-operation and co-ordination among those concerned with 
Islamic finance at the global level, that a great deal of the issues and problems can be 
adequately addressed. 
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4.17 FORMATION OF ISLAMIC CAPITAL MARKET 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
4.17.1 Malaysia (IPDS) 
Malaysia spearheaded the developments necessary for such an infrastructure in the 
1990s by implementing a dual banking system, in which Islamic banks were allowed 
to operate in parallel to the conventional sector. This made possible the creation and 
the evolution of an Islamic inter-bank money market. In the summer of 2002, 
Malaysia issued a US$600mn Islamic sovereign sukuk al-ijara lead managed by 
HSBC, with a five-year maturity tenor. This was heavily oversubscribed and the 
sukuk were awarded a BAA2 rating by Moody's and a BBB rating by S&P - 51% of 
investors were from the Middle East. 169 
In an effort to level the playing field for non murabaha-backed securities, 
Malaysia introduced tax concessions against the cost of structuring, documenting and 
issuing Islamic asset-backed securities based on the more acceptable contracts of 
ijara, musharaka and mudaraba, rather than the debt securities resulting from 
murabaha and 'albai bithaman ajil'. 
4.17.2 The Middle lEast 
The BMA 170 has recently issued BDlO million worth of6-month asset-backed sukuk 
al-ijara based on the prevailing 6-month LIBOR rate, and these will be issued 
monthly once the first issue matures in Feb. 2006. These sukuk will be tradable and 
will act as collateral against short-term credit. Previously short-term sukuk al-salam 
169 IRTI: Chapter 2: "Islamic Capital Market Products, Development & Challenges". IDB. Jeddah, 
Saudi Arabia 
170 BMA website; Sukuk-Net on Google; IFIS on <URL.http://www.securities.com> 
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were issued. These short-term sukuk should provide the much-awaited development 
towards facilitating supply of liquidity in the markets and should complement a host 
of other medium to long-term securities by both Bahrain's US$250mn and Qatar's 
US$700mn in the markets. 171 
The Bahrain Monetary agency (BMA) was also the first in the Middle East to 
issue Shari'ah-compliant government 3-month bills, referred to as sa/am securities, of 
which its weekly issuance has recently increased from US$25 million to US$40 
million. The government of Bahrain would undertake to sell aluminium on a deferred 
basis for an advance payment. Price has to be prepaid in a sa/am contract because the 
objective in such contracts is to provide businesses with working capital financing. 
Since there is full repayment, sa/am sale is beneficial to the seller. The future price is 
usually lower than the spot price, unlike conventional futures contracts where the 
future price is typically higher than the spot price by the time-value of money. 172 
Aluminium in this case is the underlying asset for the salam contract. The 
Bahrain Government sells aluminium to the buyer. As consideration for this advance 
payment, the Government undertakes to supply a specified amount of aluminium at a 
future date. The BMA, on behalf of the Bahraini government, securitises the sale by 
issuing sukuk al-salam. These are purchased by Islamic financial institutions as a 
means of investing their excess liquidity. The purchasers then appoint the government 
as their agent to take delivery of the aluminium and sell it through their distribution 
channels at a price that will yield a rate of return to the holders of sukuk al-salam 
equivalent to the yield on similar short-term instruments in the conventional money 
market. The risks attached to sukuk al-salam are those that relate to government 
171 See the appendix. 
172 McNemara, P. (2005, September). "The BMA and the Sukuk AI Salam series". The Banker, pp., 
1-3 
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inability to take delivery and to the fact that, when it does take delivery, it may not be 
able to sell it or sell it at a price lower than cost. These risks constitute sovereign risk 
and may be mitigated by the structure of the deal. 173 
The benefits of sukuk al-salam, it is claimed, is that the cost price may never 
be declared (a transparency issue, which is questionable under Shari'ah) and the credit 
risk lower because of the Sovereign counterparty. However, they are not tradable, but 
this should not pose a problem as they are only for 91 days' duration. 
4.18 THE INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC FINANCIAL MARKET 
The diversity of the Islamic world and the emergence of the Islamic capital markets 
have been dependent not only on Shari'ah stipulations as understood by a particular 
school of thought, but also on conforming to various regulatory and financial 
accounting standards. A few years ago, the Labuan Offshore Financial Services 
Authority signed a memorandum of understanding with BMA and IDB to support the 
establishment of an Islamic capital market. The resultant IIFM is now headquartered 
in Bahrain with membership including Sudan, Indonesia and Brunei. Its primary 
purpose is to provide a co-operative framework for the market infrastructure. 
4.19 ISLAMIC CAPITAL MARKET: MULTINATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS 174 
The LMC in parallel with the IIFM has taken a proactive role in the sukuk issuance 
programme. Ultimately, LMC will be well-placed to act as liquidity manager for the 
Islamic financial sector. This is very important because the initiatives, presently 
173 Ibid. 
174 Thomas, Cox and Kraty. op. cit. P. 181-182 
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underway, tend to address investment of liquidity rather than access to funding (which 
is what is required). Bahrain is also the HQ for the International Rating Agency, 
established to bring consistency to rating Islamic financial instruments. To gain 
international credibility, the procedures need to be extremely transparent and there are 
suggestions that they will work with international agencies to achieve comparability. 
Finally, the Islamic Financial Services Board in Kuala Lumpur has been established to 
centralise the setting of prudential standards for the regulation and supervision of 
I 1 . b nk. 175 s am1c a mg. 
4.20 ONGOING DEVELOPMENT 
Individual banks can also have an important role in capital market initiatives. In April 
2003, FIIB (now Arcapita Bank) launched its debut sukuk to finance the expansion of 
its European operations. The US$75mn medium-term loan was managed by the 
Securities House of Kuwait. 
International banks have also played their part in the development of Islamic 
financial services and it is hoped that this would not be limited to their own products. 
There is now greater competition amongst investment banks to manage new Islamic 
sukuk issues and it is anticipated that their substantial financial positions and long-
term market experience will positively impact the trading volumes needed to achieve 
the critical mass. 
Arab governments, banks and large corporations are now engaged in financing 
through sukuk though some 60% of all bonds issued in Malaysia are yet to achieve the 
volumes expected in the Gulf. IDB's debut international sukuk issue of US$400mn 
175 IRTI (2005, Aug.), "Islamic Capital Market products: Developments and Challenges". IDB, Jeddah 
Saudi Arabia. 
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was awarded AAA by S&P and was meant to familiarise the capital markets with the 
structure. 
In preparation for secondary trading, provision is being made to list and cross-
list sukuk issue. By way of example, in September 2003 the Malaysian Global sukuk 
was cross-listed on the Bahrain S/E. Sukuk are still being held to maturity and not 
traded as was envisaged. This is justified by the lack of quality sovereign paper in the 
past. Aggregate international issues currently total less than US$3bn and it is 
suggested that unless the market expands and achieves the necessary critical mass at 
some point beyond the US$1 Obn, there will be little appetite to trade. 176 
In a major development that reflects the way in which banks are attempting to 
maintain and control their liquidity, there has been a shift away from murabaha and 
parallel murabaha towards tawarruq 177, which is basically the purchase of a 
commodity on a deferred basis and the reselling of it at less than the immediate 
payment using brokers and bona fide third parties. It is a complex transaction 
involving many contracts and intermediaries. Spot value purchases and sales of assets 
are supporting the facilitation of wholesale, Shari'ah-compliant inter-bank 
transactions. Further structuring developments have enabled tawarruq-based 
financing products to be offered at retail level by a growing number of Islamic and 
Arab banks. Such has been the growth and demand for the structure that scholars have 
been called to review merits on a number of occasions. It is likely that the principles 
of the contract will require further definition and some are pushing for establishing 
parameters for ongoing development with full Shari'ah endorsement. Although new to 
the market, there have been unprecedented levels of standardisation in the operational 
176 
"Capital Market Review" 
177 Thomas, Cox and Kraty, op. cit., p. 174. 
132 
and administrative procedures that support delivery of this product. It has served to 
deliver liquidity when required. 
4.21 CONCLUSION 
With the improvement in the asset base of the sukuk and the ongoing structure 
innovation and the establishment of its four multinational institutions (LMC, IIFM, 
liRA and IFSB), the scene has been set for a robust market to develop in these 
instruments with the necessary infrastructure. Cooperation and coordination between 
the major Islamic institutions will lead to more standardisation of new products and 
further innovation. 
In the final analysis, supervision by regulatory authorities and central banks in 
the countries of Bahrain and Malaysia can only bring substance and security to the 
market. Independent rating allows objective assessment and enhances customer 
confidence. This in tum will create market confidence in trading in these instruments, 
providing the liquidity and, eventually, the critical mass which financial markets need 
to sustain their development. 
The debt explosion in the West, amounting to some US$44 trillion, is not all 
linked to assets or specific productive projects or to the capital base of the economy. 
The Islamic position is that there should be a strong linkage between the financial and 
the real economy. Shari'ah law requires the community to strike a balance between the 
claims of production, assets and business requirements. The means used are the asset-
based sukuk which attempt to channel funds into productive activities with 
expectations of higher profits and lower risk. This is in sharp contrast to conventional 
debts, which are not necessarily directed towards economic pursuits that add value. In 
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fact, we have seen the collapse of giants of industry in the West because of excessive 
leveraging: GM is only one recent example. 
In the eyes of many, sukuk would be seen as structurally more viable for 
controlling the global debt proliferation and facilitating sounder economic 
fundamentals in the long run. Muslims, however, should avoid the temptation of 
'dressing up' conventional products to make them look like Islamic products (a 
practice called 'resorting to hiyal'). Shari'ah jurists in Islamic jurisdictions should not 
sacrifice Islamic principles for the sake of expediency in approving what is put 
forward as" innovative" Islamic products. 
Finally, sukuk have helped the convergence between Islamic and conventional 
markets in the West, with all that this would entail in terms of sharing experiences and 
expertise. Malaysia and the GCC countries with their sovereign sukuk issuances have 
made their impact in achieving global appeal and acceptability and have provided the 
conventional global investor with a sound diversification of financial resources. Such 
interaction between these markets can only have positive cultural and political effects 
in both the Middle East and the West. 
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CHAPTER 5. INDEXATION 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter deals with alternatives to interest or LIBOR-linked rate of return. 
Growth-linked rates of return on Islamic financial instruments are examined at some 
length because of the available literature on the subject and the substantial body of 
opinion supporting such linkage. The crucial role of government and the private sector 
in bringing about this change is explored and the concerns and obstacles facing the 
introduction and adoption of such a model is investigated and, hopefully, addressed. 
The benefits of adopting growth-linked returns are also outlined and examined. 
The prohibition of riba has been at the core of Islamic finance, whereas the 
interest-based system is central to Western monetary systems. It seems, however, that 
despite all the unease with using conventional interest as a benchmark, there is a 
dearth of research literature on deriving a benchmark that will do away with interest 
and satisfy Islamic scholars and investors alike. 
The issue of benchmarking to an interest rate index such as LIBOR and 
EURIBOR or the equivalent local rate in the case of issues in the Malaysian ringgit, 
raises certain doubts in the minds of some Islamic investors as to the genuineness of 
the 'Islamic-ness' of such an investment. Certain scholars justify this by drawing on 
the example of two brothers, one brother selling liquor and the other selling soft 
drinks. They see no problem if the latter should use the same, presumably profitable, 
pricing formula as that used by the former, and although not ideal, they do consider it 
acceptable. But all of this totally ignores the forces of supply and demand and the 
impact of taxation and a host of other factors which go into price determination. 
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Moreover, they all admit that further economic research and analysis are greatly 
needed in this respect. 
What follows, therefore, is an attempt to examine the economic literature on 
alternatives to the prevailing system of benchmarking Islamic financial instruments to 
the interest system. 
5.2 SUKUK PRICING AND RISK ASSESSMENT 
Professor R. Wilson178 and others involved in Islamic finance regard the innovation in 
sukuk structures thus far as being purely legal. In his opinion, this stems from the 
attempt of financiers to regard sukuk as being identical to, rather than distinct from, 
their conventional asset classes from a financial perspective, as this simplifies for 
them the risk assessment. But one cannot deny the importance of devising Shari'ah-
compliant legal structures on Islamic financial innovation. The Prophet (pbuh) 
himself always urged his followers to put their mu 'amalatltrading transactions in 
writing. 
Present-day scholars have also been focused on the Islamic legality and 
Shari'ah-compliance of a transaction structure because they consider the financial side 
as only one aspect of a multi-component transaction and that there are many other 
precepts that have to be complied with to make it Islamic. Such precepts concern not 
only the ethical and productive aspects of a financial transaction but also the hal a! and 
haram codes that permit or prohibit a transaction. Financial innovation with sukuk 
would require financial engineering to bring about new types of Islamic products. 
178 R Wilson, (2005, December) "Innovation in the stmcturing of Islamic sukuk securities". Islamic 
Finance Information Service, London, December 2005. 
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In fact, most of the legal structures put in place for Shari'ah-compliant 
financial transactions are done by Western legal firms who seem intent on finding a 
legal structure in which conventional and Islamic modes of financing may be made to 
co-exist by separating the two, by means of layers of SPV s and trusts. This was the 
case with the Caravan (HANCO) transaction which, as far as one can tell, was not 
rated by any International rating organisation. 
Financial engineering to bring out new Islamic financial instruments is 
sometimes stunted by the high costs of product development and the inadequate 
research funds directed towards developing new products; this stands in contrast to 
their Western counterparts where the allocation of funds into research and 
development sometimes approaches a third of the revenues. 
5.3 PRICING SOVEREIGN SUKUK 
As we shall see later in this section, linking repayment of their obligations to ability to 
pay, governments would have less difficulty in avoiding default, renegotiating and 
restructuring of their debts or the use of fiscal policies which could have a high 
economic and social cost. Various proposals have been put forward and these will be 
discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Whatever the approaches used to arrive at an acceptable rate of return for 
growth-indexed debt, a growth-based index is therefore seen as a sensible way of 
providing insurance for countries in times of economic slowdowns and as a tool for 
internationalising risk -sharing. Baxter and J ehrman ( 1997), in evaluating the likely 
gains from risk-sharing among countries, have noted that individual portfolios 
implement very little international diversification. Dreze (2000) notes that 
globalisation of risk is far from being adequately realised and securitisation through 
137 
innovative financing instruments can offer prospects for improvement. In this respect 
bonds indexed to national income can offer "unquestionable prospect for improved 
risk -sharing." 179 
It is widely accepted that a country's sovereign debt is largely dependent on 
the state of its economy in terms of its GOP growth. In fact, slow growth has 
underlined many of developing countries debt crises of the 1980s. 
For sovereign sukuk, pricing could be based on real macroeconomic variables such as 
GDP growth rather than interest benchmarks. When GDP growth is high, government 
tax revenues will increase more rapidly, for countries with income and sales tax and 
higher returns to investors in their sovereign sukuk 180, assuming of course that there is 
an efficient tax collection system and proper accounting for tax by various economic 
entities. And when GOP growth is lower, the government will have less to service the 
debt and pay the sukuk holders; in other words, the sukuk holders will be taking on 
some of the sovereign risk. 181 By doing so, they will be lifting some of the burden of 
financing obligations off their government, thereby reducing the latter's risk of default 
and improving the rating for sovereign sukuk. 
In figures (see table below), based on interest rates and GDP growth for KSA 
and Malaysia, 182 and with non-oil GOP growth taken as more a stable indicator for 
KSA given the volatility of international oil markets and hence the kingdom's oil 
sector and overall GOP growth, Professor Wilson is attempting to show that investors 
in ijara sukuk are not only concerned with average returns but also with the volatility 
of the returns as a lower volatility will generally be preferred to a higher volatility by 
179 Tabova, Alexandra. (2005). "On the Feasibility and Desirability of GOP-Indexed Concessional 
Lending". A discussion paper No.5 (University of Athens), pp., 2-4 
180 Wilson, R., (2005). "Innovation in the Structuring oflslamic Sukuk Securities", pp., 13-14 
181 Tariq, Ali, S., (2004, September), "Managing Financial Risks of Sukuk Structures", Msc 
Dissertation, Loughborough University, pp., 43-54 
182 Wilson, R., (2005). "Innovation in the Structuring oflslamic Sukuk Securities", Table 4, p. 15 
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the risk adverse. The standard deviations from the means are shown in table 4, with 
significantly lower volatility for returns based on non-oil GOP growth than for returns 
based on inter-bank rates in Saudi Arabia. Typically, ijara sukuk pay 200 basis points 
above SIBOR but with lower volatility investors may be willing to purchase riyal 
denominated sukuk without any premium on non-oil GDP returns. In Malaysia the 
reverse is the case, as with the much higher volatility of GDP growth, a return based 
on this that is only marginally greater than the ringgit inter-bank rate would be 
unlikely to attract investors motivated only by financial returns. 183 In this case a 
premium would have to be paid by the sukuk issuer above GDP growth rates to ensure 
that the offer was fully subscribed. 
The data also shows that the average return on Saudi Riyal denominated 
sukuk (plus 200 basis points) for the period between 1999 and 2005 would have been 
lower than what might have been obtained on sukuk whose yield was based KSA's 
non-oil GDP growth without any premium. The result for Malaysia shows the return 
on sukuk based on GOP growth would have been marginally higher than that on 
ringgit inter-bank rates with the premium added. 
Professor Wilson also maintains that since the non-oil GOP growth shows less 
volatility of returns and because investors are more concerned with risk exposure, 
they would prefer the less volatile returns. With this lower volatility, investors might 
be willing to purchase the riyal denominated sukuk without any premium on non-oil 
GOP returns even if there the return is 200 basis points above SIB OR. In Malaysia, 
the reverse is the case, the return based on GOP growth is marginally greater than the 
ringgit denominated inter-bank rate but is much more volatile and therefore a 
183 Empincal evidence from Malaysia indicates that financial factors are more important than religious 
factors in determining the choices between Islamic and conventional securities, even for Muslim 
dealers. See Kamisan Gadar, An Empirical Analysis of Islamic Bond Selection by Individual Dealers on 
the Kuala Lumpur Stock Market, PhD thesis, Durham University, 2004. 
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premium would have to be added to the GOP growth rate to attract the sukuk investor 
and ensure that the issue was fully subscribed. 184 
Saudi Arabia and Malaysian Interest Rates and GDP growth 
SR interest rates Saudi non-oil GDP RM interest Malaysian GOP 
growth rates growth 
1999 6.14 4.20 5.00 5.00 
2000 6.67 4.30 2.50 8.60 
2001 3.92 3.50 2.80 0.30 
2002 2.23 4.20 2.70 4.20 
2003 1.63 3.40 2.75 5.20 
2004 1.73 5.70 2.70 7.10 
2005 3.53 7.40 2.70 5.20 
Mean 3.69 4.67 3.02 5.08 
SD 1.90 1.31 0.81 2.39 
Sources: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency and Bank Negara, Malaysia 
However, the introduction of GOP growth-linked securities brings with it the 
probability of capital gains or losses in the short-to-medium term; the extent of these 
gains/losses will depend on the term to maturity. lfthe GOP growth rises relative to 
inter-bank rates, then investors will be induced to buy sukuk and this would push up 
demand and price. If, on the other hand, GDP growth rates fell below the inter-bank 
rates, people will sell and that would lead to capital losses as the only way to induce 
someone to buy a security with returns lower than the inter-bank rate would be to 
offer it at a discount. With fixed rate securities, prices would depend on interest rate 
184 Wilson, R., (2005). "Innovation in the Structuring of Islamic Sukuk Securities", pp., 14-15 
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expectations but in the case of growth-linked securities, expectations about growth 
would also influence pricing. 185 
However, a number of points must be noted about the use the use of data 
above. The Saudi economy is largely dependent on oil and it is difficult to imagine 
sustainable growth in the non-oil sector without the oil-fuelled government 
expenditure on huge infrastructure programmes and construction. Statistical 
correlation between oil prices, government expenditure and private sector growth 
should produce interesting results in this respect. In a paper by Makiyan (200 1 ), the 
author shows that the supply of loans between 1984 and 1994 was largely influenced 
by government intervention and not rates of return. 186 Furthermore, Ul Haque and 
Mirakhor recommend "filtering out from the private sector rate of return expectations 
of future earnings which is an important element of stock market prices; speculative 
elements that may at times grip the private sector; and seasonal variation." before 
using it as a basis for an overall rate of return for government paper. 
Additionally, there are many distortions in the market for private sector 
activity, let alone its relatively small size compared to the government sector in many 
Islamic countries for it to produce a rate of return that can be used to price Islamic 
securities. It is certainly an important element in arriving at a rate of return to replace 
the interest-based return but doubtful if exclusively adopted to obtain such a return, 
particularly in the light of the crucial role that government revenues play in 
stimulating economic activity in Islamic countries. 
185 Wilson, R. op. cit., pp., 12-16 
186 Makiyan, Seyed Nezamaddin. (200 I). "The Role of Rate of Return on Loans in the Islamic Banking 
System of Iran", pp., 1-5, International Journal of Islamic Financial Services, Vol. 3, No.3, pp. 1-7 
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5.4 THE CASE FOR GROWTH-INDEXED BONDS 
In the following paragraphs, the arguments for issuing growth-indexed bonds (GIBs) 
will be presented and explained. 
Gills could, in the eyes of its advocates, stabilise rates of economic growth, 
reduce vulnerability of the economy to external shocks and improve long-term 
economic prospects. GIBs would link payments on sovereign debt and rate of return 
on new issues of debt in the form of sukuk to the issuing country's rate of economic 
growth, thereby reducing the need for drastic spending cuts when there is a recession 
and moderating spending when the economy is on an upturn. It should also reduce 
volatility, which in the long run would surely improve long-term growth rates and, by 
corollary, the standards of living- thereby also reducing poverty. However, the 
linkage with growth could never be a substitute for sound macroeconomic policies; 
yet by stabilising debt ratios, they might help to reduce debt defaults and financial 
cnses. 
Let us see how this linkage to GOP might work in practice. Consider a country 
whose GOP has been growing at 3% and is expected to continue doing so. Now, 
assume the country can issue a straight bond at 10% interest (or rate of return in the 
Islamic case). This country could consider issuing GIBs whose annual payment or 
coupon will be reduced by 2% for every 1% drop in the rate of growth below its 3% 
trend. If growth turns out to be 1%, the annual payment will be 6% (plus a small 
insurance premium). If, at some future date, the growth rate turns out to be 5%, the 
annual payment or return will be 14% (plus the insurance premium). The conclusion 
from this simple model is obvious: when GOP growth turns out to be lower than 
expected, debt payments due will also be lower under indexation and vice versa. This 
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helps to maintain the debt/GDP ratio at sustainable levels. The insurance premium to 
be paid for the scheme keeps the debt/GDP ratio within narrower limits. 187 
The risk premium required for growth-indexed bonds should initially reflect 
lack of liquidity, novelty of these instruments and pricing difficulties. It should be 
minimal, reflecting the low volatility of returns/payments, which in tum is due to very 
low correlation, if any, between growth in emerging markets, global equity markets 
and growth in advanced countries. 188 For example, IMF researchers estimated 
Mexico's risk premium at 0.36 per year on its GIBs over its standard interest rate on 
fixed rate debt. 
An assumption that we could make here is that all the risks have been taken 
account of and incorporated into the GOP risk. This is not to dismiss those risks that 
can have a direct impact on the national economy and incomes in particular. 
Significant changes in the price of a key commodity, such as oil in the Middle East, 
tea in Kenya, or copper in Chile, will adversely affect the term of trade and impair the 
capacity to service foreign debt and, of course, this effect will be worse for poorer 
countries. An adverse change in the currency in relation to foreign ones will have a 
similar negative impact on the exchange rate and on incomes. 
5.5 BENEFITS 
Borensztein and Mauro, in their IMF paper (see footnote below), show that the main 
advantage ofGIBs is that they restrict the range of variation of the debt/GOP ratio, 
thereby reducing the likelihood of a debt crisis. They also indicate that it is important 
187 Borensztein, M., and Mauro, P. (2002), "Reviving the Case for GOP-Indexed Bonds". An IMF 
Policy Discussion Paper, pp., 2-3 
188 Council of Economic Advisors (2004, July). "Growth-Indexed Bonds: A Primer": UN, pp., 8-9 
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to consider the impact of this advantage on fiscal policy189. Gavin and Perotti (1997) 
find that during deep recessions the fiscal surplus increases on average by about 2% 
ofGDP in Latin American countries but falls by 4% ofGDP in OECD countries. 
Therefore, by limiting the range of volatility in the debt/GOP ratio and stabilising 
growth rates, there is less need to use procyclical fiscal policy to raise taxes during 
economic slowdowns. This is especially true of emerging markets, where the 
government may, for reasons of liquidity or the need to maintain credibility and 
access to international markets, find it necessary to maintain debt at a sustainable 
level. In simulations carried out by them, the benefits from indexation were found to 
be considerable. 
These positive effects of growth-indexed bonds could also generate additional 
benefits that improve the overall performance of the economy. By stabilising the 
growth rates and reducing macroeconomic volatility, GIBs can improve the 
investment and business climate and encourage individuals to start new businesses 
and undertake long-term projects in countries with lower aggregate risk and it is such 
activities that drive the growth of an economy. There is also a social dimension to the 
issuance of GIBs which may substantially benefit the poor. In periods of economic 
downturn, when governments feel the need to cut spending, most of these cuts fall on 
social programmes that benefit the poor. GIBs reduce the need to cut social spending 
and thereby avoid the harmful effects of these economic cycles on the poor. 
During 1994 and 1995, Mexico devalued its peso and had a deep recession, 
resulting in peak unemployment, huge cuts in its healthcare spending and a big drop 
in its tax revenues. IMF research by Borensztein and Mauro (2004) shows that if 
189 Borensztein, E. and Mauro, P. (2002). Reviving the Case for GOP-Indexed Bonds, IMF Policy 
Discussion Paper, pp., 5-8 
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Mexico had indexed only half of its public external debt to growth, it would have 
saved about 1.6% of its GDP in interest payments in 1995. The Mexican government 
could have used these savings to avoid making those drastic cuts and/or alleviated 
some of the social costs of the crisis. 190 
Another way of looking at the benefits from GIBs is to consider them as a new 
financial instrument that allows investors to hold a stake or equity in the country as an 
insurance against growth risks. This debt structure resembles shareholders in 
companies which allow them to share in the country's prosperity when growth is good 
and forego some of the benefits when the country's economy is in a slowdown mode. 
However, it has been found that there is little correlation between equity returns and 
growth rates. For example, in 2003, Brazil's stock market index rose by about 100%, 
while its real GOP declined by 0.2%. 191 
5.6 DIVERSITY OF GROWTH ACROSS COUNTRIES 
Here again, several studies show that there are substantial unrealised gains from 
international risk sharing. The potential gain arises from the fact that income growth 
rates are not highly correlated across countries at a variety oftimeframes. 
Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (2000) and Shiller (1999) estimate that the probability 
that per capita GDP will rise by 50% in the best-performing country relative to that of 
the worst performing country is 20% at the 15-year timeframe, 40% at the 20-year 
timeframe, 80% at the 25-year timeframe, and 100% at the 35-year timeframe. 
They also maintain that under the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), which 
they used to price the GIBs, the insurance premium on these GIBs would be small 
19° Council of Economic advisers (2004), op.cit. P. 4 
191 Ibid. 
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compared with the spreads that are observed in emerging markets. The premium 
would be in excess of the rate that a country would pay on straight bonds, i.e., in 
addition to the premium paid for default risk. It is to be expected that the default risk 
would be substantially reduced if a country were to convert a large portion of its debt 
into indexed bonds. 
5.7 POTENTIAL CONCERNS AND SOLUTIONS 
It is only by discussing the problems that might be encountered by investors and 
borrowers alike in the issuance of GIBs that we can arrive at sound solutions which 
pave the way for the acceptability of growth-indexed bonds on an international scale. 
The following are some of the important concerns or problems: 
Accuracy of growth data: Investors may have doubts with regard to the reliability of 
data used in estimating GDP, as countries may be tempted to understate growth rates 
in order to reduce their payments on GIBs. However, governments get re-elected on 
the basis of their economic performance and it would not be in their interest to distort 
economic date pertaining to GDP. Furthermore, once investment in GIBs takes off in 
a country, there will be a powerful lobby to reckon with if any attempt at 
underreporting is ever contemplated. Moreover, countries have faced similar problems 
with measurement when inflation-indexed bonds were initially introduced, and so 
there is no reason why one cannot have similar improvements with the way we 
measure GOP; we would certainly not be starting from scratch. Indeed, there are a 
whole lot of international financial institutions and independent agencies that can be 
contracted to verify the accuracy of GOP data, and to ensure reliability and 
transparency of statistics generation. More importantly, a GIB contract could be 
drafted to include the specific GDP measure used to calculate the bond payments. 
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Another problem that could be encountered relates to revisions and 
methodological changes to the way in which GDP data is compiled. One way to 
overcome such a problem would be to relate bond payments to a cumulative growth 
index, thereby incorporating any later revisions into subsequent bond payments. This 
solution could also limit the government's ability to understate growth, with a view to 
reducing the bond payments. Alternatively, an outside agency could be required to 
ensure that any methodological changes would not materially affect bond 
payments. 192 
Cost/ Risk Premium: International investors already invest in stocks of emerging 
market countries, which are more volatile than growth rates of the same countries. 
Additionally, international investors are also exposed to GDP risk under the standard 
debt contracts, albeit implicitly. It is surely better for investors to receive lower 
repayments through GIBs from the very beginning rather than be involved in 
uncertain recovery of their investment in case of default. 193 
GIBs are hard to price: It is probably true that GIBs are more difficult to price than 
straight bonds; but they cannot be harder to price than other emerging market 
securities such as inflation-indexed bonds and equities. GIBs are similar to floating 
rate bonds but are related to the rate of growth of the borrowing country instead of 
LIBOR or other interest rate. There is, however, a problem with this. Floating-rate or 
inflation-indexed bonds are priced using market-based indicators. Growth rates have 
no such market benchmarks; nonetheless, there are many public as well as private 
forecasts that can be used for this purpose. Furthermore, the emergence of a growth-
192 Council of Economic Advisors (2004), op. cit., P. 7 
193 Ibid. P., 8-9 
147 
indexed market for GIBs would undoubtedly lead to an even greater availability of 
growth forecasts. 194 
Market illiquidity: It is important to establish sufficient liquidity initially so that the 
instruments can be traded actively and a large premium avoided. 
Multilateral institutions and the official sector should consider buying a portion of the 
new GIBs to provide for a minimum-size market and encourage countries to issue 
GIBs around the same time in order to kick-start a larger market. 195 
GIBs and compatibility with growth: It is claimed that increasing debt payments when 
growth is higher than usual might reduce a country's incentive to grow. But economic 
growth in capitalist countries, or where the private sector plays a key role, is 
determined by decisions taken by a multitude of individual businessmen and entities 
who would not be greatly affected by how much of a government's debt is tied up in 
GIBs; and it is up to governments to decide the extent to which GIBs should affect its 
growth-orientation. 196 
Models of optimal incentive-compatible contracts in sovereign debt show that, 
even assuming the presence of a moral hazard, the optimal contract is of a contingent 
type (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996). The point is not whether there is a moral hazard 
associated with GIBs or not, but whether such a moral hazard is higher than that with 
straight bonds on which, after all, default is possible. 197 
So, if the GIBs are so popular, why have they not then taken off in the way 
one would have expected? This question can be addressed by looking at it from the 
point of view of both the investor and the borrower. 
194 Ibid. P.8, and Borensztein, E. and Mauro, P. (2002), op. cit., P. 15 
195 
cif. Council of Economic Advisors (2004), op. cit P.8 
196 Borensztein, E. and Mauro, P. (2002), op.cit. PP.15-18 
197 Ibid., pp., 16-17 and Council of Economic advisers, op. cit., p. 7 
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From the investor's point of view, these instruments tend to be illiquid and will 
remain so until a "critical mass" is achieved which is essential to their liquidity. 
Pricing them is also a costly exercise. Critical mass will help spread the computational 
costs over a larger base of capital values. It is to be noted as well that these 
instruments do not provide a hedge against inflation or interest rate volatility (as 
floating-rate and inflation-indexed bonds respectively do) but offer an equity-like 
exposure to a country. Pension funds and insurance companies have shown interest in 
these bonds. To the former, holding GIBs would better align the value of their assets 
with future liabilities. And since growth rates across many emerging markets are 
uncorrelated, a portfolio including GIBs would be well-hedged, and this might be 
attractive to insurance companies as well. 198 
On the other hand, for borrowers/issuers, the proposed indexation system 
might take years to make a significant difference and issuers might not want to pay 
too large a premium over the cost of a standard debt for the insurance provided by 
GIBs. Neither politicians nor would-be first issuers would accept to bear the brunt of 
this premium for the sake of a successor government or future issuers. To overcome 
this problem, a number of countries would need to simultaneously issue the GIBs, 
preferably under the auspices of a multilateral institution such as the World Bank. 
But what are the alternatives to linking bonds, Islamic or otherwise, to a real 
return rather than to an interest rate benchmark? 
Indexing to exports might be a good alternative. In fact, this measure might be 
more reliable than the GOP measure for many of the developing countries. Exports 
can be verified externally and many multilateral organisations such as WTO and 
others emphasise transparency and proper accounting. Furthermore, for the external 
198 (c) Ibid., p. 20 and Council of Economic advisers (2004). P. 9 
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debt of a country, the ratio of debt to exports is a closely-monitored measure, as it is 
critical to a country's ability to repay its debts. Yet another alternative might be 
industrial production, which is more correlated to a country's GDP in some 
developing countries. 
Someone who has persistently argued for the adoption of growth-linked bonds is 
Professor Robert Shiller of Yale University. He views GDP as the most 
comprehensive measure that we have of an economy's success and maintains that 
GDP's rise in nominal value would automatically move up with any inflation, thus 
providing an "automatic" adjustment to inflation. He is also of the opinion that 
emerging countries need to work harder on ensuring the accuracy of their GDP data 
and advances the idea that advanced countries should issue the GIBs first. This, 
according to him, will have an immediate demonstration effect and will establish the 
concept of GIBs, making it easier for other countries to join in. 
However, Shiller's concept of GIBs has not taken off for a variety of reasons. 
One explanation is that his type of securities represented perpetual claims on a 
country's GDP, whilst other opinions expounded in this paper have argued for a 
limited timeframe, matching maturities in the bond market- presumably, 5 to 10 
years' maturities or longer. This limited timeframe would enhance the marketability of 
the bonds. Another difficulty with Shiller's proposition is that the market which he 
envisages for his type of growth-linked bonds would involve not inconsiderable 
institutional set-up costs; the GIBs advanced in this paper would only require the 
addition of a related clause to standard sovereign debt contracts and would use 
existing markets for sovereign debts to support the market for GIBs. 199 
199 Borensztein, E. and Mauro, P., op.cit., pp., 20-21 
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There is, however, a large body of opinion in favour of indexing to commodity 
prices, over which, it is maintained, an individual country has no control. Indexing 
debt to commodity prices reduces uncertainty regarding debt/GOP ratio to the extent 
that commodity prices determine a country's revenues and GDP developments. 
However, enhanced liberalisation of trade has rendered commodity price volatility 
high. Generally speaking, commodity price indexing would be more applicable to 
countries such as Mexico, Venezuela, and Saudi Arabia (oil) or Chile (copper) than, 
for example, Argentina or Brazil, where the economy is more diversified. 
Professor C. Gilbert ofTrento University, and advisor to the World Bank, has 
argued that debt service capacity of low-income countries relies heavily on 
commodity prices which show strong variation over time, whereas repayments to 
debts are scheduled in a rather fixed way. He suggested a scheme for introducing 
flexibility into debt service and proposed that a country-specific index should 
comprise a variety of commodities with each commodity given its proper weight in 
the country's trade. He provided evidence that the direct link between commodity 
prices and growth is strong - though not linear. 
Investors and sovereigns might feel that there are sufficient opportunities for 
insurance against fluctuations in commodity prices in the futures and options market. 
By contrast, GIBs provide new opportunity to take a view on a country's economic 
growth prospects, particularly where the stock market is not well-diversified and 
where stock market fluctuations may have little to do with the country's fundamental 
growth prospects. 
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5.8 PREVIOUS EXPERIENCES WITH GOP-LINKED BONDS 
5.8.1 External Debt 
Brady bonds have been used to reschedule developing (poor) countries in ways which 
they can afford and after some debt forgiveness. In the case of Bulgaria, for example, 
the discount bonds contained an element of indexation to GD P, in that there was a 
supplemental interest payment for each year that Bulgaria's GOP exceeded 123% of 
its 1993 level. The bonds were callable and as a result of its rapid economic growth, 
Bulgaria started to redeem its external debt and in July 2004 had repaid all its discount 
bonds 20 years before maturity. The buyback resulted in an improved external debt-
to-growth ratio which increased creditworthiness and resulted in higher rating by 
Fitch and S & P. However, there was a problem with the way GDP was defined and 
calculated and this obviously impacted the additional interest payable as a result of 
GOP growth exceeding the target.200 
Bosnia and Herzegovina had similar debt rescheduling. After some 73% debt 
forgiveness by the London Club, of the remaining rescheduled US$400 million, $252 
million would fall due when the country's per capita reached US$2,800 for 2 
consecutive years before maturity in 2018. Here, both principal and interest payments 
were indexed to the growth in GOP. 
It is interesting to note that in 'per capita', a new measure ofGDP growth was 
introduced, one to which the population variable was added - necessary for 
calculating the per capita figure. 
Argentina was almost "bankrupt" in 200 1 and had suspended the payments of both 
principal and interest on its external debt. In 2004, it announced that it would 
200 Tabova, A., op.cit., pp., 34-37 
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henceforth include a GOP indexation element. Three types of debt securities were 
issued together with a detachable GOP-linked unit. Both principal and interest were 
indexed to GOP. In order to define the time and amount of payment, a base scenario 
was envisaged with annual growth of 3% at end of 2004. Should GOP in a given year 
exceed 3% annually, the payment of an additional coupon would be triggered and 
calculated as 5% of the difference between current GOP and the GOP of the base 
scenario in current prices. 
The GOP-linked unit is detachable from the main straight bond, unlike the 
warrants in the countries of Bulgaria and Bosnia Herzegovina. This will be traded if a 
market develops for stripped coupons. 
5.8.2 Domestic Debt 
Singapore has issued two types of GOP-indexed shares; one to tide over the lower 
income group during economic downturns, and the other to help its citizens to adapt 
to structural changes in its economy as with increases in tax on goods and services. 
Both types of shares offer bonus shares in lieu of dividends and are calculated at a rate 
of 3% plus the rate of GOP growth in the previous year with a guarantee of at least 
3%.201 
5.8.3 Corporate Debt 
Michelin embarked on a unique experiment to link GOP with corporate debt, which 
made for new thinking on risk management. CFM, the financial and holding arm of 
the Michelin tyre group, was granted combined bank and insurance capital facility by 
two banks and was granted the option to draw, under certain conditions, on that 
201 Ibid., p.38 
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facility. The conditions that would trigger use of the facility is a fall in the average 
annual GDP growth rate in Michelin main markets -the US and Euro zone- below 
a certain level. This level was set at 1.5% in the first three years and 2% in the last 
two years of the five-year option plan. The fact that Michelin's revenues were highly 
correlated to GOP growth in those markets necessitated an insurance trigger that 
would release resources to weather any crisis that Michelin might encounter as well as 
to finance any acquisitions without increasing equity. 202 
5.9 CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 
In an IMF paper published in 1998,203 Professors UlHaque and Mirakhor advanced 
the idea of a non-interest-based method of mobilising economic resources to finance 
infrastructural and development projects, through the issuance of a national 
participating paper (NPP) that could also serve as an instrument of monetary policy. 
The authors maintained that there was now a consensus that in the absence of 
an interest-based economy, physical capital would have to be valued in the equities 
market. Public expenditure of a government's budget on infrastructure and 
development projects, which is asset-creating, could be financed through equity 
participation, providing there was a market for trading shares. 
The question then became one of determining a rate of return that would 
compensate the shareholders of assets created by the government, in the absence of a 
benchmark such as interest in a conventional financial system. 
Such a rate of return would have to be found in the real sector of the economy, 
assuming there was a reasonably well-developed private sector, but after filtering out 
202 Ibid. 
203 Ul Haque N. and Mirakhor, A., "The Design of Instruments for Government Finance in an Islamic 
Economy", Islamic Economic Studies XI (1999), pp. 27-34. 
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any speculative elements and windfall gains. Moreover, such a rate of return was 
made to replicate closely past movement of the nominal GDP, given that such 
movement closely proxies the expected growth of private sector output. 
5.10 DIFFICULTIES IN EMERGING FINANCIAL MARKETS 
The authors admit that financial markets in Islamic countries are in a limited state of 
development and rather small. Because of this and given the distortions and 
speculative behaviour in these markets, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to 
determine an average rate of return in the private sector. 
As an alternative, they suggest an international index which would be 
independent of local conditions, yet reflective of the scarcity price of capital 
worldwide, particularly under conditions of convergence and globalisation in 
international capital markets. Such an index, in their view should be monitorable and 
easily available, relatively stable and broadly reflective of local conditions. Dow 
Jones publishes various indexes, regional, local and international, and by sector. One 
or more could now be included in the calculation of a rate of return on NPPs. 
They dismiss the use of both the earnings per share and the price-earnings 
ratio and dividend yields for their volatility and limits. They propose the use of return 
on shareholders equity (ROE) as a premier measure of a company's financial 
performance that relates to company's earnings after tax and interest and consider it 
as, "fungible and suitable for intertemporal, inter-company, and inter-sectoral 
comparisons". 
The authors suggest that the terms-to-maturity should be one year or less, as 
shorter-dated instruments provide a smaller potential for realised capital loss. At the 
same time, focus on a limited set of securities increases market depth and, 
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correspondingly, liquidity. This can be achieved by limiting issues to a relatively few 
terms-to-maturity and by re-opening issues on a frequent basis and recommend that 
the government issues such paper first and bear the cost of such issuance. 
If an ex ante rate of return on NPPs can be worked out, then, in the opinion of 
the authors, there is substantial experience, techniques and practices that can be drawn 
upon in seeking to develop the necessary financial markets. But this cannot be done in 
isolation and must be adapted to an Islamic environment. Similarly, the central bank 
and other financial institutions must be ready to adjust their practices and techniques 
as required, and new financial instruments must be designed to fit in with the existing 
institutional, market and instrument structures in each country or region. In summary, 
while the new government security must satisfy basic economic and financial criteria, 
Islamic countries have a lot of leeway to exercise their preferences. 
5.11 CONCLUSION 
Various alternatives have been suggested and proposed to replace interest rates as a 
benchmark for debt securities; none has been adopted so far. There have been 
compelling arguments in favour of growth-linked and commodity-linked rates of 
return, but there is no consensus on how to jump-start such a market, although most 
agree on the necessity that the government, or some international institution of 
substance, underwrite the initial issue. 
Islamic countries can conceivably form such an initial market if they can agree 
on what benchmark to use and how to launch securities based on such a benchmark. 
Others, principally Professor R. Wilson, have argued for the use of musharaka and 
mudaraba-returns as a benchmark for debt instruments or asset-based sukuk. There is 
certainly much to be said for using profit-based benchmarks to determine the rate of 
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return on various securities; but there has not been a timeframe long enough to 
extrapolate from and the market for such financial instruments has been limited and 
too risky for major financial institutions to seriously undertake. Furthermore, as 
Professor Wilson makes clears in his paper,204 the illiquidity of musharaka contracts 
and uncertainty regarding the exit route have not made them popular, and this applies 
to sukuk al-mudaraba- though to a lesser degree. 
204 Wilson, R., (2005). "Innovation in the structuring of Islamic Sukuk securities". University of 
Durham, Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, p. 3 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
With regard to objective# 1, this research study started out by examining the various 
types of bonds, their pricing and returns. The aim has been to show the variety, 
diversity and adaptability of conventional financial instruments which the West has 
been able to develop over the years. 
Islamic financial instruments evolved in response to the needs of Muslims in 
their own communities and in the Diaspora, by replicating, on occasions, the already-
existing conventional financial structures but without the interest element or ribawi 
features. This they did by attaching assets to the financial instrument and 
authenticating or validating the transaction by a Shari'ah board or Islamic jurists to 
ensure compliance with and conformity to Islamic principles. 
If this reasoning is accepted, then Islamic finance can develop in parallel with 
its conventional counterpart and extensively benefit from the existing but modified 
conventional financial models and future innovations. Others see hiyal in all of this: 
but the onus is on them to come up with more pure "Islamic solutions". 
Concepts like time value of money, present value and risk value are equally 
important to the understanding of sukuk. Once trading in sukuk develops to the level 
of critical mass, formulae for duration and convexity will be equally applicable and 
become useful measures of sensitivity of price to changes in yield. Sukuk-holders 
should be interested in knowing the average time to the receipt of the present value of 
their sukuk cash flows, especially if they were going to hold their sukuk until maturity. 
Duration calculations are also very useful in today's declining value of pensions, 
where a portfolio must be managed in such a way as to produce a sufficient amount of 
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cash at a predetermined future date to meet a specific liability such as tuition fees for 
children or a pension. In the same vein, convexity tells us that large changes in yield 
cause disproportionate changes in price. This again must be helpful to those who set 
the yield for various sukuk issues. These concepts must be of interest to the Muslim as 
well as the non-Muslim investor or institution. 
The risk profile for conventional bonds and Islamic sukuk has also been 
considered here, and we have shown how, under sukuk, liquidity risk assumes more 
importance, because of the underdeveloped secondary market in sukuk and the fact 
that sukuk-holders held them to maturity. The credit risk of government bonds and 
sovereign sukuk has been examined with reference to the vulnerability of nations to 
each other's economic policies and their own economic fundamentals; hence, it is the 
relative, and not the absolute, creditworthiness of a government that determines its 
credit risk profile. In other words, it is the vulnerability of a government to changes in 
its trading partners' policies and cyclical fluctuations that makes it susceptible to 
more, or less, credit risk. 
With regard to objective # 2, we examined and evaluated the main sukuk securities as 
main modes of Islamic financing. In particular, we have discussed the role of 
murabaha and ijara/leasing in short-term and long-term financing, i.e., from 
financing the purchase of a car to large-scale and longer-term infrastructure projects, 
providing examples of these various applications and uses in the main body of the 
chapter as well as in the appendix. 
We have also discussed mudaraba and musharaka as the Islamically-preferred 
modes of financing in terms of the underlying risks and their profit/loss sharing 
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arrangements which avoid the prohibited and controversial use of interest as a 
benchmark for determining the rate of return on Islamic financial instruments. 
For these four main methods of Islamic financing, an analysis was made of their 
drawbacks and limitations as well as of their advantages and benefits. 
The role of sukuk in the global market has been discussed with reference to 
both the sovereign and corporate sukuk. And in the chapter on sukuk, we considered 
the important role of sukuk as an essential step in the long road to an active secondary 
market and how securitisation (objective# 4) can open up new opportunities for the 
use of sukuk al-ijara in the West, where the real estate market may provide the 
necessary assets to securitise and provide real innovations through corporate and bank 
issuances of sukuk. Islamic financing tools have also been used to structure real estate 
deals which have traditionally relied on conventional debt instruments - Zam Zam 
Towers' time-share structure is just one example (see Appendix)- while the use of 
real estate investment trust (REIT) has been another interesting innovation. 
Yet the need for more alternatives and enhanced infrastructure persists. More 
funding for research in new market instruments is needed to satisfy the varied and 
complex financing needs. Istisna ', Build-to-Operate (BOT) and time-sharing are all 
relatively-new tools of Islamic financing, but they have all been long in use in 
conventional financing, albeit interest-based. 
Under objective# 3, we compared and contrasted bonds and sukuk and noted in detail 
their differences and similarities. But perhaps we should note two further points. For 
example, murabaha is a credit sale with deferred price but with the Islamic bank 
acting on behalf of the client to buy the commodity from a supplier and resell it to the 
customer. And instead of the interest, there is a fixed or pre-agreed mark-up, 
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representing the profit of the bank which in all probability also includes the time value 
of money. It should be noted that under Islamic principles, one cannot sell something 
that one does not own: the purchase and the sale must be subject to separate contracts. 
Thus, the outcome is the same but the legal packaging is different, albeit with higher 
costs for the Muslim consumer/investor. 
Similarly, leasing in Islamic finance is actually not much different from the 
conventional lease, as both involve the transfer of a usufruct and the generation of an 
income stream for the lessor or the sukuk-holder. However, there appears to be a 
controversy in Islamic circles among those who claim that some of the leases in sukuk 
issues represent more of finance than an operating lease, and is therefore in the nature 
of a loan. For example, Dr Zarka claims that the condition that the lessor cannot 
oblige the lessee to re-purchase the asset at cost or at a predetermined price has been 
compromised in most sukuk, including those issued by lOB, Bahrain and Qatar.205 
By and large conventional and Islamic leases are similar where in the latter the 
leasing of the usufructs is always done through an SPY. The latter leases the assets 
back to the originator, and then issues the sukuk certificates based on the income 
stream from the leased assets. This, however, is what the trustee does in the example 
cited for equipment trust certificates, and there is an increasing trend among issuers 
and financiers to use the concept of trust as an SPY. 
As an innovation, tradable sukuk have been able to address the needs of a 
variety of issuer and investor goals while imparting specific asset-linked rights and 
205 Zarqa, Prof. Anas, (2005, May). IRTI. Shari'qh Guidelines for Issuing Sukuk. 
Paper presented at the International Islamic Financial Markets Conference, organised 
by the General Council for Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions and the 
International Islamic Financial Markets (IIFM) and the Islamic Training Institute 
(IR Tl), Manama, Bahrain. 
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obligations in a Shari'ah-compliant alternative to fixed-income securities such as CDs, 
ABSs, bonds and FRNs. AAOIFI, in particular, has been instrumental in developing 
investment sukuk standards to meet Islamic transactional rules relating to asset 
possession, measurement and transfer while remaining consistent with Western 
securities rules. 
Sukuk do not permit the derivation of new instruments that break the asset 
linkage - though they may be used to structure the equivalent of certain derivatives. 
Sukuk and their underlying Islamic instruments adapt well to modem Western capital 
techniques and this convergence helps attract Western investors to high-profile 
issuances such as sovereign sukuk. We have also seen how sukuk can fill in a gap for 
corporate finance, as in the case of Hanco's innovative securitisation and cross-border 
listing (see Appendix), 
To realise objective# 5, we briefly explored the criteria of agency ratings of S&P and 
Fitch with respect to conventional bonds; but since these are well-known and 
implemented, we focused on the problems with rating securitised assets under 
Shari'ah law and under various jurisdictions. This was considered necessary because 
of the relative newness of sukuk issues and their unique features. Fitch's report on 
rating securitisation in Islamic jurisdictions covers most of those issues and concerns 
regarding sukuk that are also shared by other agencies. In particular, important issues 
relating to the "true sale" of assets to the SPY, the bankruptcy remoteness of the SPY 
and the documentation necessary to protect investors or sukuk-holders in an Islamic 
transaction were discussed; we also noted the necessary clauses to be incorporated in 
such documentation for the protection of the sukuk-holders from, for example, 
shareholders' claims to the assets of the SPY should consolidation of the accounts of 
162 
the SPY with that a parent or holding company of the shareholders prove possible in 
the event of liquidation or bankruptcy proceedings. Further protection measures such 
as restricting the SPY to one activity and winding it up once the sukuk-holders or 
investors are fully paid, have also been mentioned. 
Also noted was that the nature of the collateral under Shari'ah law might not 
be compatible with the Western understanding of it and that problems could arise as 
to the nature of security interests and enforceability against third parties. 
Another potential problem with regard to Islamic transactions is where the 
assets or collateral are physically in one place while the SPY is in another jurisdiction, 
as is the case with many leased assets in an Islamically-structured transaction. 
Finally, we cited the example of lOB's guarantee for the full maturity value of 
the notes as a possible way out of some of the problems posed by the Fitch's report. 
There is now a Islamic rating agency called the 'International Islamic Rating 
Agency' (liRA), two of its shareholders being already-existing rating agencies, 
namely, 'Capital Intelligence' from Cyprus and 'GCRYIS Credit Rating Company' 
from Pakistan. The liRA will be independent of the international rating agencies such 
S&P, Fitch and Moody's. It will be made up of a technical committee and a Shari'ah 
committee and will advise on rating for the banks and their products and funds. 
However, it is still too early to tell to what extent the ratings of liRA will be accepted 
by investors and institutions and how they will interact with the criteria of the 
international rating agencies. 
In realisation of objective # 6, we discussed the role of Bahrain and Malaysia in 
developing the Islamic financial institutions and markets necessary for the issuance 
and trading of sukuk and their liquidity. We also discussed the various ways in which 
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liquidity has been addressed, more specifically, in terms of short-term issuances of 
sukuk al-salam and sukuk al-ijara, in addition to mechanisms such as put options and 
periodical redemption in ijara funds. These developments constitute a move away 
from murabaha and the underlying commodity trading. 
The consistent sovereign issuance by Bahrain has given the Islamic, as well as 
the global investor, a pool of listed and tradable assets which will give BMA a viable 
tool for open market operations and set the stage for a much-needed secondary 
market. Other sovereign issuances by Malaysia, Bahrain and Qatar help to attract 
global investors and, with their Islamic feature, help in establishing the capital 
markets as well as building confidence in the concept itself, in turn encouraging 
corporate issuers. And as the universe of investors becomes more diverse, so too will 
their appetite, leading to expectation going beyond the prevailing murabaha and ijara 
models towards a probable shift to more profit and loss-sharing contracts. 
We have also discussed the requirements for building the infrastructure 
necessary to sustain a viable capital market and the steps taken towards this objective 
in Malaysia and the Middle East. And in the conclusion, we referred to what needs to 
be done in future in order to solidity the gains already made by sukuk in directing 
investment towards value-added, productive use of resources, and against 
proliferation of debt for the sake of cosmetic changes in the balance sheets of 
corporations and sometimes ill-considered acquisitions. 
Closer international cooperation between Islamic financial institutions, like 
AAOIFI and the International Financial Standard Board (IFSB) and their Western 
counterparts - the International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Bank for 
Settlements and International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) - should lead to 
greater convergence between the two and should improve transparency and open up 
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the global market for sukuk. In this sector, Bahrain and Malaysia have taken 
significant steps, providing the foundations of the infrastructure necessary for the 
development of the sukuk market. 
While Bahrain has encouraged the development and issuance of sovereign 
sukuk, Malaysia has managed to build the appropriate infrastructure for an Islamic 
capital market. Today an impressive array of Islamic debt securities, Islamic unit 
trusts, indices, warrants and futures can be seen and one can also see some element of 
international participation in that market. Nevertheless, sukuk al-ijara remain the 
predominant form, despite some reservations with regard to the basis of valuation of 
the assets under lease. 
Expectations remain high with regard to further progress in innovative sukuk 
issuances that would meet the varied demands of the market. There is now an 
increasing demand from the both the consumer and the corporate sector to satisfy a 
new universe of market participants which includes non-Muslims investors as well, 
partly because of their new ethical dimension and value to the market. 
However, danger persists in rushing to innovate by "dressing up" or 
mimicking conventional products by succumbing to pressure from markets for new 
products and structuring products which look 'Islamic' and Shari'ah-compliant but in 
substance are not. Malaysia's innovations in stripping the profit mark-up and turning it 
into separate and tradable securities in murabaha or securitising the income stream in 
ijara leasing have not been, to put it mildly, well-received in the Middle East, 
especially, in the GCC countries, where they are considered trading debt with debt 
and to be prohibited. 
In today' s world, the contribution of Islamic financial instrument may not 
influence conventional markets, but they can redress the imbalances in emerging 
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markets, particularly in the Muslim world. Sukuk have also, to some extent, brought 
the conventional and Islamic market closer. One can witness today an increasing 
number of Western institutions investing in sukuk, especially sovereign sukuk, in an 
effort to diversify their portfolio. Western banks have opened Islamic 'windows' to tap 
the wealth of oil-producing countries and high net-worth Muslims. Such convergence 
should be welcomed, as it also exposes the West to Islamic thinking and Islamic 
approaches and will, hopefully, bring about a better understanding and increasing 
trade between the two, and make for a world based on mutual respect for each other's 
cultures. 
Regarding objective# 7, we dealt with the largely neglected area of Islamic finance of 
finding alternatives to an interest-based system of benchmarking, as currently used in 
pricing Islamic financial products. 
Many scholars, academics and practitioners in the field of Islamic finance 
have expressed scepticism towards the 'Islamic-ness' and genuineness of a system 
that still uses a ribawi point of reference to determine the rate of return on its 
products; and yet there is not much in the way of literature or research on this topic 
from such quarters. In fact, most of the writing on this topic has come from Western 
sources. 
With regard to objective# 8, in the chapter on "Indexation", we argue for the use of 
Growth-Linked rate of return on debt securities and sukuk and explain the benefits and 
advantages of such a system while attempting to address the concerns and doubts 
relating to it. 
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The whole chapter is equally applicable to Islamic financial securities; we have only 
used the term 'bond' for the sake of convenience. The benchmarking to LIBOR in 
Islamic financial instruments can be replaced by benchmarking to GDP growth in a 
variety of ways. We could extrapolate a rate of growth historically and/or use a 
minimum acceptable rate as a basis for future indexing and leave the rate of return to 
fluctuate with this growth rate in accordance with the examples we have given. We 
could also use the key commodity in the economy of a country such as oil for the 
producing countries and link the fluctuation in the rate of return on Islamic financial 
instruments to the changing commodity prices. To narrow the fluctuation, we could 
set a cap and a floor to it. Alternatively, we could use a combination of weighted 
commodity prices and GOP rates of growth to set the rate of return. But whatever 
method is used, there would inevitably be an initial period of trial and error to test the 
various assumptions and responses to such a major shift in determining the rate of 
return on debt instruments. And as we emphasised, one cannot imagine a launch of 
such a major innovation without the aid of both governments and international 
financial institutions. Such a step would be a landmark, comparable only to the first 
issue of sukuk, if not greater: who could have imagined that sukuk would have had 
such growth and acceptability as they do now? 
Finally, with regard to objective# 9, we include in the Appendix various sukuk 
illustrations and case studies that outline various examples of sukuk issues. 
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APPENDIX: SUKUK ILLUSTRATIONS AND CASE 
STUDIES 
Case Study 1 (CSl): Sovereign sukuk- Qatar Global Sukuk'wt> 
Summary of Issue Information: 
Registered Issuer: Qatar Global Sukuk 
Arranger/ Advisor: QIIB/HSBC/ Amanah & HSBC-M. East 
Issue Amount: US$ 700 million, floating rate notes (Trust Certificates) 
Maturity date: October 09 20 1 0 
Margin/Tenor: 6 month LIBOR + 0.4% 
Rating/Listing: S&P: A+ /Lubuan and Luxemburg Stock Exchanges 
Minimum Denomination: US$10,000 
Increments thereafter: US$1,000 
enhancers: Obligor: State of Qatar 
72% Middle East, 14% Asian, 13% Europe, and 1% US offshore. 
The certificates issued are redeemable in 2010, which makes the period of the 
issue 7 years. The co-managers to HSBC and Qatar International Islamic Bank were 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank, Gulflntemational Bank, KFH, CIMB of Malaysia, IDB and 
the Qatar Islamic Bank. 
206 Adam, N., and Thomas, A., Islamic Bonds, and other sources such as IFS, and various articles in 
The Banker and Islamic Finance News. 
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Structure: 
The issuer, Qatar Global Sukuk, was incorporated in Qatar as a joint stock company, 
jointly owned by the government ofthe State of Qatar and HSBC Bank Middle East 
Limited, solely established to issue sukuk certificates and to act as trustee for the 
sukuk-holders. The proceeds from the rated sukuk certificates were to be used for 
funding such projects as Hamad Medical Centre, gas-based projects and export credits 
by the government ofthe State of Qatar. 
Qatar Global Sukuk (QGS) purchased land from the state of Qatar (Qatar) 
which QGS leased back to the state of Qatar for 7 years (equal to the tenure of the 
sukuk certificates) under a Master Lease Agreement (MLA). All acquisition costs 
relating to purchase of land and costs of any construction on the land were paid by 
Qatar. The purchased land and rental income from the lease were held on trust for the 
sukuk certificate holders. The lease rental payments from Qatar were in accordance 
with the MLA between Qatar and QGS and exactly matched the periodic distribution 
payments (semi-annual) payable under sukuk certificates on 9 April and October, 
commencing April 2004 . The lease rental payments were calculated on the basis of 
LIBOR on dollar funds plus 0.4% per annum, which makes the certificate comparable 
to the returns of a conventional floating-rate note (for a detailed discussion of 
alternative benchmarks, see the first section of this chapter). 
Qatar, as Lessee, agreed that the lease payments would not fall below a 
minimum amount, and that should a dissolution event occur, the MLA would be 
terminated and Qatar would be obliged to buy back the land from QGS at an agreed 
price, reflecting the scheduled unamortised rental. Dissolution events include, but are 
not limited to, default by QGS to the sukuk-holders and default by Qatar under the 
MLA. 
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Case Study 2: A Mudaraba example: Meezan Bank, Pakistan. In Pakistan, 
Meezan operates its deposit scheme so that the bank and its shareholders are deemed 
to be mudarib and the depositing consumers are rabb al-ma!, and where the depositor 
is not allowed a share beyond a certain low amount as defined in the mudaraba 
agreement. The shareholders' share of profit, on the other hand, cannot be less than 
their investment. The depositor's loss is restricted to the amount of the invested funds. 
The Shari'ah board of the bank allows daily calculation of the applicable net asset 
value and consumers are free to add or withdraw funds at any time. Although this not 
strictly mudaraba in its original form, it does follow the basic principle of profit/loss 
sharing. 
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Case Study 3: Sukuk al-intifa' .t.ut 
The most recent development in leasehold estate investment is the leasing of intifa ', or 
right to benefit. This tool allowed for the separation of property from occupancy 
rights, much like the concept of time-share vacation facilities and part-ownership in 
the West, within a 24 year reversionary ground lease which the builder - Munshaat 
- entered into with King Abdul Aziz Waqf to build a multiplex of high-rise towers in 
Mecca for visitors and pilgrims to Mecca. 
These sukuk al-intifa' were used in the construction of the Zam Zam Towers in 
the holy city of Mecca, Saudi Arabia. The sukuk which represented benefit of space 
for up to 24 years, were sold prior to construction, thereby funding the construction. 
Among the novel features of the project is that the holder of a sakk is offered a number 
of options from which to benefit: he or she can occupy it at the reserved time or 
exchange time of occupancy with others, or sub-lease the contracted time, or sell the 
sakk to a willing buyer for a profit/ loss. 
This innovative sukuk al-intifa' issuance has established an Islamic financial 
model that is based on flexibility of approach to the sale and utilisation of property 
facilities and can be replicated globally. 
207 Thomas, Cox and Kraty (2005), op.cit. 84 
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Case Study 4: Equipment leasing LuiS 
Another financing opportunity for sukuk is in equipment-leasing in the West, 
particularly when the economy is in a slow-down cycle and financial institutions are 
reluctant to lend because of perceived and, sometimes, real concern about the 
corporate ability to make the necessary principal and interest repayments. This is 
where Islamic finance comes in to utilise the large pool of assets in those corporations 
wishing to finance their re-tooling or improve capacity. The Master Lease representing 
the large-scale purchase is treated as a debt, with the master rental payments treated as 
interest for tax purposes. This should satisfy those who would like to minimise their 
tax liability. The Master Lease to a US leasing company is structured to a specialist 
leasing company as an Islamic lease; but sub-leasing is sometimes structured without 
regard to Shari'ah laws, though efforts have been made to rectify this situation. 
208 Ibid. 83-84 
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Case Study 5: ljara/lstisna' (Tabreed):lu<J 
The sukuk were issued by Tabreed Financing Corporation, an SPY incorporated in the 
Cayman Islands. The proceeds from the sukuk issue were used to finance future 
cooling plants in the UAE. Tabreed transferred its existing plants as assets to the SPY 
and these were leased by the SPY to Tabreed on the basis of an ijara lease agreement. 
The periodical rentals from this lease agreement are paid to the SPY and are then 
distributed to the sukuk-holders. In this arrangement, the SPY holds the assets on trust 
for the sukuk certificate holders. Additionally, the sukuk proceeds were invested in the 
manufacture of other central cooling plants, on the basis of an istisna' contract, and to 
remain Shari'ah-compliant the underlying assets could not fall below 51% of the 
Tabreed assets at any one time. Tabreed and the SPY entered into future leases in 
respect of future cooling plants to be constructed. The pre-rentals are payable by 
Tabreed pursuant to an undertaking to lease the future plants on the basis that if the 
future plants are not manufactured or required according to the specifications in the 
'agreement to lease' by a specific future date, these pre-rentals shall be repayable by 
the SPY. 
Upon maturity of the sukuk (or earlier in the event of a dissolution), Tabreed is 
required to purchase the existing plant from the SPY and in order to provide 
additional comfort to the investors, Tabreed guaranteed the SPY payment obligations 
under the sukuk and further agreed to make up any shortfall in the amount received in 
respect of the underlying assets and the amount by which the holders of sukuk 
expected to be paid under the terms of the sukuk documentation. 
209 Thomas, Cox and Kraty. op. cit., pp. 113-117 
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A key Shari'ah issue in this case concerned the composition of the pool of 
underlying assets to be purchased by the SPV. The pool comprised the main plant, the 
plants which have not yet been manufactured or acquired, investments in specific sites 
and other miscellaneous assets. 
The Shari'ah scholars in this transaction stipulated that at any one time the 
underlying assets shall comprise not less than 51% of the underlying assets of the 
SPY's underlying assets, and in the event that it does fall below that, Tabreed is 
required to purchase the cooling plants from the SPV. 
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Case Study 6: Auto leasing 1. 1u/ (HANCO)l. 11 
This is one of the strongest growth markets for Islamic financing (IAF) in the major 
Islamic countries because of strong demand for new car imports due to population 
growth, high replacement rates and sub-standard maintenance and service standards 
for cars as well as the inadequate public transport system in those countries. The 
market for IAF consists of major segments: consumer auto acquisition, fleet 
acquisition for companies or businesses and import-export finance. 
Faced with growing pools of Islamic auto finance assets on their balance 
sheets, Islamic financial institutions find it essential to develop asset-backed structures 
to expand their capacity in order to service this growing market. But corporations 
such as Hanco faced a similar situation before the securitisation and subsequent sale 
of its assets to sukuk-holders. 
The purpose behind Bemo Securitisation of the fleet owned by Hanco, a major 
Saudi Arabian fleet lessor, was to settle bank loans in order to free existing assets and 
acquire new ones, thus allowing Hanco to reposition itself financially and concentrate 
on what it does best, namely, providing a fleet management service, instead of buying 
autos and leasing them. A "unique" structure was put in place with two SPYs. The 
Jersey SPY acted for the sukuk-holders and funded the purchase of the fleet of cars; 
but it held their money in Jersey bank accounts through a security trust set up there. 
The sukuk-holders had control over the assets in the Saudi SPC through an agent. The 
Saudi SPC, through a funding agreement with the Jersey SPY, purchased the assets 
which were physically located in KSA . 
21
° Cox, Thomas & Kraty. op. cit., 83-84 
211 Norman, T. (2005). "How a Caravan came to the Marketplace". The Banker, pp., 1-2 
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The latter SPC in KSA then entered into a service agreement with Hanco to service 
the fleet. The whole sukuk issue was underwritten by Shamil Bank, which did so 
without rating. 
The sukuk were offered at 6% return with three years to maturity to May 2007. 
The cars were diversified by age, type and usage. The new company was therefore 
able to offer a pool of cars under lease to a customer-base with diverse credit risks and 
assume the operational risks of operating leases of cars. 
The sukuk securitisation was possible because of the acceptability to Shari'ah 
of the unitisation of each car. Thus each sakk or certificate holder owned a pro rata 
share of the fleet and the risks of that ownership and the benefits of the lease that go 
with it. Hanco, meanwhile, continued to earn servicing and maintenance fees for 
managing the fleet and looking after the customers, thus enabling it to expand its 
market share, having shed off the encumbrance of servicing the assets on its balance 
sheet. The investors, on the other hand, would continue to receive a stable return from 
the leasing of their assets. 
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Case Study 7: Sovereign Sukuk-Anhalt-Saxony, Germanyzu 
An example of sukuk al-ijara is the sukuk issue by the German federal state of Anhalt-
Saxony for $100 million. As a result of having their debts guaranteed by the Federal 
Government, they received excellent rating from both Fitch (AAA) and S&P (AA-). 
The sukuk were priced one basis point above the European inter-bank offered rate 
(EURIBOR). Citigroup and KFH were appointed as lead manager and co-lead 
manager respectively. The issue was given the go-ahead by Citigroup's Shari'ah 
Board. 
The assets underlying the transaction were specific buildings owned by the 
Ministry of Finance. The Master Lease was sold to an SPY, which in tum leased it 
back to the Ministry for 5 years. The SPY itself was registered in the Netherlands for 
certain legal and tax considerations. The certificate holders would receive a stream of 
rental payments benchmarked to the EURIBOR over 5 years and these securities are 
listed on the Luxemburg Stock Exchange. 
212 Gassner, M.S. (2005, Feb.). "Reasons tissue Sukuk and the Structures behind them". The Banker, 
pp., 1-2 
177 
Case Study 8: Sukuk bai bithamin Ajil 
On the other side of the divide, in Malaysia, a controversial sukuk issuance by the 
IFC, an arm of the International Monetary Fund, of RM 500 million based on the Bai 
Bithamin Ajil (sc. deferred payment) was taking place. The basic feature of the 
underlying transaction was a sales contract resulting in debt and not a lease. The joint 
lead managers first bought the assets from the issuer for RM 500 million and then sold 
the assets back at a deferred price plus a profit. This of course results in a debt which 
cannot be traded except at face value and such a transaction is considered by a 
majority of Middle East (ME) scholars akin to riba. Consequently, the issue was not 
listed on any stock exchange in the world and there was, therefore, no secondary 
market for trading in this issue. This would make future issues in Malaysia more 
likely to follow the sukuk al-ijara model, as is the custom in the ME, to enable 
secondary market trading in these sukuk and foster wider acceptance for Malaysian 
sukuk; for otherwise, Malaysian issuers would have to deal with higher pricing 
expectations and non-tradable sukuk would carry an increasing premium. 
The Wawasan Ringgit Sukuk by the IFC carried an AAA rating by S&P and 
Aaa by Fitch. The profit rate was fixed at 2.88% for a 3-year maturity. The joint lead 
managers were HSBC of Malaysia and Commerce International Merchant Bankers 
Berhard (CIMB), Malaysia. The Shari'ah certification was done by the CIMB Fiqh 
Council and Dr M. Bakar. 
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Case Study 9: Sukuk in Real Estate Development 
A case in point is the major real estate development in Bahrain, called Durrat AI 
Bahrain. The $120 million issue is a first phase funding for the massive leisure and 
tourist attraction whose cost has been estimated at $1.2 billion. The joint company, 
Durrat AI Khaleej AI Bahrain BSC, is jointly owned by the Government of Bahrain 
and Kuwait Finance House (Bahrain). 
The issue, as commonly seems to be the case with other sukuk issues, was 
oversubscribed by $32.5 million. The sukuk were priced at 125 basis points above 3-
month LIBOR, maturing in 5 years and making periodic payments in lieu of the return 
on a quarterly basis. The arranger and placement agent was the Bahrain-based 
Liquidity Management Centre (LMC). LMC holds an Islamic investment banking 
license which was established in 2002 to manage the secondary market and the short-
term needs of Islamic financial institutions. The issue was underwritten by Dubai 
Islamic Bank, Bahrain Islamic Bank, IDB, Emirates Islamic Bank, Bank of Bahrain 
and Kuwait, General Organisation for Social Insurance Bahrain, National Bank of 
Sharjah and LMC. The Shari'ah certification was undertaken by the Islamic Financial 
Market (MC-Bahrain). The sukuk will be listed on the Bahrain stock exchange so that 
it may be traded in the secondary market over there. Istisna ·, which forms part of the 
portfolio of funding, will not be a tradable security, as, according to Shari'ah law, 
there are no assets yet to back them up; however, they may form part of a tradable 
portfolio if 51% of that portfolio's market is backed by underlying assets. 
The proceeds of the issue will be used by the issuer to finance the reclamation of land 
and the development of the Base infrastructure through multiple project finance 
(istisna ') agreements. As each phase of the work is completed under an istisna' 
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agreement, and the contractor delivers that completed phase to the issuer, the latter 
will give notice to the project company under the Master Ijara Agreement and will 
lease such Base infrastructure on the basis of lease-to-own transaction. 
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Case Study 10: IDB's Floating Rate Sukuk 
Another 'structure' is the lOB's issuance of $500 million floating-rate sukuk under its 
$1 billion medium-term notes (MTN s) programme. The issuance was completed on 
May 23, 2005 and the first drawdown of $500 million took place two days later. The 
issue was rated AAA and was oversubscribed by the closing date of June 15, 2005. 
What distinguishes this sukuk issuance is the geographic diversity of its subscribers. 
In fact, for the first time, the Far East investors outstripped their ME's investors and 
accounted for 35% of the subscription compared to 32% for ME investors and 26% 
for Europeans and the remainder of 7% taken up by the Supranationals. 
The 5-year issue which is registered in Luxemburg and listed on the Local 
Exchange will be used to finance the corporate requirements of the multilateral 
development bank in Malaysia. The issue is priced at 6 months LIBOR plus 12 basis 
points, and matures in June 2010. The coupon payment is semi-annual. This issue has 
also seen the emergence of lead managers from the IDB area: the CIMB from 
Malaysia and Dubai Islamic Bank, Dubai, in addition to two international managers in 
Oeutche Bank and HSBC. 
The sukuk assets are ring-fenced in the portfolio of lOB's assets portfolio to 
separate them from other assets. The portfolio consists of not less than 30% of its 
assets leased to clients ofiDB under ijara contracts for a rental consisting of the 
unamortised portion of the acquisition cost of the leased assets (the principal) and a 
variable or fixed portion (the profit), in addition to the instalment payments under 
murabaha and istisna' contracts into which IDB has entered with some of its clients. 
IDB Trust services Limited will fund the purchase of sukuk assets through the 
sale of trust certificates. As assets under the Trust mature, IDB will sell to the trust, or 
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assist the trust in replacing, maturing assets with new sukuk assets. However, under 
Islamic principles, IDB must retain the risk of default on the sukuk assets sold to the 
trust. In this way, IDB is the liquidity provider to cover the costs and expenses and 
periodic distribution payments to sukuk holders and the unconditional and irrevocable 
guarantor of the sukuk issuance. These undertakings commit the IDB to provide the 
trustee with sufficient funds for all periodic payments and principal, due to the 
investors on time and in full. Accordingly, the Islamic Development Bank's (IDB) 
Medium-Term Notes' {MTNs) programme was assigned the same AAA ratings by 
S&P as the institutional rating assigned to IDB itself. 
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